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RECOGNIZING THE SOCIETAL VALUE IN
INFORMATION PRIVACY
James P. Nehfr
Abstract: Much has been written about database privacy in the Internet Age, most of it
critical of the way in which the American legal system addresses the issue. In this article,
Professor Nehf maintains that one of the fundamental difficulties with the public policy
debates is that information privacy is often discussed as a typical consumer problem rather
than a problem of more general societal concern. As a result, arguments over appropriate
resolutions reduce to a balancing of individual rights against more general societal interests,
such as increased efficiency in law enforcement, government operations or commercial
enterprise. Although privacy scholars discussed the "societal value" of information privacy in
the 1960s and early 1970s, the concept was not fully developed. More recently, political
theorists have revived the idea and argue the importance of recognizing privacy as a societal
norm. Professor Nehf adopts a functional analysis that compares information privacy to other
societal values, such as environmental protection, and concludes that privacy policy could
take a different form if the issue were viewed in this way.

Information about us-countless bits and bytes'--exists in computer
databases that are seemingly everywhere. Government records hold our
salary histories and track our changes of address, and state motor vehicle
departments maintain our driving histories. Much more information is
now held in the private sector. It seems that everyone from the local
grocery store to GOOGLE.com is collecting information about each of
us at every point of contact.
Professor of Law, Cleon H. Foust Fellow, and Director of the European Law Program at Indiana
University School of Law, Indianapolis. The author would like to thank Professor Yves Demeer at
the Universit6 de Lille II for support on European resource materials, Professor Nicolas
Georgakopoulos, law students Melissa Lindley, Anthony Hahn and Liz Parnell, and the faculty at the
School of Law at Mercer University for their comments and research support. Special thanks to
Indiana University, and the Dean Rusk Center and School of Law at the University of Georgia, for
sabbatical support during the research and writing of this article.
I. For most computer users, the terms bit and byte are interchangeable. There is a technical
distinction. A bit is simply a binary representation of 0 or 1. In current use, the word byte is a
collection of eight bits. The word bit in this context appears to have been a creation of John Tukey, a
computer technician who in 1949 was searching for a short term for a "binary digit." Bit (contracted
from binary digit) already carried the definition of a "small part." The need for a term representing a
collection of bits soon became apparent, since a set of bits was necessary to store, process or transfer
any useful character. Although there is some dispute about the origin of "byte," it seems that Wemer
Bucholz coined the term in the 1950s as a six-bit unit during the development of the IBM "stretch
computer." In 1956, the term was used in the development of the IBM System 360 to represent an
eight-bit set, and has carried this meaning to the present. According to the Oxford English
Dictionary, the word "byte" first appeared in the IBM "systems journal" of 1964. LINDA & ROGER
FLAVELL, THE CHRONOLOGY OF WORDS AND PHRASES 246 (1999).
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Americans have only the vaguest idea how much of their lives is
recorded in databases, and how little control they have over the
collection and sharing of that data. People understand that scattered data
exist in government and business computers, but they are only beginning
to understand the power of information technology, the widespread and
fast-growing data aggregation industry, and the harm that can result from
information collection and sharing.2
Although information about us has been recorded, filed, and
manipulated by government authorities and businesses for decades, the
database problem took a leap forward with the proliferation of Internetlinked computers' in virtually every office and home. As new
2. See Jeff Sovern, Opting in, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of
PersonalInformation, 74 WASH. L. REv. 1033, 1057-63 (1999). Public concern about information
privacy has remained consistently high over the last several years. See Am. Soc. Newspaper Editors,
at http://www.epic.org/privacy/survey/ (April 2001) (51% of respondents "very concerned" and 30%
"somewhat concerned" that a company might violate their personal privacy); First Amend. Center
and Am. Soc. Newspaper Editors Freedom of Info. Comm., Freedom of Information in the Digital
Age, at http://www.freedomforum.org/publications/first/foi/foiinthedigitalage.pdf (April 2001) (61%
of respondents were "very concerned" about "personal privacy," 38% were "more concerned" about
personal privacy since they gained access to the Internet); John Schwarz, Government Is Wary of
Tackling Online Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2001, at CI (characterizing privacy as one of the
most challenging issues for policy makers); Forrester Research, Inc., Forrester Technographics
Finds Online Consumers Fearful Of Privacy Violations (Oct. 1999) ("Nearly 90% of online
consumers want the right to control how their personal information is used after it is collected.")
(quoting Christopher M. Kelley, associate analyst in Technographics Data & Analysis), at
http://www.forrester.com/ERiPress/Release/0,1769,177,FF.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2003); Susan
Fox, Trust and Privacy Online: Why Americans Want To Rewrite The Rules, THE INTERNET LIFE
REPORT, at http://www.pewintemet.org/reports/toc.asp?Report=19 (Aug. 20, 2000) (60% of all
Americans are "very concerned about privacy"); Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC),
Public Opinion on Privacy, at http//:www.epic.org/privacy/survey/ (last updated July 16, 2002)
(summarizing a collection of recent survey results).
A 1998 survey showed that 89% of the public was concerned about threats to personal privacy.
ALAN F. WESTIN & DANIELLE MAURICI, E-COMMERCE & PRIVACY: WHAT NET USERS WANT 7
(1998). Another survey conducted in the same year found that 88% of consumers were concerned.
See Executive Summary: 1998 Privacy Concerns & Consumer Choice Survey, at
http://www.privacyexchange.org/iss/surveys/1298execsum.html (December 15, 1998). See also Alan
F. Westin, Whatever Works: The American Public's Attitudes Toward Regulation and SelfRegulation on Consumer Privacy Issues, Conference Report, DATA PROTECTION IN THE GLOBAL
SOCIETY, available at http://www.privacyexchange.org/iss/confro/aicgsberlin.html (November 15,
1996); Simson L. Garfinkel, How Computers Help Target Buyers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July
25, 1990, at 13 (quoting Bonnie Guiton, Special Advisor for Consumer Affairs to President George
Bush: "A major concern of mine is that consumers are uninformed .... In most cases, they don't
even know that [information on them] is being collected.").
3. Although the word "interet" dates from the late 19th Century (in an 1883 volume of NATURE,
an author wrote of "[t]he marvelous maze of internetted motions"), the Internet as we know it began
in 1969 when researchers at UCLA, Stanford, UC-Santa Barbara and Utah linked computers to form
part of the Advanced Research Projects Agency. Until the early 1980s, however, the users of the
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technologies allow businesses and public authorities to collect and
process information with increasing speed and sophistication, we can
expect the data collection and dissemination problem to become more
threatening in the years to come. There is an enormous amount of
information about us in other people's hands, and one thing is certainsome of us will be harmed by it. We just don't know who, when, or how
badly.
Our perception of the database problem is conflicting and ambiguous
because many uses of our information are benign, or even beneficial.
Yet, however, other uses (or misuses), such as identity theft, can have
devastating consequences.4 The problem we currently face is thus not
merely that a vast amount of information is resting in databases, but that
we have very little control over that information-how it is used, shared,
and manipulated--once it is "out there."5 We are at the mercy of those
who hold our data.' We trust them to guard it and use it in ways that will
help and not hurt us.

linked computer network were limited to a small number of scientists using large, mainframe
computers. As smaller, less expensive computers became available to universities, businesses and
individuals, commercial, consumer and academic exploitation of the Internet grew rapidly.
Acceptance of the TCP/IP standard language in 1982 accelerated Internet usage, allowing previously
incompatible systems to communicate with a common set of protocols. FLAVELL, supra note 1,at
255-56.
4. According to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), identity theft represented 42% of all
consumer fraud complaints in 2001, making it the fastest growing category. The FTC Theft Data
Clearinghouse received more than 86,000 identity theft complaints in 2001, more than doubling the
number from the previous year. See Kelly Lucas, Losing Identity, Saving Face, 13 IND. LAWYER,
July 3-16, 2002, at 9. See also the FTC website for identity theft at
http//:www.consumer.gov/idtheft (last updated Jan. 3, 2003). The identity theft problem hit the front
pages in November 2002 when the federal government filed a criminal indictment against several
defendants for allegedly stealing the personal, credit and banking information of approximately
30,000 individuals and selling it in a vast criminal conspiracy, resulting in millions of dollars of
losses. United States v. Cummings, No. 02 MAG 2354 S.D.N.Y. (Nov. 22, 2002).
5. With modem data processing technology, the original reason for collecting the data becomes
irrelevant. Once it has been stored, it can be used or shared in a variety of ways unconnected with
the original purpose. See Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L.
REv. 707, 711 (1987). According to a study of 1,017 Internet users, 86% of respondents were
concerned that personal information about them or their families could end up in the hands of
businesses or people they did not know. See Fox, supranote 2.
6. Disclosure of information can be intentional or accidental, but the potential for injury is the
same in either situation. In July 2000, as part of its bankruptcy plan, online toy retailer Toysmart
attempted to sell information in its customer list despite language in its privacy policy to the
contrary. Greg Sandoval, Toysmart Creditor Targets Disney in Lawsuit, CNET News.Com, at
http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1007-200-2759944.html (Sept. 12, 2000). In April 2000, the DeBeers
website, www.adiamondisforever.com, exposed the names, home addresses and e-mail addresses of
35,000 of its customers. See Stephanie Olsen, DeBeersSecurity Hole Reveals Customer Information,
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Surveys dating from the 1970s show that public support for
information privacy has been consistently strong.7 Americans will not
tolerate abuse or misuse of information technology at the expense of
their personal privacy, and they overwhelmingly support action to do
something about it.' Yet survey results also reveal that a great number of
us understand that our interests in privacy must be balanced against other
interests, i.e., the multitude of benefits resulting from more efficient
government, business, and law enforcement functions when information
in digital form is readily accessible.' Government program administrators
can process claims and detect fraud more easily if employment, personal
history, and salary data are cross-referenced." Medical treatment can be
more effective if physicians have access to our medical histories and
prescription records online.1' Law enforcement can be strengthened if
criminal records, employment, education, and immigration data can be
accessed, matched, sorted, and correlated more easily."1 Direct marketing
CNET News.Com, at http://www.landfield.comisn/mai-archive/2000/Apr/OOO0.htnl (Apr. 4,
2000)). In February 2001, Indiana University accidentally exposed the personal identifying
information of thousands of students to a hacker who gained access to university records. See
Hacker Gets Student Data, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 26, 2001, News Section 3.
7. See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 60-62 (1995) (discussing polling data from
various sources). An October 2000 study at UCLA concluded that almost two-thirds of Internet users
and three-fourths of non-Intemet users fear that going online endangers their privacy. Reuters, Web
Privacy Tops List of Consumer Concerns, CNET News.Com, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005200-3293032.html (Oct. 25, 2000). See also UCLA Center for Communication Policy, The UCLA
Internet Report: Surveying the Digital Future at 45, at http://www.ccp.ucla.edu/pages/internetreport.asp (October 25, 2000) (discussing concern about privacy of personal data was the number
one worry about shopping online).
8. See supranote 2.
9. See REGAN, supra note 7, at 64, 66-67 (discussing responses to survey questions about the
need to weigh privacy interests against countervailing interests of government in having access to
information).
10. See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 710-11 (1986) (concluding that the use of social security
numbers to match database records is the "Federal Government's most cost-effective tool for
verification or investigation in the prevention and detection of fraud, waste and abuse").
11. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, James G. Hodge, Jr., & Mira S. Burghardt, Balancing Communal
Goods and PersonalPrivacy Under a National Health InformationalPrivacy Rule, 46 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 5, 6 (2002) (stating "significant benefits may flow from the electronic health information
infrastructure," including faster and more accurate diagnoses, increased checks on medical
procedures, enhanced public health surveillance, more cost-effective health services, and increased
prevention of adverse drug events). In addition, electronic security tools such as personal access
codes, encryption programs and audit trails can more efficiently monitor health care fraud and abuse,
and protect data from unauthorized uses and disclosures. Id.
12. Indeed, the tendency in the past year has favored the strengthening of law enforcement powers
at the expense of individual privacy. Shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress
enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272

Information Privacy
can be better tailored to individual preferences if our preferences are
better known to the marketing organization. 3
Since there are benefits and risks associated with information
collection and data sharing, policy makers must attempt to strike a
balance. In doing so, they must first define the problem. This is a critical
step in the formulation of public policy because the way in which a
problem is defined on the public agenda will affect its ultimate
resolution.' 4 In the United States, information privacy has historically
been defined as an individual concern rather than a general societal value
or a public interest problem. 5 This has influenced the resulting public
policy solutions, yet it may not be the most effective way to approach
modem privacy concerns.
Most consumer problems (e.g., defective goods, unfair trade practices,
predatory lending, etc.) are viewed primarily as individual concerns. This
means that public policy resolutions are characterized by laws that
impose legal obligations on businesses, but injuries are seen as individual
in nature (though sometimes aggregated for convenience in a class
action). Enforcement largely depends on individuals recognizing an
injury and seeking redress when the legal norms are breached. "Lemon
Laws" or the consumer credit acts are examples of this regulatory
approach. Although there may be important agency oversight (Federal
Trade Commission, state attorneys general, or Federal Reserve Board),
consumers assume a large responsibility for identifying their own
injuries, policing the market by making informed decisions, and
enforcing their rights, usually through litigation, when legal norms are
breached. 6
In contrast, when a problem is viewed as a general societal concern,
and a resolution in the public interest is sought, enforcement of the legal
norm is primarily through government agency oversight and regulation.
Resolutions are characterized by the imposition of general standards,
reporting requirements, periodic audits, government investigations, and
(2001), to aid law enforcement in identifying terrorist activities and other criminal enterprises. Much
of the Act seeks to enhance law enforcement efficiencies by expanding government access to
financial, student, medical, travel and other records for surveillance purposes. Id.
13. See Martin Evans, et al., The Direct Marketing-Direct Consumer Gap: QualitativeInsights, 4
QUALITATIVE MARKET RESEARCH 17 (2001) (finding ambiguous and conflicting responses of
consumers to targeted direct marketing practices).
14. See REGAN, supra note 7, at xiii.
15. See discussion infra at Part II.C.
16. See infra note 342 and accompanying text.
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remedies sought for the general welfare rather than for specific
individuals. 17 Moreover, to manage general societal concerns, our elected
representatives create a regulatory regime in hopes of minimizing our
collective injury before it occurs, not relying as heavily on individual
enforcement and compensation for those who are injured by breach of
the law."8 Environmental policy and food and drug laws are illustrative.
We do not expect, as the primary control mechanism, individuals to seek
redress for injuries resulting from contaminated water or dangerous
pharmaceuticals. Although private remedies are an important supplement
to the regulatory scheme, a foundation of government regulatory
oversight is designed to minimize harm in the first instance. 9
During the 1960s and 1970s, there was some discussion in debates and
commissioned studies about information privacy having a general
societal value as well as being a matter of individual concern.20 Congress
ultimately concluded, however, that privacy policy should begin with a
voluntary, market-oriented approach, with reliance on individual selfpolicing as the dominant means of control.2' Proposals for a federal
"Privacy Board," for example, were rejected.2 2
To this day, information privacy legislation in the United States has
placed heavy reliance on individuals policing their own data records and
protecting their own information from unintended use. For example, the

17. See generally Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public
Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553 (1995). See also infra notes 334-341.
18. See Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives,
and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 549, 556, 560 (1979) (recognizing that government action may be
called for when individual use of available remedies is expensive or impractical as an effective
means of addressing a problem).
19. Cf Alexander D. Eremia, When Self-Regulation, Market Forces, and Private Legal Actions
Fail: Appropriate Government Regulation and Oversight is Necessary to Ensure Minimum
Standards of Quality in Long-Term Health Care, 11 ANNALS HEALTH L. 93, 104 (2002) ("selfregulation, market forces, and private tort actions all serve important roles in the promotion of
quality [long term health care]," yet "long-term care providers have had trouble sustaining quality
standards, absent some level of government intervention").
20. See infra note 143 and accompanying text. Cf. Joseph I. Rosenbaum, Privacy On the Internet:
Whose Information is it Anyway?, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 565, 566 (1998) (noting that our notion of
privacy has been and always will be a moving target, dependent on technological capability, societal
values and cultural norms).
21. See infra notes 144-57 and accompanying text.
22. See UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, PROTECTING
INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN FEDERAL GATHERING, USE, AND DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION, S. REP.

No. 93-1183, at 26 (1974). See generally, infra notes 171-200 and accompanying text.
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Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA)23 imposes limits on the
collection and sharing of credit histories by credit bureaus. Success of the
FCRA depends largely on individuals monitoring compliance by keeping
their credit reports complete and accurate. More recently, the GrammLeach-Bliley Act of 199924 imposes limitations on the sharing of
information in the financial services industry. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act allows affiliated companies to share data among each other and
requires individuals to take affirmative action to prevent data sharing
outside the affiliated group (so-called "opt out" legislation).25
This article argues that, in the modem digital world, information
privacy should be viewed as a societal value justifying a resolution in the
public interest, much like environmental policy and other societal
concerns, with less emphasis on individual self-policing and marketbased mechanisms. In doing so, this article does not invoke abstract
notions of natural rights, fundamental values, or the preservation of
human dignity, as other defenders of privacy protection have argued in
recent years.26 Its point is more functional and pragmatic. If we look at
the way in which information is collected and used in today's society, we
see that the problems presented are not typical consumer issues that we
can expect individuals to police for themselves with the aid of
prohibitory laws. The policy issues have much more in common with
societal problems that we have historically regulated in a fundamentally
different way. Policy makers should recognize this relationship in the
formulation of privacy legislation and create a regulatory environment
that provides meaningful protection of our collective privacy interests.
Part I discusses the reasons why we have difficulty thinking about
information privacy as a public policy issue, and concludes that we are
only beginning to focus on the most troubling aspect of the problem-lack of control over our information once it has been revealed or
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000); see also generally UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, supra note 22.
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6827.
25. Id. § 6802.
26. See, e.g., Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in PersonalInformation:An Economic Defense
of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2393 (1996) (discussing the economic implications of treating
personal information as a property right); Glenn Negley, Philosophical Views on the Value of
Privacy, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 319, 320 (1966) (modem thinkers have proposed and now
reject the idea that privacy is a "natural right"); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 50305 (1977) (noting privacy is a basic value, part of the nation's history and traditions); Edward J.
Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,39 N.Y.U. L. REV.
962, 1000-07 (1964). See also infra at Part IlI.A.
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gathered. Part II examines the origins of privacy law in the United States
that resulted in our treating information privacy as a problem of
individual, rather than societal, concern. The principle control
mechanisms-a combination of self-regulation, individual self-policing,
and market-driven controls-are a natural consequence of this
conception of privacy, and they are unlikely to produce the degree of
privacy protection that most Americans deserve and expect. Part III
makes a case for viewing information privacy as a more general societal
concern justifying a higher level of protection (or at least a different way
of seeking public policy resolutions). This Article concludes that
regulation similar to the European model of privacy protection, in which
the issue is framed as a foundation of social protection, should prevail in
the United States.
I.

CONCEPTUALIZING THE DATABASE PRIVACY PROBLEM

A.

Why Does Data Collection Bother Us?

Public concern about information collection and storage is an ancient
problem. In the 11th century, William the Conqueror compiled a
"Doomsday" survey, which collected information on each of his English
subjects, ostensibly for taxation and other state purposes.27 For centuries
thereafter, government authorities and commercial enterprises have
collected, organized, and shared information about the general
population or certain segments of it. Only recently, however, have new
information technologies amplified the problem to an unprecedented
degree.
Technology usually enables and empowers people to perform tasks
that they could not previously perform, thus producing many benefits to
individuals and society at large. Yet technological developments can also
introduce previously unknown problems. For example, the printing press
allowed information to spread rapidly among the citizenry and
undermined the authority of those who previously controlled its

27. REGAN, supra note 7, at 69. The people of England referred to William's survey as the
Domesday book, a Middle English spelling of doomsday. The root "dom" meant "law or decree"
during this period but it could also mean "judgment, sentence or condemnation." See FLAVELL,
supra note 1, at 30. Historical evidence suggests that William's subjects probably were not
concerned about the Doomsday book infringing on their privacy, since privacy as a societal concern
developed centuries later. See FERNAND BRAUDEL, CAPITALISM AND MATERIAL LIFE, 1400-1800,
224 (1973) (describing the idea of privacy as an "an eighteenth century innovation").
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dissemination. Yet the press could be censored, misinformation could be
spread, and publications could be used to expose damaging facts or
spread rumors about a person to a wider audience than was previously
possible. The telephone opened communication links to the world, but
phone lines could be tapped or recorded, calling records traced, and
personal information revealed. Radio and television have been powerful
instruments for education and information sharing, but also can be used
for manipulation, pacification, and political propaganda.2 8
Today's information technologies present tradeoffs as well. While
some individuals object to the collection and distribution of personal
information for virtually all purposes,29 most recognize and appreciate
the many benefits of data storage and information sharing technologies.
We appreciate the efficiencies brought about by the revolution in
information processing, but we are concerned about how personal
information might be used. We may not care if a grocery store computer
"knows" that a woman buys three bottles of wine and a carton of
cigarettes each week if the store uses the information to send her some
useful discount coupons. However, most of us would object if the store
28. See generally RONALD J. DEIBERT, PARCHMENT, PRINTING,
COMMUNICATIONS IN WORLD ORDER TRANSFORMATION 47-110 (1997).

AND

HYPERMEDIA:

29. See Fox, supranote 2 (stating that 27% of Internet users are "hard-core privacy protectionists"
that would never provide personal information, 10% would be willing to provide it under the right
circumstances, and 54% of Internet users have provided personal information in order to use a Web
site). Alan Westin divided the American public into three groups regarding attitudes towards
privacy:
"Fundamentalists," about twenty-five percent of the American public, who rate privacy as an
extremely high value, are loathe to trade this for promised benefits to them or to society, and
generally favor legislative standards and government regulation.
At the opposite pole are the "privacy unconcerned," about twenty percent of the American
public, who are generally ready to give personal information about themselves in order to get
consumer benefits and support government programs, and are not at all worried about
intrusiveness.
This leaves the "privacy pragmatists," fifty-five percent of the American public and clearly the
"swing group" in setting public norms. The pragmatists are willing to listen to possible benefits
to them or to society from disclosing their personal information and weigh those values against
the important privacy interests involved. If they feel the benefits are meaningful, they next look
for meaningful safeguards-basically, the fair information practices elements-and decide
whether they trust these to be provided by private standards or whether they feel laws are
needed. Whether private standards are accepted generally depends on the trust the public has in
particular industries or government agencies to handle their information in a responsible way.
Alan F. Westin, Whatever Works: The American Public's Attitudes Toward Regulation and SelfRegulation on Consumer Privacy Issues, Conference Report, DATA PROTECTION IN THE GLOBAL
SOCIETY, available at http://www.privacyexchange.org/iss/confro/aicgsberlin.html (November 15,
1996).
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gives or sells that information to a health insurance company for
purposes of evaluating her insurable risk. We may not mind that a dinner
guest can log onto Anywho.com and get a map to our home or office
simply by inputting a last name and home town. Yet we likely would not
feel the same about a stranger who overheard a young girl's name in a
casual conversation at the shopping mall.
Because of these concerns about how personal information is used, the
most often quoted definition of database privacy is "the right to control
information about ourselves."30 The lack of control over information has
long been a concern of privacy advocates. Many have invoked the "Big
Brother" metaphor from George Orwell's novel 1984 to describe the
threat to privacy that databases present.3 Orwell's fictional citizenry
feared the totalitarian government in part because they lost control over
vast amounts of personal information that Big Brother had collected, and

30. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Purposes of Privacy: A Response, 89 GEO. L.J. 2117, 2120
(2001) (discussing privacy in terms of the "ability to exercise control over personal information").
One of the first to discuss information privacy in these terms was Charles Fried, in Privacy,77 YALE
L.J. 475, 482 (1968) (discussing information privacy as "the control we have over information about
ourselves") (emphasis in original). Privacy has been defined in various other ways. See JUDITH
WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 58 (1997)
("whatever is not generally ...a legitimate concern of others"); THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE LAW OF
TORTS 29 (1888) (defining privacy as the "right to be let alone"); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the
Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421,428 (1980) ("limitation of others' access to any individual").
31. The list of writers who have invoked the "Big Brother" metaphor in privacy literature is
endless. See, e.g., REG WHITAKER, THE END OF PRIVACY: How TOTAL SURVEILLANCE IS
BECOMING A REALITY 160 (1999) (chapter titled "Big Brother Outsourced: The Globalized
Panopticon"); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1396 (2001) ("[c]ommentators have adapted the Big
Brother metaphor to describe the threat to privacy"); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2000) (noting that at least since George Orwell's 1984, the image of
the all-seeing eye has been synonymous with the power to exercise repression); Bryan S. Schultz,
ElectronicMoney, Internet Commerce, and the Right to FinancialPrivacy: A Callfor New Federal
Guidelines, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 797 (1999) ("society inches closer to fulfilling George Orwell's
startling vision of a nation where 'Big Brother' monitors the who, what, where, when, and how of
every individual's life"); Katrin Schatz Byford, Privacy in Cyberspace: Constructing a Model of
Privacyfor the Electronic Communications Environment, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1,
50 (1998) ("Life in cyberspace, if left unregulated, thus promises to have distinct Orwellian
overtones-with the notable difference that the primary threat to privacy comes not from
government, but rather from the corporate world."); Alan F. Westin, Privacy in the Workplace: How
Well Does American Law Reflect American Values, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 271, 273 (1996)
(expressing skeptisism that the creation of government data protection boards would be like "calling
on 'Big Brother' to protect citizens from 'Big Brother'). See also McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp.
215, 220 (D.D.C. 1998) ("[i]n these days of 'big brother,' where through technology or otherwise the
privacy of individuals from all walks of life are being ignored or marginalized").
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they feared how it might be used against them. 2 Since Orwell's Big
Brother was a pervasive government surveillance mechanism, writers
have sometimes referred to private sector databases as an amalgamation
of "Little Brothers" or similar 33metaphors that invoke the same
overpowering surveillance concern.
Along the same lines, writers in recent times have reached further
back in literary history to recall Jeremy Bentham's horrific "Panopticon"
vision,34 which describes the ultimate utilitarian prison that consisted of a
central watchtower surrounded by a multi-storied ring of prison cells.
The inner wall of each cell is a clear window, floor to ceiling, facing the
watchtower. Each prisoner is completely exposed through the window
twenty-four hours a day, so a single guard in the watchtower can see
every movement.35 Just knowing that one could be observed, a prisoner
would behave in accordance with the expected norm. 6 A modern variant
of the Panopticon vision is the "nannycam," a surveillance product
marketed to anxious parents who want their child care provider to know
that his or her every move is being monitored and recorded.37

32. See Daniel J. Solove, DigitalDossiers and the Dissipation of FourthAmendment Privacy, 75
S. CAL. L. REv. 1083, 1101-02 (2002) (citing Margaret Raymond, Rejecting Totalitarianism:
Translating the Guarantees of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1193, 1198
(1998) (noting that throughout history, totalitarian governments have instilled fear by creating
elaborate systems for collecting data about people's private lives).
33. See, e.g., Dorothy Glancy, At the Intersection of Visible and Invisible Worlds: United States
Privacy Law and the Internet, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 357, 377 (2000);
Marsha Morrow McLaughlin & Suzanne Vaupel, ConstitutionalRight of Privacy and Investigative
Consumer Reports: Little Brother is Watching You, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 773, 776 (1975).
34. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS (Miran Bozovi ed., 1995). See WHITAKER,

supra note 31, at 32-33 ("The image of the Panopticon permeates all contemporary discussions of
surveillance."); DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 62

(1994); OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL
INFORMATION (1993); Solove, Privacyand Power, supra note 31, at 1415-16.
35. The Panopticon metaphor in modem privacy literature is invoked almost as frequently as Big
Brother. See, e.g., Alexander T. Nguyen, Here's Looking at You, Kid: Has Face-Recognition
Technology Outflanked the Fourth Amendment?, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, n.l 11(2002); Jeffrey H.
Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A PhilosophicalExploration of the Risks to Privacy Posed by
the Highway Technology of the Future, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 27, 28
(1995).
36. See WHITAKER, supra note 31, at 32; Michel Foucault, Surveiller et Punir: Naissance de la
Prison, in DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1979);
Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 31, at 1415 (discussing Foucault's description and observing
that the Panopticon is "so efficient that nobody needs to be in the tower at all").
37. See WHITAKER, supra note 31, at 80-81 (1999).
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One difference between modem "dataveillance" and the pervasive
observation of the Orwellian and Panopticon worlds is that we are
"watched" not through a camera or guard tower, but by a computer
collecting facts and data.38 The effect on human behavior may be similar,
however. Data collection can restrain our free will.39 We experience this
in everyday life. Parents of a teenage child may assume that if they learn
a lot about their child's behavior, living habits, and activities, and the
child knows about the continual observation, the child is more likely to
obey the rules of the house. Workers whose telephone calls are
monitored may make fewer personal calls on the job. The database
problem can thus be viewed as a shifting in the balance of power from
the individual to the entities that collect and control information about
us. 40 Viewed in this way, the problem with databases is similar to the
surveillance of Big Brother or the Panopticon. Databases are a form of
observation that curtails individual freedom and enhances the power
employers, governments, insurance companies, and others have (or hold)
over our lives.
Yet as Daniel Solove observed, Big Brother, Panopticon, and other
surveillance metaphors do not entirely capture the current concern with
database technologies.4 Orwell's Big Brother and Bentham's Panopticon
demanded obedience from their subjects and sought to control important
aspects of their behavior. The goal was conformity and discipline.
Through continual surveillance, the technologies policed individuals to
the point where individualism would be suppressed. By constantly living
under the possibility that one could be observed at any time, people
would do what authorities wanted them to do.
The collection of information in cyberspace can only roughly be
analogized to the Orwellian or Panopticon worlds. As we apply for jobs
or government benefits or surf the Internet information about us is
collected.42 We are being watched in a sense, and we do not know
38. See
Roger
Clarke,
Information
Technology
and Dataveillance 3,
at
http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/CACM88.html (Nov. 1987).
39. See Paul M. Schwartz, supra note 17, at 560.
40. See Rosa Ehrenreich, Privacy and Power, 89 GEO. L. J. 2047, 2053 (2001) ("[W]hat certainly
should bother us [about data collection] and confidentiality has a great deal to do with power. More
specifically, what should bother us are balances of power that are damaging or inequitable.").
41. Solove, supra note 31, at 1422.
42. See Rosenbaum, supra note 20, at 571 ("Individuals cruising on the information highways
often are blind to the electronic footprints they leave. Every post to a bulletin board, every electronic
message, every Web page accessed and item purchased can be monitored and tracked."); see also
infra notes 69-81.
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precisely when or to what extent. But for the most part we are not being
observed by anyone who has any interest in controlling our behavior,
minimizing individualism, or keeping us from uprising against
authoritarian power. With the exception of FBI-type of law enforcement
surveillance, an issue outside the scope of this Article, the people
collecting and sharing information today are usually just looking for
better and more efficient ways to run their businesses or government
departments or to market their goods or services.43 Motives are largely
benign, or at worst greedy.
Solove argues that the database problem is better captured by Franz
Kafka's depiction of prosecutorial bureaucracy in The Trial.44 The
protagonist, Joseph K, is arrested yet never told what crime he is accused
of committing. The novel is an anxiety-ridden nightmare during which
nameless authorities actually do little to Joseph K, although he is
constantly fearful of what they might do. He feels powerless to find
answers or participate meaningfully in the bureaucratic process. Joseph
K becomes obsessed with his predicament. He wants the court to treat
him like an individual and he wants the case to reach finality. However,
he does not know who has information about him, what that information
is, or how it might be used.45
The Trial captures the sense of helplessness and vulnerability we may
experience when large bureaucratic organizations--or a multitude of
smaller, private ones-collect information about us and possess the
power to use it against our interests. 46 Governments, employers, and
businesses continually make decisions based on our data, and we may

43. Joel Reidenberg, Jennifer Barrett, Evan Hendricks, Solveig Singleton, and David Sobel, Panel
H: The Conflict Between Commercial Speech and Legislation Governing the Commercialization of
Private Sector Data, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 59, 67 (2000) (noting that the
collection and storage of personal information about consumers is a means that businesses use to
improve the relationship they have with these very consumers); Lawrence Jenab, Will the Cookie
Crumble?: An Analysis of Internet Privacy Regulatory Schemes Proposed in the 106th Congress, 49
U. KAN. L. REv. 641,648 (2000) (the primary use of personal data is marketing).
44. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1419-23.
45. See FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL: A NEW TRANSLATION BASED ON THE RESTORED TEXT 35-54
(Breon Mitchell trans., 1999).
46. The Kafka metaphor was invoked recently by a public university professor whose e-mails
were read by university administrative officials pursuant to a state "open door" law that considered
e-mail to be a public record. "I felt like a person in a Kafka novel," the professor lamented after
witnessing the perusal of his private messages by school administrators. See Andrea L. Foster, Your
E-Mail Message to a Colleague Could Be Tomorrow's Headline, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER
EDUCATION, available at http://chronicle.com/free/v48/i4l/4la03101.htm (June 21, 2002).
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have no knowledge of the process or an ability to challenge outcomes."7
Like Joseph K, we might not even know if and when important decisions
are being made. We are at the mercy of an unknowable digitized
process-a world where people feel powerless and vulnerable, without
any meaningful form of participation in the collection and use of
information that can cause them harm.
Yet The Trial metaphor also fails to describe the modem database
problem as most of us perceive it because, unlike Joseph K, we
voluntarily participate in the data collection system because we see
benefits from participating. My son cannot get a job unless he fills out an
application form. I do not receive discounts from the grocery store unless
I use the store "convenience" card. My research assistant cannot get
information from a web site without divulging some personal
information. None of us can get money from the ATM without leaving
footprints that reveal where we were and what we were doing at that
point in time. We cannot use a credit card on line to avoid the shopping
mall traffic without transmitting a name and card number. We are not
coerced but seduced to reveal personal information by the pleasures we
derive from living in the modem world and consuming the goods and
services that others offer. A better literary metaphor would be from the
story Hansel and Gretel.4" We are happily eating all the cookies, candy,
and gingerbread, enjoying what we think are the benefits of sharing
personal bytes of data in the information society. As we do so, we may
be fattening ourselves for someone else's feast, unaware of the fate that
may await us.

47. See Froornkin, supra note 31, at 1463 (employers continually seek new ways to monitor
employees for efficiency and honesty; businesses search databases for information about new
customers); Mary W.S. Wong, Electronic Surveillance and Privacy in the United States After
September11 2001: The USA PatriotAct, 2002 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 214, n.142 and accompanying
text (noting that one criticism of the FBI's e-mail reviewing software program, the Carnivore system
(referred to as "DCS 1000" by the FBI), is that the FBI does not disclose details about how the
system works).
48. The Brothers Grimm, Hansel and Gretel (1889), reprinted in THE BLUE FAIRY BOOK
(Andrew Lang ed., 1965). Along the same lines, see Pamela Paul, What Are Americans Afraid O.
Mixed Signals; When It Comes to Issues of Privacy, Consumers Are Fraught With Contradictions,
AM. DEMOGRAPHICS 46 (July 2001) (using "big bad wolf' as a metaphor for information privacy
invasion). See generally, FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY INTHE INFORMATION AGE 30-31 (1997) (noting
that this tradeoff is not limited to Internet use: "Instant credit, better targeted mass mailings, lower
insurance rates, faster service when ordering merchandise by telephone, special recognition for
frequent travelers, and countless other benefits come only at the expense of some degree of
privacy.").
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There is another difference with database surveillance. Since
marketers and other users of databases generally are interested in
aggregating data and selling products or services, they do not usually
care much about snooping into the private lives of particular individuals.
We are being watched not by other humans, but by machines, which
gather information, compute profiles, and generate lists for postal
delivery, e-mailing, or phone solicitations. This impersonality makes the
surveillance seem less personally invasive than the leering of a "Peeping
Tom," an FBI wiretap, or Aunt Edna looking at your credit card bill
when she stops by for a visit. A large portion of our personal information
involves facts that are hardly embarrassing at all: our financial
information, race, marital status, hobbies, occupation, and the like.
Indeed, most information collected about us in cyberspace concerns
relatively innocuous and boring facts and details. Even so, there is a real
and justified concern about how even this seemingly innocent
information might be used in ways we would not prefer. We hope that
our data will be accurate, complete, relevant, and current in every
database in which it resides. We want the data used only for the right
purposes (those to which we consent or would consent if asked), and
which are permitted by law. We want it used by the right people (those
who need to use the data for permissible purposes), and by no others. If
any of these conditions is missing, we feel that important rights and
interests have been jeopardized." Privacy literature is sprinkled with
horror stories about inaccurate, incomplete, irrelevant, or derogatory
information in files, and unauthorized access to files containing
information that can be dangerous in the wrong person's hands." The
49. See PAUL SIEGHART, PRIVACY AND COMPUTERS 76 (1976)

(referring to this as the

"instrumental" value in privacy protection); COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY 33-35
(1992).
50. See. e.g., William McGeveran, ProgrammedPrivacy Promises:P3P and Web Privacy Law,
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1812, n.24 (2001) (citing McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1998)
(refrencing homosexual sailor who discussed his sexual orientation in a seemingly anonymous
online profile, only to have it revealed to his military superiors, who commenced discharge
proceedings)). For additional illustrations, see Margot Williams & Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Online
Searches Fill in Many Holes, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1998, at At9, reporting on free web service that
found consumer's address, phone number, names, and addresses of 20 neighbors, and provided map
and directions to consumer's home; another service provided for $9.50 consumer's previous
addresses and for $12.00 consumer's Social Security number and birthday; another service provided
driving record for $15.50. In a 1999 article, Jeff Sovern warned about the types of lists that are for
sale, including: lists of people who have bought skimpy swimwear; college students sorted by major,
class year, and tuition payment; millionaires and their neighbors; people who have lost loved ones;
men who have bought fashion underwear; women who have bought wigs; callers to a 900-number
national dating service; rocket scientists; children who have subscribed to magazines or have sent in
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reason data collection bothers us is not complicated: we live in fear that
we may be the next storyline.
B.

Evolution of the Database

Our fears are heightened by a vague awareness of the absolute
enormity of information residing in databases. Federal agencies alone
control hundreds of databases on immigration, bankruptcy, Social
Security histories, military personnel, and countless other subjects of
legitimate government activity." The federal government has a database
containing the Social Security numbers, addresses, and wages of nearly
everyone who obtains a job in the United States. 2 State governments
keep digitized records on prescription drug purchases, automobile
ownership, car insurance, births, criminal records, marital status, real
estate holdings, liens and easements, voter registration, worker
compensation claims, and many other aspects of our lives that are
recorded, stored, and sorted.53 Licensing offices keep records on a variety
of occupations from bail bondsmen to beauticians. 4 Federal and state
governments are encouraged to seek new, more efficient ways of
integrating and aggregating these databases to serve their public
mandates, but we can never be sure who has access to all of that
information, and whether adequate security procedures are in place to
guard it from theft, sale, or unauthorized use.
rebate forms included with toys; people who have had their urine tested; medical malpractice
plaintiffs; workers' compensation claimants; people who have been arrested; impotent middle-aged
men; epileptics; people with bladder-control problems; buyers of hair removal products or tooth
whiteners; people with bleeding gums; high-risk gamblers; people who have been rejected for bank
cards; and tenants who have sued landlords. Sovern, supra note 2, at 1034.
51. See THE PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, THE PRIVACY RIGHTS HANDBOOK: HOW TO
TAKE CONTROL OF YOUR PERSONAL INFORMATION 116 (1997).
52. See Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Uncle Sam Has All Your Numbers: Huge Netfor DeadbeatDads
Catches Privacy Criticism, WASH. POST, June 27, 1999, at Al.
53. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records. Privacy and the Constitution, 86
MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2002).
54. States are also creating an increasing number of DNA databases. See Amy Argetsinger &
Craig Whitlock, Maryland Seeks the DNA of Violent Criminals: Critics Cite Threat to Privacy
Rights, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1999, at BI. States had intended to use DNA to track sexual
offenders, but some are expanding their databases to include genetic information on other felons. Id.
The Department of Defense established a DNA database to identify remains of soldiers. CHARLES J.
SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY 128 (1999). Iceland made headlines by selling the genetic information
of the general population to a biotech company. John Schwartz, For Sale in Iceland: A Nation 's
Genetic Code: Deal with Research Firm Highlights Conflicting Views of Progress, Privacy and
Ethics, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1999, at Al. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1403.
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Although the build up of government databases has been
extraordinary, the most revolutionary developments have occurred in the
direct marketing industry and the private sector trade in personal
information. This is where the "information superhighway"55 merges into
the Autobahn,56 and where the speed is limited only by the power of the
data processing machines driving it. As computers, software and data
manipulation methodologies grow more powerful and sophisticated, data
collection in the private sector will be an increasingly dangerous threat to
information privacy interests.
Direct marketing to individuals was an inefficient and comparatively
costly business practice for most of the twentieth century. 7 One of the
reasons for its slow development was the low response rate compared to
the cost of compiling contact lists, printing and mailing solicitation
letters, and hiring workers to make individual contacts by phone." To
increase positive response rates, marketers realized that they needed to
target their customers more accurately. Firms began compiling research
on consumer preferences in various geographic areas and devising ways
to analyze, sort, and use the collected data more effectively.59
Improvements in direct marketing were aided by the federal
government. When the postal service began using the five-digit zip code
in the 1960s, direct marketers began grouping consumers by zip code to

55. Most sources credit former Vice-President Albert Gore for coining the term "information
superhighway" in a 1994 speech. See ComputerHope.com Online Dictionary, at
http://www.xmission.com/-comphope/jargon/i/infosupe.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2003) (defining
"information superhighway" as a term coined by Vice President Gore when giving a speech January
11, 1994).
56. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Identity, Privacy, and the New Information Scalpers:
Recalibratingthe Rules of the Road in the Age of the Infobahn: A Response to Fred H. Cate, 33 IND.
L. REv. 233, 251 (1999).
57. See ARTHUR M. HUGHES, THE COMPLETE DATABASE MARKETER: SECOND-GENERATION
STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR TAPPING THE POWER OF YOUR CUSTOMER DATABASE 51 (2d ed.
1996).
58. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1405-06; Sovem, supra note 2, at 1046-47; Michael A. Fisher,
The Right to Spam? RegulatingElectronicJunk Mail, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 363, 364 (2000)
(noting that an important cost of marketing activity is the time and inconvenience suffered by
consumers, particularly those who never requested the information); cf David E. Sorkin, Technical
and Legal Approaches to Unsolicited Electronic Mail, 35 U.S.F. L. REv. 325, 337-39 (2001)
(stating e-mail "spammers," unlike senders of traditional non-electronic communications, have little
incentive to compare the expected benefits of the communication against the cost, as the cost of
sending unsolicited bulk e-mail is negligible).
59. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1405.
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determine the best areas to target particular product lines.6 ° Sorting data
by zip codes proved to be a rough but inexpensive way to reach certain
demographic subgroups.6 ' A decade later, the government began selling
census data in electronic form. In an effort to protect the privacy in
individuals identified in the census, the Census Bureau sold the
information in bundles of several hundred households, providing
addresses but not names.62 Businesses reattached many of the names,
however, by matching census addresses to addresses in telephone
directories and other databases such as voter registration lists. As a result
of these and other developments, by the early 1990s consumers on
average were included in nearly one hundred mailing lists, and the
number was growing at a rapid pace. 3
Cyberspace technologies and the widespread use of the Internet
profoundly affected the data collection business by the late 1990s.
Government agencies placed individual records on their websites,
although this practice is now receding due to public complaints about the
disclosure. 6 These government-held records used to be maintained in
filing cabinets physically scattered in offices across the country. As a
legal matter, these records were available to the public, but as a practical
matter they were accessible only to local authorities and the occasional
news reporter or ardent researcher. Now many of these records can be
searched by anyone with a personal computer and some basic
instructions on the system's search logic.65 To make searching for
personal information even easier, several Internet websites collect and

60. DICK SHAVER, THE NEXT STEP IN DATABASE MARKETING: CONSUMER GUIDED MARKETING:
PRIVACY FOR YOUR CUSTOMERS, RECORD PROFITS FOR YOU 27 (1996).
61. Solove, supra note 31, at 1405-06; Douglas A. Kysar, Kids & Cul-De-Sacs: Census 2000 and
the Reproduction of Consumer Culture, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 853, 875-77 (2002) (book review).
62. SHAVER, supra note 60, at 29-32.
63. See ANN WELLS BRANSCOMB, WHO OWNS INFORMATION? FROM PRIVACY TO PUBLIC
ACCESS 11 (1994); Solove, supra note 31, at 1408.
64. William
Matthews,
Access
Denied,
FEDERAL
COMPUTER
WEEK,
at
http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2000/0529/cov-access-05-29-OO.asp (May 29, 2000) ("Information
once eagerly posted on government Web sites to promote environmental safety, assist military
personnel or help retirees is now being viewed as dangerous if found by terrorists, hackers and other
criminals.... [A]gencies and Congress are tightening controls over federal Internet sites. Federal
Webmasters who once enthusiastically posted information now anxiously take some of it down.").
65. See Solove, supra note 53, at 1139; Steven C. Carlson & Ernest D. Miller, Comment, Public
Data and Personal Privacy, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 83, 84 (1999)
(warning that federal, state, and local governments are currently pursuing ambitious programs to
upgrade and integrate their information technology systems into unified data networks, making vast
holdings of data far more accessible to government officials and to the general public).
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compile public records from across the country and sell it online from a
single source.66
Currently, most personal information in cyberspace is collected in one
of two ways. An organization may directly solicit and collect information
from individuals who contact the organization and provide information
voluntarily.67 Alternatively, and increasingly more common, the
organization might surreptitiously track and record individual's surfing
activity on the Internet.68
Direct solicitation of information has been with us for years in various
forms. We have all completed job or credit applications or filled in
surveys. Many consumers have completed and returned "warranty
registration" cards to the manufacturer, which volunteer valuable data
that can be used for marketing purposes.69 In the modern age, more
information is directly solicited online as an increasing number of
websites require registration and the disclosure of personal information
before a user can access the site's content. Amazon.com, for example,
uses registration information to help keep track of its customers'
purchases of books, CDs, electronics, toys, and other items.70
66. KnowX.com and Locateme.com, for example, sell information on airplane ownership, court
filings, death certificates, pilot licenses, judgments, liens, professional licenses, foreclosures,
refinancings, driver and voter registrations, and credit "headers" (part of a credit report), at
http://www.knowx.com (last visited Jan. 20, 2003); http://www.locateme.com (last visited Jan. 20,
2003). Focus USA claims to have information on 203 million people and offers demographic lists
such as "Tech-Savvy Hispanics," "Big-Spending Parents," "Proven Patriots," "Rural Riches," and
"Pet Lovers Online." See http://www.focus-usa-l.con/lists-az.html (last visted Jan. 20, 2003). See
generally Solove, supra note 31, at 1409.
67. See Solove, supra note 32, at 1094 (noting that Web sites collect data when people fill out
online questionnaires pertaining to their hobbies, health, and interests).
68. See Joel Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for
Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 201-02 (1992).
69. Warranty registration cards for many products ask a host of lifestyle questions in addition to
product-related queries. Other surveys are more direct. The author received a mailing called the
"Consumer Product Survey of America" asking the "main grocery shopper in your household" to fill
out the form and mail it. The questionnaire asked dozens of questions ranging from the kind of
bladder-leakage products used to the name of the consumer's auto insurance company. It also asked
for name, home address, phone numbers and e-mail addresses. See Letter from Laura David,
Shopper's Voice, Consumer Product Survey of America (undated) (original on file with author).
at
EPIC,
Project,
Profiling
Online
Shen,
70. Andrew
http://www.epic.org/privacy/intemet/Online Profiling_Workshop.PDF (last visited Dec. 17, 2002)
(citing an article from The Economist in which Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon.com, describes Amazon
as an "information broker", acting as the connection between consumers looking for books and
publishers looking for consumers; according to Bezos, Amazon's vast database of customers'
preferences and buying patterns is tied to their e-mail and postal addresses); Alan Murray, Net
Effect: Is Service Getting Too Personal?, WALL ST. J., July 19, 1999, at Al. "[T]he next wave of
Internet innovation is in the area of personalized marketing and services. Companies such as
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Surreptitious collection of information from web users is even more

common. Many websites secretly track a customer's surfing practices
through the use of "cookies" and similar technologies. 7' When a user
explores a site, the user leaves electronic footprints behind. By following
the footprints, the site can record information about the user, such as the
Internet service provider used, and the type of hardware and software the
user employed. The site can also record some behavioral information
about the user's Internet habits, such as the website previously visited,
the amount of time spent on each web page, and the length of time spent
visiting different parts of the site.72
To make this information more useful, the web site might connect the
"clickstream" data to particular Internet users. 73 This can be done by
either requiring users to register or branding them with cookies that will
report identifying information back to the website the next time the user
visits.74 Using either method, the site can compile a profile of individual
Amazon.corn are eagerly assembling and sorting massive amounts of information on customer
preferences. Their aim is to know what book, record or other product you want before you know it,
and then market it directly to you.").
71. A "cookie" is a small file of codes that is dispatched to a user's computer when a web page is
viewed. The site puts an identification mark in the file, and the cookie is stored on the user's hard
drive. When the user visits the site again, the site locates the cookie and matches the file code with
information previously collected about the user's surfing activity. While privacy advocates object to
the use of cookies, the problem with banning them is that they have practical uses other than secretly
collecting information about surfing activity. They can store passwords, for example, which speeds
access to frequently used websites. See generally Viktor Mayer-Schdnberger, The Internet and
Privacy Legislation: Cookies for a Treat?, 1 W. VA. J.L. & TECH. 1.1 (1997) (discussing cookie
technology and its impacts on privacy); Lori Eichelberger, The Cookie Controversy, COOKIE
CENTRAL, at http://www.cookiecentral.com/ccstory/cc2.htm (Apr. 8, 1998).
Indeed, the much maligned cookie can even enhance online privacy. The electronics retailer
Future Shop switched to the use of cookies on its site in November 2000 after learning that
unauthorized people could log on and view other customers' names, addresses, phone numbers, and
possibly credit card numbers. The company claimed that cookie technology would have prevented a
breach of security and an invasion of privacy. See Future Shop Homepage, at
http://www.futureshop.ca (last visited Jan. 20, 2003); T. Hamilton, PriceSnafu Stings Web Retailer,
THE TORONTO STAR Nov. 17, 2000, at C01.
72. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1411.
73. Jerry Berman & Deirdre Mulligan, Privacy in the Digital Age: Work in Progress,23 NOVA L.
REV. 551, 559 (1999) (explaining "clickstream" data are series of detailed transactional information
that improve targeted online advertising; some firms, such as Adfinity, combine clickstream data, or
"mouse-droppings," with personal information collected from other sources to create profiles of a
person's Web browsing behavior).
74. See supra note 71. Internet users usually associate clickstream and cookie technology with
private sector websites, but they have been frequently used in government websites as well. Despite
a ban on federal government use of these information gathering tools, a survey in October 2000
found cookies in use in 11 of 65 government websites, 3 of them passing information to third parties
without the permission of users. See Ronna Abramson, FederalAgencies Caught With Hand in the

Information Privacy
interests, concerns, and general web surfing habits.75 Savvy online
marketing firms can even draw inferences about how we respond to web
page presentations. For example, an online travel service could keep
track of every destination to which a person requested a fare or every city
in which hotel information was sought.7" A medical information site
could track the number of times a user linked to pages providing
information on osteopathic remedies. Clickstream data can thus reveal
lots of useful marketing information about all who use the Internet.
Another form of user-tracking technology is the "web bug," also
known as a web beacon or clear graphic image file (GIF) tag. Web bugs
are image files secretly imbedded in a web page and are invisible to the
person browsing the page.77 The bug sends information about the user's
browsing habits and interaction with the page back to the home server.
Internet advertisers also can capture the search terms a person uses to
find web sites on a subject of interest. The process, known as "banner ad
leakage," allows an advertiser to record search terms as the user submits
them to the search engine." Banner ad leakage allows the advertiser to
collect an enormous amount of potential marketing data and to tailor ads

available
at
THE
STANDARD,
Cookie
Jar,
http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1 151,19600,00.html (Oct. 23, 2000); Associated Press,
available at
Sites
Track
Users,
NYTIMES.com,
Study:
Government
Web
http:www.nytimes.com/aponline/technology/AP-Intemet-Privacy.html (Oct. 21, 2000); John B.
Kennedy & Mathew H. Meade, Privacy Policies and FairInformation Practices:A Look at Current
Issues Regarding Online Consumer Privacy and Business Practices,632A PLI/Pat 321 (June 2001).
Privacy policies of data collectors may openly acknowledge that they collect information via cookie
or clickstream technology. See, e.g., GAP Credit Card, "Our Privacy Commitment," Monogram
Credit Card Bank of Georgia, PRIV-GAP [92391GA] 01/01 (on file with author).
75. See Steven J. Barber & Jennifer Quinn-Barabanov, Statutory and Common Law Theories
Asserted by Plaintiffs in Online Privacy Cases, 5 INTERNET NEWSL. 1 (Aug. 2001).
76. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1412.
77. A web bug is invisible because it is only one pixel square in size and blends into the
background on a web page or HTML e-mail message. The only way to detect a web bug is to locate
the source code for the web page or e-mail message and discover that the web bug image comes
from a different server than everything else. The server sending the bug might belong to an
advertising network that uses it to obtain information, including the Internet Protocol (IP) address of
the computer that accepted the web bug, the URL of the page on which the web bug appears, the
time the web bug was viewed, the type of browser that accepted the web bug image, and any
previously set cookie data. (The cookie can link the bug and the information it has obtained back to
the online profile associated with that cookie.) Web bugs are common in HTML e-mail and are used
to tell if an e-mail has been read or forwarded to another person. See R. Smith, FAQ: Web Bugs, at
http://www.privacyfoundation.org/resources/webbug.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2003); Robert
O'Harrow Jr., Fearing a Plague of 'Web Bugs': Invisible Fact-Gathering Code Raises Privacy
Concerns, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1999, at E01.
78. See Barber & Quinn-Barabanov, supra note 75.
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to the user's specific interests more quickly and accurately than cookie
technology would permit.79
The data aggregation industry also developed technology for sharing
information between websites, thereby making the aggregated data
considerably more useful to merchants, advertisers, direct marketers and
other entities that see value in personal information. The best known
provider of this type of service is probably DoubleClick, a service that
distributes client advertisements to various web sites."0 When a user
clicks on a client's advertisement banner on a web site, a message is
automatically sent back to DoubleClick reporting that the banner had
achieved some success with a particular user. This lets DoubleClick
determine which ads are being seen and which user is seeing them.
DoubleClick can then create a profile of a user and search its list of
subscribing companies for advertisements that match the user's interests.
When the user browses the Internet later, the user will see advertisements
tailored to his or her revealed preferences. Using this process,
DoubleClick compiled eighty million customer profiles by the end of
1999. 1
Even with knowledge of the astounding amount of digital information
that is collected, manipulated, and shared every day, we still have
difficulty discussing precisely what harm is being done. We see the
benefits of the data processing revolution, yet we still have an uneasy
79. See id.
80. See Berman & Mulligan, supra note 73.
81. Heather Green, Privacy Online: The FTC Must Act Now, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 29, 1999, at
48. DoubleClick's notoriety is due in large part to an investigation of the company's practices by the
FTC in 2000. The FTC initiated a "routine" investigation after learning that the company planned to
merge its database with the database of Abacus Direct Corp., a direct marketing company that had
information on most U.S. households. Charles L. Kerr & Oliver Metzger, Online Privacy: New
Developments and Issues in a Changing World, Third Annual Institute on Privacy Law: New
Developments & Issues in a Security-Conscious World, 701 PLIiPAT 303, 330-31 (2002); Robert
W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Benefits and Costs of Online Privacy Legislation, 54 ADMIN. L.
REV. 85, 109 (2002). The FTC was concerned that DoubleClick might be disclosing sensitive
information about consumers in violation of its privacy policy, which would be a violation of the
FTC Act. See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
The FTC closed its investigation in January 2001, finding no evidence of illegal conduct. Robert G.
Bagnall, Privacy: Investment Company Regulation and Compliance, SG100 ALI-ABA 255, 265
(2002). DoubleClick ultimately declared that it would not pursue the plan to merge information, and
agreed to require all new clients and web sites to disclose their use of DoubleClick's services.
Anthony Rollo, The New Litigation Thing: Consumer Privacy, 1301 PLI/CORP 9, 56-59 (2002);
Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 843,
867 (2002). It also agreed to modify its privacy policy to explain its practices more clearly and to
provide a better explanation of its opt-out procedures. See Barber & Quinn-Barabanov, supra note
75.
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sense of foreboding. What exactly are we afraid of? This question is not
easy to answer because we are not entirely sure how much of the
collected data can be traced to us as individuals and used in a harmful
way. Online firms, for example, maintain that the bits of information
gleaned from cookies, web bugs, and the like cannot be associated with
specific persons. At most, they can be used to identify computers at
particular locations. That is hardly comforting news, however, because it
will not be long before information about a computer location will be
matched with individual owners or users of the computer.82 This
uncertainty about how personal information might be used in the future
is cause for concern, 83 especially because once data is collected and
stored, the shelf life is indefinite.
C.

Conceptualizingthe Harm

There are several ways to conceptualize the types of injury that can
result from data collection and sharing.84 One of the most discussed
harms is the mischaracterization of an individual.8 5 Other people,
82. Individual identification is already feasible to some extent. See Junkbusters, How Web
Servers' Cookies Threaten Your Privacy: You Can be Tracked From Your Mouse Clicks, at
http://internet.junkbuster.com/cookies.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2003). ("All they may need is your
email address because various databases let them look up your name and address from it .... Any
web site that knows your identity and has cookie for you could set up procedures to exchange their
data with the companies that buy advertising space from them, synchronizing the cookies they both
have on your computer. This possibility means that once your identity becomes known to a single
company listed in your cookies file, any of the others might know who you are every time you visit
their sites.") (emphasis omitted).
83. Studies have shown that the percentage of Internet users who balk at giving any personal
information to web sites at 17 to 27%. Over 50% of Internet users are willing to provide information
under the right circumstances. A third group would provide information to web sites under almost
any circumstance. See John MacDonnell, Exporting Trust: Does E-Commerce Need a Canadian
Privacy Seal of Approval?, 39 ALBERTA L. REV. 346, 352 (2001) (citing L.F. Cranor, J. Reagle &
M.S. Ackerman, Beyond Concern: UnderstandingNet Users' Attitudes About Online Privacy, at
http://www.research.att.com/resources/trs/TRs/99/99.4/99.4.3/report.htm (Apr. 14, 1999)).
84. David Flaherty identified thirteen different privacy interests that deserve protection: the right
(1) to individual autonomy, (2) to be "left alone," (3) to a "private life," (4) to control information
about oneself, (5) to limit access to oneself, (6) to exclusive control of one's "private realms," (7) to
minimize intrusiveness, (8) to expect confidentiality, (9) to enjoy solitude, (10) to enjoy intimacy,
(11) to enjoy anonymity, (12) to enjoy reserve, and (13) to ensure secrecy. DAVID H. FLAHERTY,
PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES 7-8 (1989).
85. See Jeffrey Rosen, supra note 30 (discussing the concepts of privacy-dignity, autonomy,
"creation of knowledge," and mischaracterization problem).
The most influential book discussing information policy in the late 1960s was ALAN WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967), which examined the meaning of privacy in an historical,
sociological and legal context. Westin maintained that privacy was a basic need of all human beings
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businesses, or governmental institutions examine information that we
generally regard as private, and they use that information to make
judgments about us. Since the information used to form the judgment is
not the complete set of relevant facts about us, we can be harmed (or
helped) by the stereotyping or mischaracterization. 6 Jeffrey Rosen
observed in his influential work, The Unwanted Gaze, that "[p]rivacy
protects us from being misdefined and judged out of context in a world
of short attention spans, a world in which information can easily be
confused with knowledge." 87 Our data records cannot tell the whole story
about us, yet we are frequently judged on the basis of small bits of
information in important aspects of our lives.
We are aware of the mischaracterization problem in many areas of
life. For example, in the legal education community, we sometimes
measure the importance of law review articles by looking at the number
and type of citations made to them in judicial opinions.88 Each spring,
law school deans, faculties, and alumni lament (or quietly cheer) the
release of a national "ranking" of law schools by U.S. News and World
Report, which uses selected facts and figures to divide schools into four
"tiers" of descending prestige. 9 College athletic teams are ranked by a
computerized data system that relies on a handful of variables, including
margin of victory and the relative strength of each team's opponents.9"

and was important even to primitive societies. Westin also observed that privacy was in jeopardy
even then by developments in information technology.
86. Kenneth Karst warned in the 1960s that one problem with a large database of personal
information is that the facts in the database "will become the only significant facts about the subject
of the inquiry." Kenneth L. Karst, "The Files": Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility
of Stored PersonalData, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 342, 361 (1966). See Solove, supranote 31, at
1424.
87. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 8
(2000). The book was the subject of a symposium in 89 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL (2001).
88. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1424.
89. See Best Graduate Schools, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, available at
http://www.usnews.con/usnews/edu/grad/rankings/law/lawindex.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2003). Cf
Stephen P. Klein, and Laura Hamilton, The Validity of the U.S. News and World Report Ranking of
ABA Law Schools, at http://www.aals.org/validity.html (Feb. 18, 1998) (noting many problems with
the U.S. News survey methodology); cf Mitchell Berger, Why the US. News and World Report Law
School Rankings Are Both Useful and Important, 51 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 487 (2001) (justifying the
rankings as useful for students, lawyers and law schools).
90. See http://collegerpi.com (last visited Jan. 20, 2003). Cf Dan Wetzel, National Notes: RPI
Flawed,
Inaccurate
and
Unfair,
CBS
SPORTSLINE,
at
http://ww3.sportsline.com/b/page/pressbox/0,1328,3553019,00.html (Feb. 22, 2001) (criticizing the
RPI for giving an advantage to well-funded athletic programs that are willing to pay opponents to
play in their arena).
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The reasons for stereotyping are easy to appreciate. The objective is to
place people, groups, or other subjects in specific categories that can give
us some measure of confidence that judgments based on the
categorization will be well founded. For example, only if a consumer's
credit score rises above a certain threshold will she be considered a good
credit risk and then receive a "pre-approved" credit card. The card issuer
has confidence that individuals in the higher scoring groups will be more
likely to pay their bills on time.91 While stereotyping has been with us for
ages, computer databases encourage the practice by making it much
easier to collect vast amounts of data quickly and sort it in countless
ways. The resulting judgments might be proved correct in the aggregate
(for example, the overall default rate on credit accounts may decrease),
but they can be unfair in individual cases. A bankruptcy filing or
criminal arrest record can be misleading without knowing the story
behind it or the ultimate disposition of the case, but the record's
appearance on a credit report will adversely affect a credit decision
regardless of the background details.
If mischaracterization were the main problem with information
collection and storage, however, it is by no means clear that the
appropriate public policy response would be to restrict data flows. A
logical solution would be to encourage the collection of more, not less,
information about each of us. We could reduce the likelihood of
misjudgments if our data files were more complete, so we should
encourage greater aggregation of data and more extensive sharing of
information among data processors. The FCRA essentially embraces this
approach. If a consumer believes that her credit report contains
inaccurate or incomplete information, she can supply the missing facts
and have them added to the report in hopes of providing a more accurate
picture.9 2
91. See generally The Credit Scoring Site, at http://www.creditscoring.com (last visited Jan. 20,
2003); Daniel Mendel-Black & Evelyn Richards, Peeringinto Private Lives: Computer Lists Now
Profile Consumers by Their PersonalHabits, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1991, at H01 ("Details ... are
sorted, digested and compiled so that computers can plop you into neatly defined categories to help
determine the likelihood that you'll pay your Visa bill on time or buy a new brand of detergent or
cigarettes within the next few months."); David Rameden, When the Database Is Wrong ... Do
Consumers Have Any Effective Remedies Against Credit Reporting Agencies and Information
Providers?, 100 COM. L.J. 390, n.10 (1995) (citing Consumer Problems With Credit Reporting
Bureaus: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Consumers of the Comm. on Commerce, Science
& Technology, 102 Cong., 2d Sess. 2 at 47 (1992) (testimony of Mary Santina, retail
representative)); What Price Privacy?, 56 CONSUMER REP. 356, 357 (1991) (credit scoring
example).
92. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(i)(b) (2000).
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Other categories of injury from data collection and sharing have been
described in anthropological or sociological terms. Loss of privacy can
be seen as an affront to human dignity,93 a loss of personal autonomy, 94
and other terms that reference the value of one's "core self."95 These
concepts focus on the objectification of an individual resulting from
pervasive surveillance and seemingly unlimited access to personal
information in modem society. Protecting privacy, and contracting those
aspects of our lives that are open to searching and monitoring, is an
important way of showing that individuals are worthy of respect.96 The
promotion of this ideal is central to the modem view of a liberal society.
It bolsters John Stuart Mill's vision that "over himself, over his own
body and mind, the individual is sovereign."97
For most of us, though, the more troubling problem is not a
mischaracterization of our complex persona or a reduction of our
humanity to a set of electronic bits and bytes. The more cognizable and
immediate problem with a loss of information privacy, and the problem
that is most likely to produce a political resolution, is our inability to
avoid circumstances in which others control information that can affect
us in material ways-whether we get a job, become licensed to practice
in a profession, obtain a critical loan, or fall victim to identity theft. 98 We
cannot avoid the collection and circulation of information that can
profoundly affect our lives. We feel that we have little or no voice or
choice in the data collection and sharing process. We do not know who
has what information, how they got it, what purposes or motives those
93. See generally Robert Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2088, 2092-98
(2001) (discussing Jeffrey Rosen's book, THE UNWANTED GAZE, see supra note 87). Post views
privacy as connected to three distinct concepts: dignity, autonomy and the creation of knowledge.
94. See Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood,in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS
OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 300 (Shoeman ed., 1982).
95. WESTIN, supra note 85, at 32.
96. See Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in PHILOSOPHICAL
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 223 (Shoeman ed., 1982); Rosen, supra note 30, at
2121.
97. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM 135 (Mary Wamock ed., 1962).
98. In the area of privacy and technology, part of the explanation of why privacy did not draw
more congressional advocates in the 1960s and early 1970s is that it is difficult to agree on a
definition of the problems presented. See WESTIN, supra note 85, at 7 ("Few values so fundamental
to society as privacy have been left so undefined in social theory or have been the subject of such
vague and confused writing by social scientists."); Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4
PHILOS. & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 295, 295 (1975) ("[Tlhe most striking thing about the right to privacy is
that nobody seems to have any very clear idea what it is."); REGAN, supranote 7, at 3. The definition
of privacy in the U.S. that has formed the basis of most of the policy discussion is the right to control
information about and access to oneself. Id. at 4.
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entities have, or what will be done with that information in the future.99
Even if the information in a database is accurate and complete in all
relevant respects, it can still harm us if it falls into the wrong hands or if
it is used for a purpose we did not envision when we disclosed it.' °
What compounds our discomfort is the likelihood that as
technological developments improve, we can expect to lose more control
over the collection and sharing of information about us. Advances in
genomics are fueling the creation of DNA databases.' °' The trend in

99. In 1969, Alexander Solzhenitsyn described the relationship between an individual and an
authority that controls information about him:
As every man goes through life he fills in a number of forms for the record, each containing a
number of questions. A man's answer to one question on one form becomes a little thread,
permanently connecting him to the local center of personnel records administration. There are
thus hundreds of little threads radiating from every man, millions of threads in all .... Each
man, permanently aware of his own invisible threads, naturally develops a respect for the people
who manipulate the threads ... and for these people's authority.
ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN, CANCER WARD 192 (1969).
100. See Robert S. Peck, The Right to Be Left Alone, 15 HUM. RTS. 26, 28 (1987) ("information
collected for one purpose may be shared with other agencies and used for entirely different
purposes ... [and] assembled into a complete personality profile at the touch of a computer button").
101. Many companies have begun commercializing genomic information for therapeutic and
other purposes. As early as 1995, over 50 biotechnology companies were developing or providing
tests to diagnose genetic disorders or to predict the risk of their future occurrence through
identification of "susceptibility-conferring genotypes." See Neil Holtzman, Are Genetic Tests
Adequately Regulated?, SCIENCE 286, 409 (October 15, 1999).
The web site for Celera Genomics, Inc. describes its function as that of a "leading provider of
information based on the human genome and related biological and medical information." See
http://www.celera.com (last visited Jan. 20, 2003); Scott Hensley, Celera 's Genome Anchors it Atop
Biotech, WALL ST. J., Feb.12, 2001, at A3 ("Three-year-old Celera, it now is clear, has produced a
[genome] map that drug and biotech companies, hungry for gene information that will help them
find new treatments, are plunking down millions of dollars a year for the right to sift through.").
Other recent literature documents the worldwide scope of these activities. For example, an August
2000 article notes proposals for the creation of "phenotype" databases (databases containing
information about the physical characteristics of patents for whom genetic information is known) in
the United Kingdom, Italy, and Estonia; and a recent $200 million agreement between Reykjavikbased decode Genetics and Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. based on a database based on the medical
records of Iceland's 275,000 citizens. See Daniel Machalaba, Burlington Northern Ceases its Genetic
Testing, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2001, at B10; Antonio Regalado, Medical Records, Inc., TECHNOLOGY
REVIEW (July/August, 2000); Editorial, Gene Library,BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 17, 2000.
Several states have taken action to guard genetic information more zealously than other medical
records. See, e.g., Cal. CtV. CODE § 56.17 (West 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-45 (West 2002). Cf
GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-6 (2002) (research facilities may use the information derived from genetic
testing for scientific purposes so long as the identity of any individual tested is not disclosed to any
third party, except that the individual's identity may be disclosed to the individual's physician with
the consent of the individual).

Washington Law Review

Vol. 78:1, 2003

business is to use technology to create "human-centered computing"1 °2
and new technologies designed to benefit consumers by making their
lives more efficient and their work more productive. Yet while the
potential efficiencies of new technologies are trumpeted, the societal cost
of these technologies is hardly noticed. Examples include: biometric
signatures that can make air travel, banking, and other activities more
secure and efficient as they enhance customer convenience; °3 "smart
cards" that can be carried like a digital passport, which are useful
because a stolen credit card is much less valuable when the person
attempting to use it could be immediately identified as an imposter; °
palm or retinal scanners that businesses could install to verify every
customer's identity; and even "smart buildings" that can follow the
whereabouts of all employees and visitors, all day long, and record the
data for future use. °
Video analysis and scanning systems can pick out a face in the crowd
that matches a digital imprint of an escaped convict, a father behind on
child support, a terrorist, or a missing person."° Every time a person
moves in front of a surveillance camera, a database could record the
location of the person and at precisely what time she walked by.0 7
102. See Dick Brown, Chief Executive Officer, EDS Corporation, COMDEX 2001 Keynote
Address, available at http://www.eds.com/thought/thoughtspeechesbrown 111301 .html (Nov. 13,
2001).
103. See Lisa Jane McGuire, Banking on Biometrics: Your Bank's New High-Tech Method of
Identification May Mean Giving Up Your Privacy, 33 AKRON L. REV. 441, 447-49 (2001)
(investigating privacy implications of using biometrics in the banking industry); U.S. Senate Special
Committee on Aging, "Identity Theft: The Nation's Fastest Growing Crime Wave Hits Seniors,"
107th Cong., 2d sess, at 147-57 (2002) (statement of Marc Rotenberg, Executive Director,
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)) (advocating government regulation of biometric
signatures before vast stores of data are built and privacy interests compromised further).
104. See Steven A. Bercu, Smart Card Technologies, Novel Privacy Concerns and the Legal
Response, 7 J. PROPRIETY RTS. 2, 3 (1995); Thomas B. Keams, Note, Technology and the Right to
Privacy: The Convergence of Surveillance and Information Privacy Concerns, 7 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 975, 992-93 (1999); Steven A. Bercu, Toward Universal Surveillance in an Information Age
Economy: Can We Handle Treasury's New Police Technology?, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 383, 398-99
(1994).
105. See Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Past,Present, and Future, THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
PRIVACY LAW: NEW DEVELOPMENTS & ISSUES IN ASECURITY-CONSCIOUS WORLD, 701 PLI/Pat 63
(2002).
106. See WHITAKER, supra note 31, at 140-42 (discussing new surveillance technologies that
"render individuals 'visible' in ways that Bentham could not even conceive"); John D. Woodward,
Biometric Scanning, Law & Policy: Identifying the Concerns-Draftingthe Biometric Blueprint, 59
U. PIr. L. REV. 97, n.203 (1997) (hypothesizing that a state legislature could decide to require all
children attending private day care to be biometrically scanned for identification purposes).
107. See WHITAKER, supra note 31, at 140-42.
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Global Positioning System (GPS) technology' ° can take the concept
further. With a fairly low-cost receiver, a computer can pinpoint a
person's location anywhere on earth within a few feet. Lost automobile
drivers and hikers in remote areas can benefit immensely from this
technology. With some enhancements, a computer chip could be attached
to a small child, an Alzheimer's patient, or a parolee, and the person
could be tracked anywhere he or she goes.0 9
Of course, all of these developments have two sides. One is
convenience, efficiency, and empowerment; the other is continual
surveillance and loss of individual control once information is revealed.
We like the information used for some purposes, but we dread its use for
others. This dynamic is typical of most public policy problems that find a
resolution in our legal system. How do our laws work to preserve the
benefits of information collection and storage, but minimize the risks of
its misuse?
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE IN THE UNITED STATES
A.

Inadequacy of Common Law Torts and the UnitedStates
Constitution

Privacy law in the United States did not begin to develop until the
middle of the twentieth century. 1 As it developed, the legal doctrine
addressed problems fundamentally different from those presented by
digital databases. Courts and legislatures created a number of torts
designed to redress injuries caused by unwelcome interlopers, such as an
overly aggressive press or a political enemy, who invaded what Warren
108. A Global Positioning System (GPS) can transmit information about an object's threedimensional position, velocity and time to anyone equipped with a GPS receiver. GPS can also
provide precise guidance and targeting information for missiles. See Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable
Expectations and the Erosions of Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 843, 882-83 (2002) (explaining
that the Department of Defense developed the GPS in the early 1970s as a satellite-based positioning
and navigation system).
109. See WHITAKER, supra note 31, at 140-42; Froomkin, supranote 31, at 1496-98 (noting that
satellite tracking is being used to monitor convicted criminals on probation, parole, home detention,
and work release, at a daily cost of only about $12.50 per target); Mark G. Young, Note, nhat Big
Eyes and Ears You Have!: A New Regime for Covert GovernmentalSurveillance, 70 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1017, 1035-36 (2001).
110. Although the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a Fourth Amendment right to privacy as early
as 1886 in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), most of the case law development in tort and
constitutional law emerged decades later. See generally Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment
and the "LegitimateExpectation of Privacy,"34 VAND. L. REv. 1289 (1981).
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and Brandeis called "the sacred precincts of private and domestic life."'' .
Depending on the jurisdiction, variously named "privacy torts" ordered
the payment of compensation for the most egregious harms resulting
from disclosure of facts that most would consider purely private matters.
These torts included invasion of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, public
disclosure of private facts, false light or false publicity, and
misappropriation."'
Because these torts developed to address injuries resulting from the
release of private and embarrassing facts,' they were not intended, and
are not well suited, to redress the harms caused by the collection and
sharing of information in databases." 4 Most of the injuries caused by the
misuse of data in modem society are not particularly embarrassing or
emotionally disturbing. Even when they are, because data can be
aggregated, stolen, or transferred with the click of a keystroke, tracing
the injury to the source of the information leak, and then establishing the
requisite mens rea for the tort, will often be impossible. "' A remedy in

111. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195 (1890). Justice Brandeis later referred to privacy as "the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
112. See REGAN, supra note 7, at 32-33; ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY:
COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 189 (1971) ("[M]ost significantly, the existing common
law structure does nothing to give the data subject a right to participate in decisions relating to
personal information about him, a right that is essential if he is to learn whether he has been
victimized by a privacy invasion."); Solove, supranote 31, at 1432.
Defamation is another tort that can be alleged in some cases of unauthorized information sharing.
For example, privacy and defamation torts were being combined in cases where the use of a person's
name without consent was held to be offensive. See Harry Kalven Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were
Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 333 (1966). This comes close to
judicial recognition of Charles Fried's definition of privacy as "that aspect of social order by which
persons control access to information about themselves." Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475,
493 (1968). Still, courts seldom adopted this reasoning. See REGAN, supra note 7, at 34.
113. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383-423 (1960) (isolating four distinct torts
for invasion of privacy interests).
114. Although many writers discount the effectiveness of privacy torts as a mechanism for
redressing misuse of personal information, others believe that tort law has simply been underutilized
in information privacy cases. See, e.g., The Privacy Torts: How US. State Law Quietly Leads the
Way in Privacy Protection, at http://www.privacilla.org/releases/TortsReport.html (July 2002)
(maintaining that greater use of privacy torts would more effectively protect information privacy
than would government regulation); Denise G. Callahan, Courts Make Better Privacy Law, 13 IND.
LAWYER, Aug. 14-27, 2002, at I (noting that litigation may be the best way to discover harmful
information practices, citing tobacco litigation as an example of successful litigation strategies).
115. See Solove, supra note 32, at 1085 (noting that harms resulting from the misuse of personal
data often do not result from malicious intent or the desire for domination); Catherine Therese

Information Privacy
tort, assuming precedent would support one, will often be unobtainable
as a practical matter.
More recently, other torts have been alleged in litigation over the
collection and misuse of information in databases. Although some show
promise for database protection, to date they have proved unsuccessful.
Fraud (or deceit), and unjust enrichment, for example, have been asserted
in situations where information was collected surreptitiously or used in
ways contrary to the data collector's privacy policy." 6 Fraud is difficult
to prove because of the requirement that the tortfeasor act with intent to
defraud or at least with reckless disregard for the truth. 117 In the fast
moving and often depersonalized world of digital data transfers, this can
be difficult to establish.
The equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment has more promise as a
vehicle for redressing the harms caused by unlawful data collection and
sharing. Unjust enrichment requires a showing of economic benefit to
one party at the expense of the other, plus a finding that the enrichment
was somehow unfairly or unjustly obtained." 8 In the context of digital
Clarke, From CrimiNet to Cyber-Perp: Toward an Inclusive Approach to Policing the Evolving
Mens Rea on the Internet, 75 OR. L. REV. 191,205 (1996).
116. Seth R. Lesser, Privacy Law in the Internet Era: New Development and Directions, 632A
PLI/Pat 187, 218, June 2001 (unjust enrichment is a potential claim against an Internet defendant's
surreptitious collection of information and/or online profiling). See Healey v. DoubleClick,
No. OCIV.00641 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (complaint alleged violations of the federal Electronic
Communications Privacy Act and other federal statutes, deceptive advertising under New York law,
and common law unjust enrichment and invasion of privacy for DoubleClick's alleged practice of
surreptitiously using cookies to create profiles of Internet users); Judnick v. DoubleClick, No. CV421
(Marin
Cty.
Sup.
Ct.,
2000)
(copy
available
at
http:/legal.web.aol.com/decisions/dlpriv/doubleclick.pdf). See generally Steven A. Heteher, The
Emergence of Website Privacy Norms, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 97 (2001).
117. See e.g., Cao v. Nguyen, 607 N.W.2d 528, 532 (Neb. 2000) (stating that to maintain an
action for fraudulent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that a representation was made;
(2) that the representation was false; (3) that when made, the representation was known to be false or
made recklessly without knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion; (4) that it was made with
the intention that the plaintiff should rely upon it; (5) that the plaintiff reasonably did so rely; and (6)
that the plaintiff suffered damage as a result); Suiter v. Mitchell Motor Coach Sales, Inc., 151 F.3d
1275, 1282 (10th Cir. 1998) (concluding that "intent to defraud" may be inferred if it is shown that
the defendant lacked such knowledge only because he displayed reckless disregard for the truth or
because he closed his eyes to the truth). See generally 37 Am. JuR. 2D, Fraudand Deceit § 107
(2002) (explaining that proof of a mere naked falsehood or representation is ordinarily not enough,
but in addition to the false representation, the false statement must have been made intentionally to
deceive).
118. See Lesser, supra note 116. A cause of action for unjust enrichment lies where someone has
conferred a benefit and it would be inequitable or unjust for the recipient to retain that benefit.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §§ 1, 2 (2000); United Coastal
Indus., Inc. v. Clearheart Const. Co., 802 A.2d 901, 905 (Conn. App. Ct., Aug. 13, 2002)
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databases, this doctrine has potential for success when, for instance, a
web site violates its privacy policy by selling information to a marketing
firm, or storing information that the site said it would not store." 9
Aggrieved web site users would have to show that the site obtained an
economic benefit from the information obtained, and that the collection
or transfer of information was otherwise inequitable and unjust. 2 '
Proving both elements is difficult in many circumstances, which may
explain why unjust enrichment is generally considered a relatively
ineffective doctrine in this and other contexts.
As a public policy matter a more important problem with common law
principles is that they do not protect the individual prior to injury. When
our privacy is threatened by public or private sector data collection and
sharing, lawsuits only offer a means of redress after the invasion; they do
not provide a sufficient deterrent that will prevent the invasion from
occurring.' Since most of us are not going to pursue damage remedies
for privacy invasion except in the most extreme circumstances, these
doctrines cannot do much to redress the dangers of information
collection and exchange that most Americans fear.
Federal constitutional protections have proved equally unhelpful for
most database privacy problems, at least at the federal level. 2 2 Like tort

("[riecovery is proper if the defendant was benefited, the defendant did not pay for the benefit and
the failure of payment operated to the detriment of the plaintiff"); State Dep't of Human Servs. ex
rel. Palmer v. Unisys Corp., 637 N.W.2d 142, 154-55 (Iowa 2001) ("[rjecovery based on unjust
enrichment can be distilled into three basic elements of recovery. They are: (1)defendant was
enriched by the receipt of a benefit; (2) the enrichment was at the expense of the plaintiff; and (3) it
is unjust to allow the defendant to retain the benefit under the circumstances").
119. Lesser, supra note 116; Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?,52 STAN. L.
REV. 1125, 1134 (2000) (arguing that "a property rights approach [will] ...halt the unjust
enrichment that compilers of personal information now enjoy"); Natalie L. Regoli, A Tortfor Prying
Eyes, 2001 J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 267, 287 (2001) (envisioning an Internet profiling tort that would
provide restitution as a baseline recovery, and arguing that the unjust enrichment that was obtained
at the user's expense should be measured by the aggregate enrichment gained from all users'
information).
120. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION, supra note 118.
121. See Guy J. Sternal, Comment, Information Privacy and Public Records, 8 PAC. L.J. 25, 27
(1977).
122. See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY OF
UNITED STATES DATA PROTECTION 33-35 (1996) (discussing the limited availability of
constitutional law in protecting privacy interests in the private sector). Indeed, to the extent the U.S.
Constitution is invoked in privacy litigation or public policy debate, it is often to invoke the First
Amendment in support of those who support less onerous restrictions on access to information and
fewer impediments to exchange of information once they obtain it. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People
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law, to the extent there is a constitutional remedy, it arrives only after the
injury has occurred. Moreover, the U.S. Constitution protects only
against unlawful government action, and many of the more powerful and
23
potentially injurious databases are maintained in the private sector.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized constitutionally protected
privacy interests in various contexts, deriving the right from the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments. 2 4 However, most of the
Court's decisions have only marginal relevance to the problem of
databases. 5 The Fourth Amendment comes closest to encompassing a
right of information privacy against government misuse of data, but thus
far it has not been construed broadly enough to protect against most
harms that result from the data collection, use, and distribution.1 26 The
Supreme Court has assumed that privacy is about protecting highly
personal information.Y7 Thus, we have no constitutionally protected
expectation of privacy when we permit our information to be accessed by
a third party (such as an online search engine) or when we voluntarily
give the information to someone else (such as filling out a job
from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1049 (2000); Fred H. Cate, The Changing Face of
Privacy Protection in the European Union and the United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 173 (1999).
A right of privacy appears in some state constitutions that could be construed more broadly than
the federal constitution, which does not recognize the right expressly. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art.
1, § 22; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; HAW. CONST. art.
1, § 7; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 5; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6. Of course, to the extent there is a conflict with
the First Amendment, free speech rights would override any privacy protection in state constitutions
or case law. See John H. Garvey, Freedom of Choice in ConstitutionalLaw, 94 HARv. L. REV.
1756, 1770-71 (1981); Shelley Ross Saxer, Shclley v. Kraemer's Fiftieth Anniversary: "A Time for
Keeping; A Timefor Throwing Away? ", 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 101 (1998).
123. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The OssificationofAmerican Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527,
1580 (2002); William J. Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities " Seriously: A Call to Expand the
Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. L. REV. 153, 211, 211 n.361 (2002). According to the Supreme
Court, "[t]he overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity
against unwarranted intrusion by the State." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
124. See REGAN, supra note 7, at 35.
125. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, has recognized privacy interests such as associational
privacy, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958), political privacy, Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178, 198-99 (1957), and the right to anonymity in public expression, Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (distribution of handbills in public place). See also Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973) (the privilege against self-incrimination "respects a private inner sanctum
of individual feeling and thought").
126. See, e.g., Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 231 (1986) (no violation of
Fourth Amendment when EPA engaged in warrantless aerial photography of manufacturing facility);
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash
bags left at curb for pick-up because bags are "readily accessible to ... scavengers, snoops, and
other members of the public").
127. See infra note 132.
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application). The Court has held, for example, that there is no
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers we dial because we have
released the information to the phone company.' There is no privacy
right in the information contained in personal checks because they are
not "confidential communications"
once they are sent through the check
12 9
process.
collection
However, courts have upheld a constitutional right to information
privacy in a narrow set of circumstances. In 1977, the Supreme Court
recognized a right to information privacy, noting a constitutionally
protected "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters.""'3 Most of the decisions in this line involve a breach of
confidentiality, or the risk of unwanted publication of very private facts.
In particular, courts have occasionally found a constitutionally protected
right to information privacy when the records involve highly personal
issues such as sexual practices or medical conditions. 3' Thus, while
medical records might be protected from disclosure, 3 2 arrest and
conviction records are unprotected because they already appear in a
public record.'33 Outside the realm of health and sex information, courts
have not found much protection within the United States Constitution
against information collection and disclosure.

128. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979). See also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 442 (1976) (holding there is no expectation of privacy in a person's financial records held by a
third party).
129. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442. In response to the decision in Miller, Congress enacted the Financial
Privacy Act in 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 et seq. (2000), which provides some privacy protection for a
customer's banking records.
130. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977). Although the Court recognized the privacy right,
it upheld a New York law that required the state to maintain computerized records for certain drugs.
Id.
131. See Solove, supra note 53, at 1204-05.
132. See Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 382 (D.N.J. 1990) (police disclosure
that a person had AIDS); Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874, 875 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (prisoner has
privacy right in medical records). The Supreme Court in Nixon v. Administratorof General Services,
433 U.S. 425, 465 (1977) held that President Nixon had a privacy interest in his communications
with family members, his physician and his minister, but not in communications within the scope of
his official duties. Even with respect to Nixon's personal communications, however, the Court held
that the privacy interest was outweighed by the public interest in obtaining full access to the
documents. Id.
133. See Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding law requiring
community notification of sex offenders did not violate privacy rights because the arrest and
conviction records were "already fully available to the public"); Cline v. Rogers, 87 F.3d 176 (6th
Cir. 1996) (holding that there is no protection for information already in public record).
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Without a radical expansion of tort and constitutional law doctrine,
these areas are not likely to provide effective privacy protection for most
database problems. What people want when they demand privacy with
regard to their personal data is confidence that information about themeven if it is not confidential or embarrassing per se-will be used only
for the purposes they desire. 34 There is a considerable loss of privacy
when someone extracts even ordinary information buried in government
or business records and uses it for purposes other than the purpose for
which it was originally intended.
More importantly, as more and more information about us is
maintained in databases, less and less information will be considered
secret. The limited federal constitutional and common law protections
that currently exist will become even less relevant. If privacy law is only
concerned with protecting against the release of certain highly personal,
non-public, confidential information, it protects very little information at
all. And if we rely on individual enforcement of common law and
constitutional norms through private litigation as the principal policing
mechanism, we have hardly any legal safeguard whatsoever.
B.

The Development of Legislative Solutions-the Public Sector and
the Privacy Act of 1974

Concerns about information privacy as a political and social issue
surfaced in the 1960s. Two factors combined to bring the issue to the
public agenda. One was the rapid development in record-keeping
systems in both government and the private sector. The other was the
computerization of information storage, retrieval, and data processing.
During the period after World War II, government agencies expanded
social welfare programs, consumers and businesses became more credit
dependent, and the insurance industry grew rapidly. As a by-product of
these and other developments, more records containing personal
information were being collected and maintained by an increasing
number of institutions, both public and private. At the same time,
governments, financial institutions, insurance companies, and other
entities that held personal information on large numbers of individuals
began to see the benefits of converting their paper files and forms to
134. "Between data warehousing, profiling, and bankruptcy asset liquidations, American
consumers perceive that they have lost control over their personal information. For e-commerce, this
belief becomes an obstacle to the growth of online transactions." Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce
and TransatlanticPrivacy, 38 HOUSTON L. REv. 717, 722 (2001).
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computer databases. 135 Few legal norms constrained data collection
practices during this era.' 36
The first major catalyst for the privacy debate in Congress occurred in
1965. A report of the Social Science Research Council proposed the
creation of a "Federal Data Center" that would coordinate the storage
and use of government statistical information among several agencies
that, until then, had been operating independently.'3 7 The proposal was
intended to increase the efficiency of government operations by
aggregating data from various government sources and combining it into
a single, more versatile system. However, the proposal raised concerns
that too much information would be held and maintained by one
centralized source, and more generally, about the impersonality of
treating citizens as data entries rather than human beings. 3 ' This led to a
series of hearings that focused on invasion of privacy in the
computerized world. Congress ultimately rejected the national data
center idea, but government agencies continued to computerize
information systems hoping to increase the efficiency of government
operations. 131
Also influential in the development of early privacy legislation was a
1973 report by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW
Report) entitled "Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens.' 40 The
report viewed information privacy as an important and growing societal
135. See REGAN, supra note 7, at 69.
136. Id. at 70.
137. The proposal prompted extensive hearings in both the House and Senate. See UNITED
STATES HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVASION

OF PRIVACY, The Computer and Invasion of Privacy: Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d sess. (1966)
[hereinafter U.S. HOUSE PRIVACY HEARING]; UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES AND PROCEDURE, Invasion of Privacy

(Government Agencies): Hearings,89th Cong., 2d sess., part 5(1966).
138. Rep. Cornelius Gallagher (D-NJ), chair of the House Special Subcommittee on Invasion of
Privacy, expressed this concern about creating a Federal Data Center: "[l]f safeguards are not built
into such a facility, it could lead to the creation of what I call 'The Computerized Man.' The
Computerized Man, as I see him, would be stripped of his individuality and privacy. Through the
standardization ushered in by technological advance, his status in society would be measured by the
computer, and he would lose his personal identity. His life, his talent, and his earning capacity would
be reduced to a tape with very few alternatives available." U.S. HOUSE PRIVACY HEARING, supra
note 137, at 2.
139. REGAN, supra note 7, at 73.
140. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SECRETARY'S
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, Records, Computers, and the

Rights of Citizens (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1973) [hereinafter HEW
REPORT].

Information Privacy
problem, and concluded that the "natural evolution of existing law will
not protect personal privacy from the risks of computerized personal data
systems."' t Its final recommendations included the adoption of a Code
of Fair Information Practices to govern recordkeeping throughout the
federal government. " The report was influential in creating a framework
for subsequent policy formulation in both the public and private sectors
for years to come.
Early legislative initiatives followed the recommendations of the
HEW Report and viewed information privacy as a societal value and
called for a comprehensive regulatory response in the public interest. In
1974, Senators Sam Ervin (D-NC), Charles Percy (R-Ill.), and Edward
Muskie (D-Maine), introduced a bill that was broad in scope, covering
all information storage systems in federal, state, and local government, as
well as the private sector.'43 Its regulatory approach included the creation

141. HEW REPORT, supra note 140, at 37. The report also called for "[t]he development of legal
principles comprehensive enough to accommodate a range of issues arising out of pervasive social
operations, applications of complex technology, and conflicting interests of individuals, recordkeeping organizations and society, will have to be the work of legislative and administrative rulemaking bodies." Id.
142. The proposed Code of Fair Information Practices set out certain fundamental principles of
privacy protection:
There must be no personal record-keeping system whose very existence is secret.
There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him or her is in a
record and how it is used.
There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him or her that was obtained
for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without his or her
consent.
There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of identifiable information
about him or her.
All organizations creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of identifiable personal
data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take precautions to
prevent misuse of data.
HEW REPORT, supra note 140, at 40-41. A similar set of guidelines was developed in England and
Germany at about the same time, and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) issued eight similar principles in 1980. See OECD, Guidelineson the Protectionof Privacy
and Transborder Flows of Personal Data [hereinafter Guidelines], available at
http://www.oecd.org/oecd/pages/home/displaygeneral/0,3380,EN-document-43-1 -no-no-102550,00.html (1980); see also BENNETT, supra note 49, at 98-100. As the OECD was developing its
Guidelines, a similar effort by the Council of Europe resulted in the Convention for the Protection of
Individuals With Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data. The Convention had similar
aims, but one difference is that the Guidelines are not legally binding on OECD member states,
whereas the Convention is binding on all ratifying states. However, only 21 of the Council's 41
member states ratified the Convention. See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of
Individuals With Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, E.T.S. 108, available at
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of a national Privacy Board with authority to police breaches of the
privacy rules and standards established by the law. It also proposed a set
of fair information practices similar to those in the HEW Report, and
granted individuals the rights to see and amend their personal files, and
to be informed about the release or sharing of their information.'
These comprehensive privacy bills did not fare well in the legislative
process. The private sector was eventually removed from the most
seriously considered privacy bills. Influencing this decision was the lack
of evidence that the private sector was misusing large amounts of
personal information at the time.'45 The burden was placed on privacy
advocates to show that a serious problem existed in private sector
databases, and the evidence was unconvincing.'4 6 Although anecdotal
accounts of improper information disclosure were offered, and some
evidence of systematic problems with the integrity of private database
was presented, the evidence was not persuasive enough to justify a heavy
47
handed regulatory approach that included privately held data records.'1
There were practical considerations as well. The private sector was
considered too complex for a centralized regulatory system and it

http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/108.htm> and http://conventions.coe.int/ (Jan. 28,
1981).
143. See Privacy Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T
OPERATIONS AND HOUSE COMM. ON GOv'T OPERATIONS, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History
of the Privacy Act of 1974, S. 3418 (Pub. L. No. 93-579), Source Book on Privacy, at 9-28 (Joint
Comm. Print 1976); Steven W. Becker, Maintaining Secret Government Dossiers on the First
Amendment Actitivies of American Citizens: The Law Enforcement Activity Exception to the Privacy
Act, 50 DEPAUL L. REv. 675, 688 (2000).
144. REGAN, supra note 7, at 77. At the time, several important participants in the debate
considered the establishment of a federal agency to oversee information privacy practices to be an
integral part of an effective plan. Among them was Arthur Miller, who called for the appointment of
an "information ombudsman." See UNITED STATES. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, Federal Data Banks, Computers, and the Bill of
Rights, Testimony of Arthur Miller, 92d Cong., 1st sess., at 19 (1971). Others recommend a
"regulatory commission with full powers over the collection, use and dissemination of personal
information." See Becker, supra note 143, at 713.
145. See Before the Ad Hoc Subcomittee on Privacy and Information Systemes of the Senate
Committee on Government Operations and the Subcomittee on Constutational Rights of The Seante
Committee on the Judiciary,Privacy--The Collection, Use and Computerizationof PersonalData:
Joint Hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 515, 450-51 (statements of the American Life Insurance
Association and Department of Commerce).
146. See REGAN, supranote 7, at 78.
147. Id. See also Patricia Mell, A Hitchhiker's Guide to Data Exchanges Between EU Member
States and the US. Under the European Union Directiveon the Protection of PersonalInformation.
9 PACE INT'L L. REv. 147, 158 (1977).
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involved too many competing interests.' Countless factors would have
to be balanced if a regulatory regime was going to protect information
privacy yet not impose high costs on businesses. Even Alan Westin, a
was not
strong privacy advocate during this period, concluded that this 49
the right time for comprehensive regulation of the private sector. 1
With the private sector effectively removed from the legislation,
support also weakened for the creation of a national Privacy Board, or a
similar independent agency with supervisory authority over information
privacy in the government sector.'50 A new oversight agency would be
costly and, agencies argued, unnecessary because they also regarded
privacy as a high priority and could monitor their own compliance with
legal mandates. A separate entity would only pit one agency against
another, an inefficient course when all agencies shared the same privacy
protection goals.' At this pivotal point in the debates, the focus thus
shifted to privacy as an individual concern, with emphasis on agency
independence and legislative solutions that gave legal rights and
remedies to individuals who would be left to police their rights under the
law. 152
The ultimate legislative result came after more than ten years of
debate,' 53 when Congress enacted the Privacy Act of 1974 (Privacy

148. See REGAN, supra note 7, at 79.
149. See HEW Report, supra note 140, at 43; REGAN, supra note 7, at 78-79. This political
dynamic in the development of privacy law has continued to this day. Industry lobbyists argue that
information practices have not resulted in significant economic loss to individuals and that greater
protection of privacy would cost the rest of society more than any harm done to the individuals
affected. See Reidenberg, supra note 134, at 724; William S. Challis and Ann Cavoukian, The Case
for a U.S. Privacy Commissioner: A CanadianCommissioner's Perspective, 19 JOHN MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER AND INFO. L. 1, 4 (2000); Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rulemaking in
Cyberspace,45 EMORY L. J.911, 922 (1996).
150. REGAN, supra note 7, at 79.
151. Id.
152. Influential in the debates was this statement by President Ford:
I do not favor the establishment of a separate Commission or Board bureaucracy empowered to
define privacy in its own terms and to second guess citizens and agencies. I vastly prefer an
approach which makes Federal agencies fully and publicly accountable for legally mandated
privacy protections and which gives the individual adequate legal remedies to enforce what he
deems to be his own best privacy interests.
123 CONG. REC. 162, H10962 (1974). See REGAN, supranote 7, at 79-80.
153. Debates over privacy policy did not end in 1974. Congressional committees held more than
150 days of hearings dealing with privacy policy between 1965 and 1988, excluding those on the
privacy aspects of the FCRA. During the same period, congressional staff released more than a
dozen reports on the subject. See REGAN, supranote 7, at 7.
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Act). ' 4 In its final form, the law provided the lowest level of protection
that policy makers were considering at the time."5 ' The statute covered
only federal agencies and did not establish a separate entity to oversee
government information processing practices. With regard to digital
databases, the policy resolution was more procedural than substantive.
From the beginning of the debates, database technology had been a
primary concern. A stated objective of the Privacy Act was to restrict the
government's use of technology to invade privacy interests, and the
Privacy Act even included a statement that digital technology "greatly
magnified the harm to individual privacy that can occur from any
collection, maintenance, use or dissemination of personal
information."' 56 The solution to this growing problem, however, was not
to impose substantive limits on the use of technology in collecting and
sharing information, but to create a handful of procedural safeguards to
give individuals a right of access to their files, an opportunity to correct
errors, and a right to demand disclosure about records under certain
circumstances. 15 The only notable substantive limit in the Privacy Act
was the imposition of standards of fair information handling on federal
agencies to reduce the likelihood of mistakes or inadvertent disclosure to
unauthorized sources, and even here the standards were vague and
riddled with loopholes.'5 8
The Privacy Act is generally considered weak and ineffectual by
today's standards.'5 9 Although the privacy interest was properly defined
throughout the years of legislative debates as the right to control
information about oneself, the most seriously debated solutions merely
quibbled over how individuals could effectively guard this right. 160 On
paper, the Privacy Act guaranteed access to one's own records and the
right to correct inaccurate or irrelevant information. But these rights were
not easily exercised because the costs, in time and money, were high
both for the individuals involved and the agencies covered by the law.
154. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000).
155. Regan, supra note 7, at 82.
156. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a), Pub. L. 93-579, § 2(a)(2) (congressional findings and statement of
purpose). See Robert Gellman, Does Privacy Law Work?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW
LEGAL LANDSCAPE 193, 195 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997).
157. REGAN, supranote 7, at 81-82.
158. See Gellman, supra note 156, at 195-96.
159. See id. at 196-98. Gellman deftly illustrates the shortcomings of the Privacy Act as a means
of satisfying the list of six Fair Information Practices developed a year earlier in the HEW Report.
See HEW REPORT, supra note 140.
160. See REGAN, supra note 7, at 100.
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For example, individuals were given the right not to have their
information shared among agencies without their consent, but obtaining
consent from massive numbers of people was impracticable. 6 ' It was
suggested that individuals be notified prior to sharing their information,
but privacy advocates questioned whether this would give individuals a
bona fide choice, and agencies complained that the expense of mass
paper notification would outweigh any efficiencies gained from database
technologies. 6' 2
The Privacy Act had other deficiencies. It had no specific enforcement
or oversight structure for ensuring compliance with the statute's
limitations on information collection. 163 It limited the internal use of
personal information to those agency employees who had a need to know
the information in the performance of their official duties, but this proved
to be a vague standard incapable of systematic enforcement." There was
no requirement that information be used only for purposes related to the
original reason for gathering it. 6 No administrative process provided a
safeguard or review process for internal agency use. Individuals have
occasionally objected to specific uses as unauthorized
by law, but in
166
prevailed.
has
agency
the
cases
most litigated
Perhaps the most glaring failure of the Privacy Act is the manner in
which it addresses the disclosure of information to external sources.
Agencies have been permitted to disclose records for virtually any
purpose if the agency can establish that disclosure is for "routine use," or
it can satisfy the statute's procedural requirements for notice by advance

161. See REGAN, supranote 7, at 86-87.
162. See REGAN, supra note 7, at 96-99. Ultimately "Data Integrity Boards" (the Boards) were
created in the late 1980s as intermediaries between individuals and agencies that wanted to share
information or run matching programs with databases maintained by other agencies. The Boards,
which every federal agency doing computer matching was required to create, had authority to reject
database matching programs before they were implemented. The idea was borrowed from the
Defense Department, which had implemented a similar privacy board to comply with its obligations
under the Privacy Act of 1974. See REGAN, supra note 7, at 95-100. Gellman, supra note 156 at
200.
163. In contrast, the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3507, calls for a specific
administrative approval process before a federal agency collects information covered by the Act. The
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) oversees both the Paperwork Reduction Act and the
Privacy Act, but it devotes far more resources to the Paperwork law. See Gellman, supra note 156, at
197.
164. See Solove, supra note 32, at 1166.
165. See Gellman, supra note 156, at 198-99; See Solove, supra note 32, at 1167.
166. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE AND PRIVACY ACT
OVERVIEW 478-80 (1994); Gellman, supra note 156, at 198.
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publication in the Federal Register.'67 Neither has been an effective limit
on information collection and sharing. 6 Consequently, the Privacy Act
became more of a procedural impediment for federal agencies and a
symbolic, but ineffectual law for citizens, far less protective of
individuals' privacy interests than other alternatives would have
ensured. 6' 9
Congress has not materially revised the Privacy Act since 1974
because efforts to strengthen the law have met strong resistance. Three
years after the Privacy Act was enacted, a report of the Privacy
Protection Study Commission (PPSC) 170 resurrected the idea of creating
a federal Privacy Board that would monitor and implement privacy
legislation and advise on the privacy implications of proposed
legislation.' 7' Advocates of the idea saw the Board serving as an
"influential prodding structure,' 172 which would have supplemented selfpolicing legislation such as the FCRA that calls upon individuals to
monitor their own privacy interests. The recommendations of the PPSC
were never enacted, however, due in part to strong opposition from
government agencies, trade associations, and other organizations that
were enjoying the benefits of more relaxed controls on information
sharing. '71 In addition, although President Carter supported efforts to
protect privacy in principle, establishing a federal Privacy Board
conflicted with his view of
limited federal involvement in this and other
74
time.
the
at
issues
policy
167. Limited oversight by the OMB and Congress also has some controlling effect on the external
sharing of personal information. See HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, WHO
CARES ABOUT PRIVACY? OVERSIGHT OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 BY THE OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET AND BY THE CONGRESS, H.R. No. 98-455, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1983).
168. See Gellman, supra note 156, at 198.
169. See id.
170. The Privacy Protection Study Commission (PPSC) was established by the Privacy Act of
1974 to examine the need for privacy legislation governing the private sector and to review the need
for a general oversight body to ensure compliance with privacy rules by the federal government. See
REGAN, supranote 7, at 81-82.
171. THE REPORT OF THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN
INFORMATION SOCIETY 36 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977) [hereinafter
PPSC REPORT].
172. Id. See REGAN, supra note 7, at 84-85.
173. See REGAN, supranote 7, at 85.
174. See id. at 86. The decision to reject a federal Privacy Board was critical. Public policy
analysts have long recognized that the institutions chosen to pursue a public policy goal will
profoundly affect the ultimate public policy resolution. See J. Brooke Overby, An Institutional
Analysis of Consumer Law, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1219, 1232 (2001) ("Under an institutional
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As it turned out, an important role for a national oversight body
became apparent two years after the PPSC report was issued. In an effort
to reduce welfare fraud, HEW created Project Match, which compared
the digital records of federal employees to the records of individuals who
received benefits under the entitlement program Aid to Families with
Dependent Children. 75 In March 1979, the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) issued guidelines for Project Match and allowed it to
proceed over the objections of a few federal agencies and numerous
privacy advocates.' 76 Critics observed that the Privacy Act prohibited the
use of information for purposes other than those for which it was initially
collected, unless the individual gave affirmative consent to the different
use.'77 The OMB guidelines permitted the matching so long as the
agency complied with certain procedural requirements, including
advance notice in the Federal Register, and established that the matching
178
would have "demonstrable financial benefit" exceeding its costs.
Agencies did not follow the procedural guidelines in many cases,
however, and the public did not respond to the Federal Register notices.
Because there was little congressional opposition to the matching
program, the practice grew over time. The only group with a vested
interest in protesting the program was the class of individuals under
investigation, but they were not aware that their records were being
matched until the results of the matching detected a conflict.'79
framework, the social policy aims of consumer law must be balanced with the question of
institutional and organizational choice-for example, by considering whether a goal is better
accomplished through a particular type of rule and through a particular mechanism, such as markets,
state legislatures, federal legislatures, and so forth.").
175. See Kenneth Langan, Computer Matching Programs:A Threat to Privacy?, 15 COL. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 143, 144-45 (1979); John Shattuck, Computer Matching Is a Serious Threat to
Individual Rights, COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 27, no. 36 (June 1984) at 538; Laura Weiss,
Government Steps Up Use of Computer Matching to Find Fraud in Programs, CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT, Feb. 26, 1983, at 432; Jake Kirchner, Privacy-A History of
ComputerMatching in the FederalGovernment, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 14, 1981, at 1.
176. See REGAN, supra note 7, at 86-87.
177. See id.
178. Privacy Act of 1974: Supplemental Guidancefor Matching Programs, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,138
(Apr. 18, 1979). This cost/benefit analysis was frequently ignored by agencies, and the requirement
was dropped from the guidelines in 1982. REGAN, supra note 7, at 95-96.
179. See REGAN, supra note 7, at 86-87. The cost savings from the matching program were
debatable. See Jeffrey Rothfeder, Is Nothing Private?, BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 4, 1989, at 74
(discussing conclusions of a 1986 study by the General Accounting Office). Matching has been used
to detect fraud and mistakes in other federal benefit programs. See, e.g., Jaffess v. Secretary of
HEW, 393 F. Supp. 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (upholding match of recipients receiving veterans'
disability benefits with recipients of social security benefits as a "proper" administrative purpose).
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For the next several years, privacy did not disappear from the
congressional agenda, but the importance of other governmental
interests-particularly operational efficiency and improved law
enforcement-took on greater importance. Catching "welfare cheats"
through information sharing was more important than limiting
governmental intrusions on privacy interests."1 Nevertheless, the
increased use of computer matching during the late 1970s and early
1980s reawakened privacy advocates and reopened the debate.' The
number of computer matches performed by federal agencies had almost
tripled by 1984,182 the Orwellian year of reckoning that once again
brought Big Brother to the front pages and privacy concerns to the public
policy stage. Also during this period, the capabilities of computerized
databases were expanding rapidly, making it possible for governments
and private organizations to monitor the activities of individuals to an
unprecedented degree. 3
By 1986, increased concern about information privacy prompted the
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to survey the practices of
federal agencies on database sharing and privacy protection.' 84 The
OTA's analysis revealed that new applications of information technology
were undermining the principal goal of the Privacy Act-to give
individuals more control over their personal information. The study
concluded that widespread information collection, sharing, and computer
networking was leading to the creation of a "de facto national database"
containing information about most every person residing in the United
States.' 85 This was the same concern that had ignited the privacy debate
86
more than twenty years earlier.

180. See REGAN, supra note 7, at 92.
181. Seeid.
182. See id. at 94 and n.83.
183. See Gary T. Marx & Nancy Reichman, Routinizing the Discovery of Secrets: Computers and
Informants, 27 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 425, 425 (1984); John Shattuck, In the Shadow of
1984: National Identification Systems, Computer-Matchingand Privacy in the United States, 35
HASTINGS L.J. 991, 991-95 (1984).
184. UNITED STATES CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, Federal Government
Information Technology: Electronic Record Systems and Individual Privacy, OTA-CIT-296
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June, 1986) (survey of 142 agency components
covering various aspects of Privacy Act compliance).
185. See REGAN, supra note 7, at 95.
186. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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In response to the concern about data matching, Congress enacted the
Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act (CMPPA) in 1988."7
The legislation required agency review and cost-benefit analysis before
computer matching could be performed, and it instituted other procedural
requirements in an effort to curb abuses.' But the ultimate effect of the
CMPAA was not to limit, but to legitimize, computer database sharing in
the federal government. Rather than address privacy and surveillance
concerns, the law took the same approach as the Privacy Act by
emphasizing procedural and administrative goals rather than imposing
limits on what kind of data could be collected and how it could be
used.8 9
With respect to privacy protection in the federal government, not
much has changed since the late 1980s. The PPSC report in 1977
observed that "neither law nor technology now gives an individual the
tools he needs to protect his legitimate interests in the records
organizations keep about him."' 9 Twenty-five years later, this statement
rings truer than ever.
C.

ProtectingPrivacyin the PrivateSector

On the subject of information privacy outside of government, 191 the
Privacy Act charged the PPSC with studying the issue and making
recommendations to Congress. 92 As the PPSC considered the relevant
public policy interests in regulating information practices, it took the
position that privacy was both a "societal value" and an "individual
interest."' 93 Because record-keeping relationships were "inherently
187. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000). For a discussion of the legislative history of the CMPAA, see
REGAN, supranote 7, at 95-99.

188. See REGAN, supra note 7, at 96-97.
189. See DAVID A. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES: THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES 357

(1989).
190. PPSC Report, supranote 171, at 8. See Reidenberg, supra note 134, at 722.
191. Although privacy protection laws in the United States usually apply to either the public or
private sector, the line between the two in information sharing is often blurred. The FBI, for
example, routinely purchases information from privately assembled databases in its crime
investigations. See Glenn R. Simpson, Big Brother-in-Law: If the FBI Hopes to Get the Goods on
You, It May Ask Choicepoint, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2001, at Al; Reidenberg, supra note 134, at
721.
192. See PPSC Report, supra note 171, at 621-38 (schedule of hearings from credit, banking,
insurance and other economic sectors); REGAN, supra note 7, at 83.
193. PPSC Report, supra note 171, at 21.
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social" the societal interest could not be ignored. 9 4 The PPSC developed
a list of "significant societal values and interests" against which privacy
should be balanced, including First Amendment concerns, freedom of
information policies, law enforcement priorities, cost implications, and
federal-state governmental relations.' 95 But in deciding how these
interests should be balanced, the PPSC ultimately lost sight of the
"societal value" of maintaining privacy and treated privacy protection as
largely a problem of individual concern.
As the PPSC viewed the policy problem, the goal was to strike the
right balance between an individual's interest in keeping his or her
personal information private and the need for governments and
businesses to gain access to that information for various societal
purposes. 9 6 Consistent with the philosophical literature on privacy that
had been circulating during this period, the PPSC recognized in principle
that privacy has a societal value apart from each individual's own
privacy interests, but the group did not develop that value further.'97 Only
the societal benefits to governments and businesses were taken into
account.
Consistent with the view of privacy as a matter of individual concern,
the PPSC Report ultimately concluded that privacy policy in the private
sector should begin with a voluntary, market-oriented approach."' As is
the case with most market mechanisms, the conclusion was premised on
the principle of individual choice and the idea that individuals could
asses their own risks of harm. If individuals were given the right to assert
their own privacy interests, they would take measures to protect
themselves, and organizations that collect and maintain information
would have incentives to honor privacy concerns voluntarily. Only if
voluntary compliance proved ineffective would mandatory enforcement
mechanisms be imposed. Moreover, existing federal agencies, such as
the FTC and state insurance regulators, were seen as appropriate control
mechanisms to the extent that some government oversight was needed. A

194. Id.
195. Id.

196. Id. at 29 ("A major interest that must be weighed in the balance of organizations' needs for
information against the individual's interest in having his personal property protected is society's
interest in maintaining the integrity of the Federal system.").
197. See REGAN, supra note 7, at 84.
198. PPSC REPORT, supra note 171, at 32.
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federal Privacy Board or similar agency that would act as guardian of the
societal value in privacy protection was deemed unnecessary.'99
This legislative evolution was not surprising given the political and
economic conditions. Protecting information privacy threatened defined
agencies, employers,
and influential stakeholders-government
enforcement-all
of
whom
were just beginning to
marketing firms, law
see the advantages of information technologies. All had an interest in
collecting and sharing as much information as possible. Each of these
stakeholders thus had incentives to redefine the issue from the ideal of
privacy as a foundational societal value to some lesser ideal that required
the balancing of other societal concerns-efficiency, productivity, crime
control, etc.-against the individual harms that might be caused by data
collection and sharing.
The result was a legislative process that quickly involved the
balancing of competing interests, and the focus of debates centered on
whose particular interests would be jeopardized by limiting information
collection and sharing, and whether jeopardizing those interests was
worthwhile. Privacy advocates were again put on the defensive to carry
the burden of showing how a particular data collection or sharing activity
invaded privacy and, even if it did, showing that protecting the privacy
interest was not outweighed by the interests of others in gaining access to
the information in question. 0 This was another burden privacy
advocates could not carry. This political dynamic, which has since been
repeated numerous times, has led to a set of privacy laws that are sectoral
in their scope and largely consist of narrowly applicable privacy
provisions that do not cover the vast array of today's data collection and
sharing activities.2"' Even in the sectors covered by legislative
enactments, there is a heavy reliance on market-based solutions and laws
that require individuals to police their own data protection interests.
1.

The FairCredit ReportingAct and the Rise of Market-Based
Solutions

As it turns out, the emphasis on market solutions to the privacy
problem in the 1970s foreshadowed a general shift in the perception of
199. Id. See REGAN, supra note 7, at 84.
200. See REGAN, supra note 7, at 174-75.
201. See Bradley Slutskey & Allison Brantley, Privacy on the Internet: A Summary of
Government and Legal Responses, 637 PLI/Pat 85 (2001); Reidenberg, supra note 134, at 726. For a
list of federal privacy laws, see Gellman, supranote 156, at 202.
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privacy invasion in the following decades. 212 The anti-regulatory position
was reinforced in 1997 when the Clinton White House released a report
entitled "A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce., 20 3 The first
principle stated in the Framework is that "the private sector should lead"
the development of electronic commerce. 20 4 The section on privacy calls
on private industry to work with consumer groups to develop a selfregulatory environment.20 5
With market-based solutions as the presumed control mechanism,
stakeholders in the formulation of privacy policy, whether proponents of
data collection, consumer groups, or privacy advocates, became partners
with largely similar objectives, differing only over the details. Resulting
regulatory schemes now involve a voluntary component that has the
effect of neutralizing public concern but with few enforceable
restrictions on the use and misuse of data.20 6 Privacy rights have been
treated primarily as commercial policy problems, rather than
fundamental civil rights. Debates are often framed as if privacy were a
consumer issue (e.g., caller identification blocking). Resulting laws do
little to prevent or limit the collection of information in the first instance,
and their success depends on individuals to seek remedies when legal
norms are broken, much as they do with other consumer laws.
This self-policing approach had an early precedent in the FCRA, 20 7 the
first major federal privacy legislation in the United States and arguably
the most detailed to date.20 8 The FCRA limits the uses for which credit
202. See Simon G. Davies, Re-Engineering the Right to Privacy: How Privacy Has Been
Transformedfrom a Right to a Commodity and a Practical Guide to Protecting Your Client, in
TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 143, 144 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg

eds., 1997).
203. W.J. Clinton & A. Gore, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, available at
http://www.nyls.edu/cmc/papers/whgiifra.htm (July 1, 1997).
204. Id.
205. Id. at II, Legal Issues, § 5, par. 17.
206. David Flaherty aptly observed in 1979 that the "public is being lulled into a false sense of
security about the protection of their privacy by their official protectors, who often lack the will and
energy to resist successfully the diverse initiatives of... the 'information athletes' in our respective
societies." See Davies, supra note 202, at 156-57.
207. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681(u) (2000).
208. See Gellman, supra note 156, at 202. Privacy legislation at the state level has been sporadic,
in part because some courts have held that state laws regulating information trafficking can violate
the Commerce Clause. See ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1160-63 (10th Cir. 1999); American
Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). For information on state privacy laws
generally, see ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, COMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS (1997);

Information
Center, Privacy Laws by State,
Electronic Privacy
http://www.epic.org/privacy/consumer/states.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2003).
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reporting companies can release the information in a consumer's file. It
provides that consumers may see their files and correct mistakes, and
relies heavily on consumers to ensure the accuracy of their own
records.2" 9 Yet only in recent times, more than twenty years after the
enactment of the FCRA, have a significant number of consumers learned
how to locate their credit reports and take steps to ensure their accuracy
and completeness." 0 This improvement is due in part to the increased
access to information about credit reports on the Internet."1 ' Even so,
most consumers have no idea how to police their rights under the
FCRA.2 z
Even with its deficiencies, 213 the self-policing scheme of the credit
reporting system is at least feasible for many consumers because most
209. See James P. Nehf, A Legislative Framework for Reducing Fraud in the Credit Repair
Industry, 70 N.C. L. REV. 781, 786-87 (1992).
210. United States Public Interest Research Group, Mistakes Do Happen: Credit Report Errors
Mean
Consumers
Lose
[hereinafter
PIRG],
at
http://www.pirg.org/reports/consumer/mistakes/index.htm (March 1998); (concluding that it is still
difficult for many consumers to obtain their own credit report; participants in a survey had to make
several calls, deal with busy signals, and remain on hold numerous times to obtain their credit
reports). See Information Resources, A Summary of Your Rights Under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, available at http://www.informationresources.com/faircredit.htm (2002) (explaining a
consumer's right to view the contents of a credit report, and the conditions under which the report
must be provided free of charge).
211. R. Ken Pippin, Consumer Privacy on the Internet: It's Surfer Beware, 47 A.F. L. REV. 125,
146 (1999) ("Credit report information is becoming more accessible on the Internet as credit
reporting agencies take advantage of this growing business medium. Although a credit report is only
supposed to be available to authorized customers, over-disclosure and unauthorized disclosure are
certainly possible, if not more likely, on the Internet.").
212. PIRG, supra note 210, at Executive Summary (warning that "until policyrnakers and credit
bureaus do what it takes to allow consumers to have free and easy access to their credit reports and
set tougher standards to prevent and clean-up mistakes, too many credit reports will remain a ticking
time bomb of dangerously inaccurate information," recommending that each national credit bureau
annually and automatically mail a copy of each consumer's report, and urging that increased duties
to ensure accuracy and avoid errors be imposed on banks, department stores and other firms that
furnish information to credit bureaus); Consumers Union, Credit Bureau Nightmares: Victims Speak
Out, available at http://www.consumersunion.org/finance/vict.htm (Sept. 29, 1997) (discussing and
illustrating the difficulty of having mistakes removed from a credit report); Dagen McDowell, How
to Fix Credit Errors: Be Ready to Dog the Process Every Step of the Way, ABCNEwS.COM,
available at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/business/TheStreet/dagen000714.html (July 14, 2002).
213. Among its weaknesses, the FCRA permits credit reporting companies to sell the "credit
header" portion of credit histories (which contains names, addresses, former addresses, telephone
number, Social Security number, employment information, and birthdate) to various commercial
entities. The FCRA does little to equalize the unbalanced power relationship between individuals
and credit reporting companies, and the vast amount of information in credit reports can be obtained
for many commercial purposes. See Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found in Cyberspace: Informational
Privacy in the Age of the Internet, 34 SAN DIEGO. L. REV. 1153, 1206 (1997).
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injuries caused by inaccurate information in a credit report will be made
known to a consumer shortly after the harm occurs. The statute requires a
user of a credit report, such as a creditor, employer, or insurance
company to whom the consumer has applied, to inform the consumer if
adverse action was taken in reliance on information in that report. 214 This
disclosure must identify the source of the credit report and tell the
consumer that she has a right to see her report and correct any
inaccuracies. 2 5 Thus, in the ordinary course of events, a consumer will
learn that a wrong has occurred and will be able to identify the problem
by tracing it to the reporting agency that issued the mistaken credit
history. Outside of the scope of the FCRA, this kind of feedback
information is much less accessible, if at all.
2.

Other PrivacyStatutes that Rely on Individual Self-Policing

Unfortunately, privacy statutes subsequently enacted follow the FCRA
model in this respect and rely largely on individual self-policing as the
primary control mechanism, but they do not create a similar framework
for ensuring that an individual will learn about a problem when it occurs.
In a few instances, these laws have been reasonably successful. For
example, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974
(FERPA),2 16 regulates the disclosure of student records. The statute
imposes controls on the release of student transcripts, disciplinary files,
and other records without the student's (or parent's) consent. 1 7 One of
the principle reasons why the law protects student privacy interests is
that there are few lawful reasons for disclosure. Accordingly, there are
few opportunities for even honest mistakes to be made. In addition,
information in student records is controlled by a well defined, relatively
small set of information keepers, the educational institutions, who have
few incentives to disclose information about their students anyway.
Information in student records has long been considered personal,

214. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (m) (2000). For example, if a consumer applies for a store credit card and is
denied, the store must inform the consumer that a credit report was relied upon in making the
decision, and it must give contact information so the consumer can find out what information is in
the report.
215. Id.
216. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2000). FERPA is also known as the "Buckley Amendment."
217. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(b).
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possibly embarrassing, and sometimes hurtful if disclosed."'
Consequently, schools usually prefer not to disclose student records, and
they have resisted market incentives to do so.219 Indeed, the law gives
schools legal cover to refuse information requests that they would prefer
to decline.
Other privacy laws that rely on individual self-policing have proved
less successful. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
(CCPA)220 prohibits cable operators from disclosing information about
the viewing habits of subscribers. It also requires cable companies to
have privacy policies that inform subscribers about the nature of
information collected and how it will be used. 22' The law contains a
broad exception, however, that permits the disclosure of personal
information for a "legitimate business activity."' Moreover, the recently
enacted USA Patriot Act reduces the privacy protections afforded to
cable Internet users. Before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
the CCPA required cable companies to notify and grant a hearing to
cable subscribers when their confidential information was subject to
disclosure to the government.2 4 The USA Patriot Act took those rights
away from cable broadband subscribers.
In 1986, Congress updated wiretapping and clandestine surveillance
limitations with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(ECPA).225 The ECPA extends the protections of the Federal Wiretap Act
of 1968 to the government's unauthorized interception of modern forms
of communications, including cellular phones, e-mail, and computer
transmissions. 6 The focus of the law, which draws heavily on the Big
Brother metaphor, is on eavesdropping and monitoring communications

218. See, e.g., Porten v. Univ. of San Francisco,64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 832, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839,
843 (1976) (recognizing cause of action for privacy invasion when university released student
transcript to scholarship commission without authorization).
219. Market incentives in some instances might favor nondisclosure. To the extent an educational
institution relies upon good alumni relations to finance its operations, disclosing student information
to outside entities could damage the school's ability to raise funds from its alumni base.
220. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2000).
221. Id. § 551 (a)(l).
222. Id. § 551(c)(2)(A).
223. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 209-212, 224, 115 Stat. 272, 283-85, 295 (2001).
224. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c), amended by USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §211, 1115 Stat. 272,
28384(2001).
225. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-20, 2701-07 (2000).
226. See Anne Meredith Fulton, Cyberspace and the Internet: Who Will Be the PrivacyPolice?, 3
COMM. L. CONSPECTUS 63, 66-67 (1995).
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between one person or computer and another.227 The ECPA does not
otherwise limit the collection and use of personal data, and its usefulness
as a limitation on cookie technology, web bugs, clickstream data
recovery, and other surreptitious Internet data mining is uncertain. 2

Moreover, the law governs only the disclosure of records to government
entities, so in the absence of a state law, service agreement or privacy
policy to the contrary, Internet service providers are free to share the email of their subscribers with non-governmental entities. 229 Even the
limited protection of the ECPA is in some jeopardy in the aftermath of
September 11, 2001 because law enforcement agencies perceive a need
to monitor e-mail and other electronic communications more rigorously
and share information more freely among each other.23°
A related federal statute is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986
(CFAA), 23 also known as the "anti-hacking" statute, prohibits persons
from obtaining access to a computer without authorization. The
applicability of the CFAA was at issue in In Re DoubleClick, Inc.
232 In that case, the federal district court held that the
Privacy Litigation.
CFAA did not bar the use of cookies and other data mining activities
online, and that the statutory minimum of $5,000 in damages under the
CFAA was not satisfied.233 Although litigation on the scope of this statue
continues, the $5,000 minimum damage threshold significantly limits the
227. See Peter Murphy, An Examination of the United States Department of Justice's Attempt to
Conduct Warrantless Monitoring of Computer Networks Through the Consent Exception to the
WiretapAct, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1317, 1321 (2002) (explaining purpose of the ECPA).
228. The ECPA contains two distinct causes of action relevant to data collection. The first
prohibits the unauthorized interception of electronic communications in transit. 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
The second prohibits unauthorized access to stored electronic communications. Id. § 2701. Plaintiffs
have argued both sections in recent litigation. The majority of decisions have held that the ECPA is
not violated by the use of cookies, web bugs and similar data mining tools. See In re Toys R Us, Inc.,
Privacy Litig., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16947, at *28 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001); In re DoubleClick,
Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Chance v. Ave. A, Inc., 165 F. Supp.
2d 1153, 1163 (W.D. Wash. 2001). Cf.In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1278 (C.D.
Cal. 2001) (district court refused to dismiss a claim based on one aspect of the ECPA-unauthorized
access to stored information-although the court agreed with the DoubleClick decision on other
claims).
229. 18 U.S.C. § 2703. See Vanessa Hwang, Cable Modems and Privacy in the New Millennium,
32 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 727, 745 (2001).
230. See supra note 12; Abraham McLaughlin, CIA Expands Its Watchful Eye to the U.S.,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 17, 2001 (describing how USA Patriot Act expands the
authority of law enforcement agencies to share information).
231. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000).
232. 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
233. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 585 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding
CFAA required proof of loss of at least $5,000).
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usefulness of the CFAA. Some courts have held that damages under the
CFAA may be aggregated in a class action, but they can only be
aggregated with respect to a single act of wrongful conduct.234 Other
courts have denied aggregation of claims altogether.235 Moreover, the
CFAA has a mens rea requirement that is difficult to establish.236
Congress enacted the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 (VPPA)237
in response to the disclosure of Robert Bork's video rental information to
reporters during his contested U.S. Supreme Court confirmation hearing
in the Senate.238 The VPPA prohibits video stores from disclosing
information about the titles of video cassettes rented or purchased unless
the customer has given prior written consent.239 The VPPA relies
primarily on customer self-policing for enforcement, and creates a
private cause of action only against stores that knowingly make
prohibited disclosures.240 The statute expressly permits disclosure of the
subject matter of video sales and rentals to marketing firms, and to any
person if the disclosure takes place in the "ordinary course of
business."24 '
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) 42 addresses
information privacy only at the margin. The TCPA permits individuals to
sue a telemarketer for certain automated dialing calls and unauthorized
faxes. 243 The TCPA is concerned primarily with the aggravation of
disruptive phone calls. It does not limit the collection, use, or transfer of
234. In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 220 F. Supp. 2d 4, 15 (D. Mass. 2002); Ingenix, Inc. v.
Lagalante, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5795, at *17 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2002).
235. In Thurmond v. Compaq Computer Corp., 171 F. Supp. 2d 667, 680 (E.D. Tex. 2001), the
court held that the $5,000 aggregated loss must be to no more than one computer. See also In re
DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 523. The Thurmond court stated that damages could not be
aggregated among individual plaintiffs, relying in part on Attorney General Janet Reno's statement
that "we may need to strengthen the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act by closing a
loophole... [which would] escape [from] punishment if no individual computer sustained over
$5,000 worth of damage." 171 F. Supp. 2d at 680-81.
236. See Inre Pharmatrak Inc. Privacy Litig., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15293, at n. 9 3.
237. 18 U.S.C. § 2710-11 (2000).
238. See Elbert Lin, Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1085, n.430 (2002); Francoise Gilbert and Brad Laybourne, Privacy Issues
for the Global Company, 724 PLI/PAT 291, n.4 (2002).
239. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(4) (definition of "video service provider" covered by the law).
240. Id. §§ 2710(b)(1), 2710(c) (the aggrieved person may recover actual damages, statutory
damages in the amount of $2,500, punitive damages and attorney's fees).
241. Id. §§ 2710 (b)(2)(D)(ii), 2710(b)(2)(E).
242. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000).
243. Id. § 227(b) (actual damages or a statutory award of $500; treble damages for willful
violations).
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personal data.244 In the same vein, many states have recently passed "no
call" legislation to supplement the federal law.245 These laws represent
important consumer rights' legislation because by registering on a stateadministered list, an individual can keep her name and phone number off
of most telemarketing calling lists, but they do little to protect the
privacy of information in digital databases.
An important step in the protection of individual records was the
Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA),246 which forces states
to obtain a driver's consent before disclosing personal information.
Although the DPPA is an important development in controlling
government disclosures of "public records" to the private sector, it
applies only to motor vehicle records, and it authorizes the sharing of
information in many circumstances. The legislation exempts law
enforcement authorities, the automotive industry, government agencies,
the insurance industry, debt collectors, businesses that want to verify
certain identifying information, researchers, private investigators, and
several other categories of inquirers.24 7
In 1996, Congress addressed the critically important issue of health
information privacy in the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA). 24' HIPAA did not contain detailed
substantive restrictions on information sharing in the health sector, but it
required the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to
promulgate regulations dealing with the privacy of medical records. HHS
published its regulations under HIPAA in December 2000.249 The privacy

244. See Solove, supra note 31, at 1442.
245. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 24-4.7-1 (2002). The law exempts several categories of callers,
including a call made "primarily in connection with an existing debt or contract for which payment
or performance has not been completed." This would include calls from creditors with whom the
consumer already carries outstanding balances. Since many telemarketing calls are solicitations from
current creditors of the consumer (e.g., the creditor trying to sell credit insurance), this is a
significant exception. It also exempts calls made by a charitable organization, a licensed real estate
broker, a licensed insurance agent, and a newspaper of general circulation. Id. § 24-4.7-1 (a).
246. 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2000).
247. Id. § 2721(b). See REGAN, supranote 7, at 103.
248. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2000)).
249. 45 C.F.R. § 164.500 (2002). For an account of the legislative history of the HIPAA statute,
see REGAN, supra note 7, at 105-07. As stated in the Federal Register, "The use of these standards
will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public and private health programs and health care
services by providing enhanced protections for individually identifiable health information. These
protections will begin to address growing public concerns that advances in electronic technology and
evolution in the health care industry are resulting, or may result, in a substantial erosion of the
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rules, which take effect in April 2003, will govern the use and
dissemination of health information and will apply to health plans, health
care clearinghouses, and certain health care providers. 2 ' HIPAA
requires that a covered institution obtain consent or authorization prior to
using or disclosing protected health information to carry out treatment,
payment, or health care operations, and contains many other
" ' Even without
requirements to safeguard patient medical information.25
written consent or authorization, there are provisions within HLPAA
which permit dissemination of patient information when identifying
information has been removed. 2 Both civil and criminal penalties are
provided for non-compliance with the mandates of the privacy
regulations.253
privacy surrounding individually identifiable health information maintained by health care providers,
health plans and their administrative contractors." 65 Fed. Reg. 82461 (Dec. 28, 2000).
250. 45 C.F.R. § 164.104.
251. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.506(a), 164.508(a)(1) (2001), and Subpart E of the regulation generally.
Beyond HIPAA's requirement for consent or authorization, and the necessary review of medical
records for identifying information, the HHS rules require additional steps to safeguard patient
medical information, including: the right to adequate notice to patients of the uses and disclosures of
protected health information that may be made by the covered entity, and of the individual's rights
and the covered entity's legal duties with respect to protected health information, Id. §164.520; the
need to ensure that patients may receive an accounting of disclosures of protected health information
made by a covered entity in the six years prior to the date on which the accounting is requested, with
certain exceptions, Id. § 64.528; the need to maintain documentation (including policy and procedure
documents, communications, and other specified documents) for a period of six years, Id. §164.530;
and the need to provide training to all members of a covered entity's workforce on policies and
procedures with respect to protected health information required by HIPAA. Id. § 164.530(b).
252. Regulations concerning these "de-identification" procedures specify numerous identification
elements, including (a) names; (b) all geographic subdivisions smaller than a State, including street
address, city, county, precinct, and zip code; (c) all elements of dates (except year) for dates directly
related to an individual, including birth date, admission date, discharge date, date of death; and all
ages over 89; (d) telephone numbers; (e) fax numbers; (f) electronic mail addresses; (g) social
security numbers; (h) medical record numbers; (i) health plan beneficiary numbers; (j)account
vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including
numbers; (k) certificate or license numbers; (1)
license plate numbers; (m) device identifiers and serial numbers; (n) web Universal Resource
Locators (URLs); (o)Internet Protocol (IP) address numbers; (p) biometric identifiers, including
finger and voice prints; (q) full face photographic images and any comparable images; and (r) any
other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code. See id. §164.514(b)(2)(i)-(ii).
253. Affected entities may be subject to civil monetary penalties of up to $25,000 per person, per
year, per standard. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (2002). In addition, federal criminal penalties may be
imposed for the knowing, improper disclosure of information or the obtaining of information under
false pretenses, with higher penalties prescribed for offenses involving actions designed to generate
monetary gain. Criminal penalties are up to $50,000 and one year in prison for obtaining or
disclosing protected health information; up to $100,000 and up to five years in prison for obtaining
protected health information under "false pretenses"; and up to $250,000 and ten years in prison for
obtaining or disclosing protected health information with the intent to sell, transfer, or use it for
commercial advantage, personal gain, or malicious harm. Id. § 1320d-6.
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The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA)2 54
was the first federal law to specifically address Internet privacy concerns.
The Act, which was prompted by an FTC study that found widespread
abuses of privacy interests on web sites directed at children,2 55 seeks to
limit the collection of personal information about children under age
thirteen. If a website or web page is aimed at an audience predominantly
comprised of children, it must post a privacy policy and obtain parental
consent for the collection, use, or disclosure of personal information." 6
COPPA applies only to sites that are "directed to children" or sites where
the operator has "actual knowledge" that it is collecting information from
children under thirteen.2 57 Moreover, it is primarily a disclosure law that
imposes a strict privacy policy on Internet sites within its reach, and it
relies primarily on individual enforcement for its success. It also contains
a number of important exceptions.258
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999259 presented Congress with an
opportunity to enact meaningful privacy legislation in the financial
services industry, but the law serves primarily as an enabling statute that
imposes few limits on the collection and sharing of information. The
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act expressly authorizes banks, insurers,
investment companies, and other financial services organizations that are
"affiliated" with each other, through common ownership or otherwise, to
254. 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2000). See generally Laurel Jamtgaard, Big Bird Meets Big Brother, 16
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 385 (2000).

255. In its 1998 report to Congress, the FTC concluded that self-regulation was not working to
protect the privacy of children online. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT

TO CONGRESS, at http://www.flc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf (June 1998). In a review of 212
American commercial web sites aimed primarily at children aged 15 and under, the FTC found that
186 of them (88%) collected personal identifying information and 188 (89%) collected personal
information. Only 109 of the 188 contained a notice of even one of the commonly accepted fair
information principles, and no site practiced the full range of those principles. Id. at 20, 31, 36.
256. The law requires "verifiable parental consent" before information is collected from children
12 and younger that would allow them to be contacted online or off-line. "Verifiable parental
consent" is defined as:
[Any reasonable effort (taking into consideration available technology), including a request for
authorization for future collection, use, and disclosure described in the notice, to ensure that a
parent of a child receives notice of the operator's personal information collection, use, and
disclosure practices, and authorizes the collection, use, and disclosure, as applicable, of personal
information and the subsequent use of that information before that information is collected from
that child.
15 U.S.C. § 6501(9).
257. Id. § 6502(a).
258. Id. §§ 6502(b)(2)(A)-(E).
259. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C.

§§

6801-09 (2000)).
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share "nonpublic personal information. 2 60 Although affiliates have to
tell customers that they are sharing this information, individuals cannot
block the sharing of this "nonpublic" information collected by the
affiliated institutions. Because the financial services industry is
dominated by large conglomerates of affiliated entities, sharing of
information is routine.26'
Under Gramm-Leach-Bliley, customers can opt-out of the disclosure
of certain "non-experience" data among affiliates and certain data that
the conglomerate wishes to share with non-affiliated third parties. 26 2' To
do so, however, individuals must read through the often lengthy privacy
policies mailed by the financial institution and learn now to exercise their
opt-out rights. 263 Bank customers who have tried to navigate through the
numerous "opt out" forms mailed in recent months know that this is not
as simple as it sounds.2 ' Financial institutions have no incentive to make
opting out easier.

260. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a) (prohibiting disclosure to nonaffiliated third parties). See also 12 C.F.R.
§ 216.4(a) (2000), 12 C.F.R. § 216.7(a) (2001).
261. See generally Gregory T. Nojeim, FinancialPrivacy, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 81 (2000)
(explaining inadequacies of Gramm-Leach-Bhley Act).
262. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b) (creating obligation to give consumers the opportunity to opt out, and
providing exceptions to the general opt out rule).
263. Acting Comptroller of the Currency Julie Williams commented, "Most bank customers can't
ever recall seeing something like this ....
[I]t
has been known to happen that the affiliate-sharing
'opt out' disclosure is buried in the middle or near the end of a multi-page account agreement. For
existing accounts, some institutions have gotten into the habit of reducing the required 'opt out'
disclosures to the fine print along with a long list of other required disclosures. Few consumers are
likely to have the fortitude to wade through this mass of legal verbiage, and fewer still will take the
time to write the required 'opt out' letter. I have even heard of people getting two separate
notifications covering different types of information, requiring two separate letters to opt out."
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Treasury Dep't, Remarks by Julie L. Williams,
Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Before the Banking Roundtable Lawyers Council, at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/98%2D50a.txt (May 8, 1998); see Sovem, supra note 2, at
1087, 1088; David J. Klein, Keeping Business out of the Bedroom: Protecting PersonalPrivacy
Interestsfrom the Retail World, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 391, 398 (1997) ("List
creators generally place [opt-out provisions] in the fine print with other boilerplate terms of the
contracts; thus the clause is not readily apparent to most consumers.").
264. In the financial services industry, opting out usually requires the account holder to read
through the privacy policy of the financial institution and call a toll-free number. In the privacy
policy of Bank One and First USA, the opt-out information appears on the third and fourth pages.
The policy warns the customer, "Choosing to opt out of this information sharing may limit
opportunities for you to receive product and service information that may interest you." It also states
that if only one customer on a joint account opts out, the bank can continue to share information
about the other joint account holders. See "Important Privacy Notice," M51388 STI40485, Letter
from Carter Warren, Chief Marketing Officer, Bank One, to James P. Nehf (on file with author).
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Note the holes in this patchwork of sector-specific privacy laws. For
adults, there is virtually no regulation of the collection and disclosure of
information on the Internet. Many Internet sites have voluntarily
published privacy policies, but even those policies can offer little privacy
protection, and if a privacy policy is breached the individual has little
recourse under current law. It is difficult to show economic injury from
the breach, and while violation may be an unfair or deceptive practice
under the Federal Trade Comission Act (FTCA),265 in most
circumstances the FTCA will only obtain injunctive remedies. In
addition, no federal law and few state laws make it illegal for an
employer to gather and compile personal information about employees,
even if the information is unrelated to the job they do. Employers can
monitor our family lives, check on organizations in which we belong, ask
about our medical histories, listen to our phone calls, read e-mail, listen
to voicemail, monitor our computer screens, install software that tracks
and counts our keystrokes, require urine tests for drugs, and check our
credit reports.266 Other classes of unprotected records include those
maintained by online and offline merchants, records held by bookstores,
department stores, restaurants and clubs, and personal information
profiles assembled by database companies.267
D.

The Failureof Self-Policing andMarket-Based Solutions

One of the problems with privacy laws and regulations is that they are
usually written by policy makers who lack thorough knowledge about the
operation of computers and information systems. Even when lawmakers
have the requisite technical background, they must try to anticipate
largely unknown technological developments. Resulting laws and
regulations have therefore contained broad guidelines with sufficient
265. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000). For a general discussion of the FTC Act, see Peter C. Ward,
Restitution for Consumers Under the Federal Trade Commission Act: Good Intentions or
CongressionalIntentions?,41 Am. U. L. REV. 1139, 1156 (1992).
266. See Benjamin F. Sidbury, You've Got Mail... and Your Boss Knows It: Rethinking the
Scope of the Employer E-mail Monitoring Exceptions to the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, 2001 U.C.L.A. J. L. & TECH. 5; Amanda Richman, Restoring the Balance: Employer Liability
and Employee Privacy, 86 IOWA L. REv. 1337, 1346-47 (2000) ("[R]estrictions on preemptive
screening create incentives for employers to monitor employees post-hire in order to minimize the
employer's potential liability and protect others from personal harm.... More than 67% of
employers monitor employees, a 3.9% increase since 1997, and e-mail monitoring nearly doubled
between 1997 and 1999."); S. Elizabeth Wilbom, Revisiting the Public/Private Distinction:
Employee Monitoringin the Workplace, 32 GA. L. REv. 825, 826 (1998).
267. See Solove, supranote 32, at 1148.
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latitude to embrace later developments, but few details or specific
directions to the information processing industry concerning permissible
or prohibited activity.268 Almost by default, the laws have placed an
enormous amount of trust in individuals and the marketplace to ensure
that privacy interests are protected.
This choice of policing mechanism was not irrational. Representatives
of free information flow have long said that the market will achieve a
socially acceptable proportion of information privacy and disclosure.269
In theory, both individuals and businesses will balance the value of
personal information, such as its commercial value in the marketplace,
against the value of keeping the information within the individual's
control.27 There are market incentives for companies to keep their
collected data secret and to be honest about their data collection policies.
Conversely, there are incentives for individuals to limit the release of
their personal information to others and to monitor the use of information
that has already been released. In some instances, market mechanisms
have worked. In 1996, for example, the online news and legal search
engine, Lexis-Nexis, announced a new service called the P-TRAK
Personal Locator, which would have given subscribers access to the
addresses, maiden names, and Social Security numbers of millions of
individuals. After considerable adverse publicity, the company changed
its plans.271
A related argument in support of marketplace solutions is that the
technology industry itself will provide an acceptable degree of privacy
protection. For example, more widespread use of cryptography has been
suggested as a technique to protect some types of privacy invasion,
particularly in the telecommunications and Internet data transfer
268. See Colin J. Bennett, Convergence Revisited: Toward a Global Policy for the Protection of
PersonalData?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 99, 104 (Philip E. Agre &
Marc Rotenberg eds., 1998).
269. One of the strongest and most powerful proponents of market-based resolutions and selfregulation is the Direct Marketing Association. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 122. The
Online Privacy Alliance, a group of large, global corporations and trade associations also promotes
industry self-regulation and issues privacy guidelines. See Online Privacy Alliance: Privacy Policy
(Nov. 15,
Guidelines, available at http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources/ppguidelines.html
1999).
270. See Solove, supranote 31, at 1446-47.
271. Along similar lines, Lotus Development Corporation and Equifax Credit Corporation had
planned to market a CD-ROM in 1990 containing information on 120 million consumers. The
parties cancelled the plans after concerned individuals posted complaints on the Internet. Kim Bartel
Sheehan & Mariea Grubbs Hoy, Flaming, Complaining,Abstaining: How Online Users Respond to
Privacy Concerns, 28 J. ADVERTISING 37 (Fall 1999). See Solove, supra note 31, at 1447.
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industries.272 Savvy consumers can install and employ a wide range of
products that allow for anonymous web surfing and defense against
surreptitious data mining.273 Computer software can be crafted to act like
an "electronic lawyer," negotiating our privacy concerns with Internet
sites. 271 Products such as Anonymizer 275 allow users to retain anonymity
while surfing the Internet.276 P3P technology, which provides a standard
language for web sites to encode privacy policies, allows web browsers
to display privacy warnings to users and block cookies.277 To date, such
systems have yet to be widely used. If they are to become the standard
control mechanism against privacy invasion on line, a massive
educational effort would be needed278 and a universal system would need
to be developed that would be compatible with most Internet sites,
relatively easy for consumers to use, and difficult for data seekers to
evade.279

272. See BRUCE SCHNEIER & DAVID BANISAR, THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY PAPERS 4 (1997)

(arguing that the FBI and other law enforcement organizations are impeding the development of new
technologies that would enhance privacy but might impede crime investigations and communication
monitoring).
273. Kennedy & Meade, supra note 74, at 344.
274. Lawrence Lessig more quaintly calls this service an "electronic butler." LAWRENCE LESSIG,
CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 160 (1999). An individual sets his or her privacy

preferences once-specifying how to negotiate privacy and what information the user is willing to
give up-and from that moment on, when the user enters a site, the site and the user's machine
negotiate. Only if the machines can agree will the site be able to obtain the user's personal data.
Microsoft, AOL, and IBM worked to develop the "Platform for Privacy Preferences" software (P3P)
along these lines several years ago. See Jeri Clausing, New Technology Is Aimed at Web Privacy,
NYTIMES.COM,
June
22,
2000,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.comlibrary/tech/00/06/cyber/articles/22privacy.html.
275. For a more detailed product description, see http://www.anonymizer.com/ (last visited Jan.
20,2003).
276. See Eric Shih, Putting Internet Privacy Laws Aside, What Technology Might Guard Your
Privacy?, 5 ELEC. BANKING L. &CoM. REP. 12 (March 2001).
277. See World Wide Web Consortium, The Platform for Privacy Preferences 1.0 (P3PI.0)
Specification, W3C Recommendation, http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P/ (Apr. 16, 2002).
278. See Exposure in Cyberspace, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2001, at BI (survey showing that almost
30% of computer users did not know about "cookies" and almost 40% had no idea how to deactivate them).
279. The P3P program, for instance, was criticized by privacy advocates for failing to comply
with basic standards for privacy protection, and for employing a protocol that was too complex and
confusing. See Electronic Privacy Information Center & Junkbusters, Pretty Poor Privacy: An
Assessment of P3P and Interet Privacy, at http://www.epic.org/reports/prettypoorprivacy.html
(June 2000). See also Bennett, supra note 268, at 117; Reidenberg, supra note 134, at 729 (stating
for technology to provide effective privacy protection, three conditions must be met: technology
respecting fair information practices must exist, the technology must be deployed universally, and
the technology must have a "privacy protecting default configuration" to ensure its widespread use).
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While technology might hold the key to privacy protection in the
future, it would require government intervention to require privacy
technology as a standard installation or default preference in most
computers. 80 A year 2000 survey showed that less than half of Internet
users-forty-three percent-even knew what a cookie was; only ten
percent said that they had set their browser to block cookies. 28 For now,
economic incentives more often produce technologies that enhance data
collection and sharing rather than restrict it. For example, a version of the
Microsoft Internet Explorer came equipped with default settings that
enabled hidden surveillance of users, and a version of Netscape
Communicator reported back to Netscape every time a user read email.282 Because personal information has become so valuable,
technologies have developed that increase data collection and decrease
our ability to monitor the data collection process. This makes privacy
protection even more difficult for computer users who might be
interested in curbing surreptitious information collection practices. 83
1.

Reasons Why Market Solutions Failto ProtectPrivacyInterests

The non-regulatory solutions to the privacy problem were promoted
with good intentions, but the conditions of market failure are simply too

280. Time Magazine ran a feature story on information privacy in July 2001 that recommended to
readers ten steps to protect privacy. See David Jackson, et al., Internet Security, TIME MAGAZINE,
July 2, 2001, at 50. Except for the advice not to "download anything unless you trust the sender" and
"be careful what you give out," the recommendations were not likely to be known or deployed by
many computer users for years to come unless required by law as a default preference in home and
business computers. Id. The list includes: installing a home firewall, changing browser preferences
to delete a user's e-mail address and replace it with a "false name and dummy e-mail account,"
opting out of information sharing policies when given the choice (although the writer acknowledges
that this "can be a chore"), resetting your browser to reject cookies or install software like "Cookie
Crusher," checking to make sure a website uses encrypted transfer software before giving sensitive
information online, hiding your identity with an "anonymizer" program, and clearing your memory
cache each time you surf the Interet. Even with all of this advice, Time gives its readers the
"Bottom line: If it has to stay secret, don't put it on a computer hooked up to the Internet." Id.
281. Fox, supra note 2.
282. See Oversight Hearing on Privacy and Electronic Commerce, Subcommittee on Courts and
Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives
(testimony of Joel R. Reidenberg), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/reid05l8.htm (May
18, 2000).
283. Reidenberg, supra note 134, at 723. See John Hanchette, New Microsoft Software Raises
Privacy Protection Concerns, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 26, 2001, at DI (describing Microsoft
plans to combine personal identification information with a powerful information distribution
network).
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strong.284 Although market-based solutions can be effective in some areas
of consumer law, they are not likely to limit the use and misuse of
personal information. There are several reasons why.
First, the operations of the data collection and sharing industry are not
transparent. The vast majority of data collection and sharing practices
occur outside public view. How do we know what information about us
is being collected and when our data is being used in a way we did not
expect or authorize? If the collection and sharing of information is not
transparent, and it is becoming less so as data mining technologies
become more sophisticated, then unfair information practices-practices
most of us would object to-will likely go unnoticed. If we are not aware
of malfeasance, we cannot seek redress or stop it from recurring.
Moreover, requiring a public protest each time a privacy invasion occurs
is not an effective privacy policy. People should not have to start a public
relations campaign whenever a dangerous privacy plan is exposed.
Second, individuals cannot effectively value their personal
information. To be effective, market-based solutions presume that we
can value our privacy rights in some meaningful way. Only then can we
make intelligent choices about whether and how to share information.
Since it is impossible to know where our information will end up and
how it will be used, it is difficult to assess the risks associated with
giving out the information or failing to monitor its use once we have
released it. We might read a privacy policy on a web site, for example,
and conclude that even though the site reserves the right to share our
data, we consent to the policy because we are only providing "innocent"
facts and details. We may perceive the risk as small compared to the
benefits provided by the web site, not knowing how or when the
seemingly innocent information might be shared or aggregated with
other information in a combination that will cause harm. According to
one commentator, it is possible to identify eighty-seven percent of the
American population knowing only a person's birth date, gender, and
postal ZIP code.285
284. See generally Reidenberg, supra note 134, at 726.
285. Erik Sherman, It Doesn't Take Much to Make You Stand Out, NEWSWEEK, Oct.16, 2000, at
74N. (quoting Latanya Sweeney, an assistant professor of computer science and public policy at
Carnegie Mellon University). According to the FTC, 99% of the "Most Popular" websites collect
personal information, including e-mail address and other personal identification, from and about
consumers. The FTC concluded that most of the sites "are capable of creating personal profiles of
online consumers by tying any demographic, interest, purchasing behavior or surfing behavior
information they collect to personal identifying information." See UNITED STATES, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE
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To create an appearance that individuals are knowingly revealing
personal information, data collection businesses often post privacy
policies voluntarily.286 These policies are hardly "arms length
agreements" between users and the data collectors, so the user's consent
is illusory in most instances.287 Moreover, privacy policies tend to make
vague promises that commit to very little.288 The privacy "commitment"
of the GAP credit card, for example, promises virtually no privacy
protection. The policy simply informs the card holder that GAP will
"collect personally identifiable information about you.., from a number
of sources," and "may use and share all of the information" for any
reason not prohibited by law.289 In addition, businesses can and do
change their privacy policies frequently. Unless a person rereads the
policy at each interaction with the business, it will never know the
current practice.290 And if a business violates its own policy, how does
one discover this fact and the extent of any injury?.29 These problems
exacerbate the difficulty of valuing information privacy.
at
9-10
[hereinafter
FTC
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf (May 2000).
286. See Transcript: Colloquium on Privacy and Security, 50 BUFFALO L. REV. 703, 723 (2002)
(comments of Ann Bartow regarding voluntary privacy policies).
287. Most Web privacy policies are little more than confusing boilerplate for the typical Internet
user. Reidenberg, supra note 134, at 727-28. See also MacDonnell, supra note 83 (TRUSTe,
BBBOnline, WebTrust and other seal programs do not require compliance with OECD privacy
guidelines, which are discussed supranote 142).
288. See Will Rodger, Privacy Isn't Public Knowledge: Online Privacy Policies Spread
Confusion With Legal Jargon, USA TODAY, May 1,2000, at 3D.
289. See GAP Credit Card, supra note 74. Cf NAT'L TELLECOM. AND INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE SELF-REGULATION FOR PROTECTION OF PRIVACY (Jan.
1998) (stating that for self-regulation to be meaningful, laws must impose substantive rules on
businesses concerning notices and consumer choice, rather than setting forth broad guidelines and
allowing
businesses
to
implement
them
as
they
choose),
available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacydraft/98DFTPRIN.htm (Jan. 1998).
290. The privacy policy of the GAP Credit Card, supra note 74, states, "We may amend this
Privacy Policy at any time, and we will inform you of changes as required by law." In December
2000, the online travel service Expedia changed its privacy policy to include the following:
"Expedia.com reserves the right to modify or amend this Privacy Statement at any time and for any
reason. If there are material changes to this statement or in how Expedia.com will use your [personal
information], Expedia.com will prominently post such changes prior to implementing the change."
Expedia.com's
Privacy
Pledge,
available
at
http://www.expedia.com/daily/service/privacy.asprfrr=--480&CCheck=-l (last visited Jan. 27, 2003).
Despite the assurance that changed privacy rules will only apply to data acquired after the change,
practical difficulties may make it impossible for Expedia to fulfill this promise, and for users to
monitor Expedia's compliance. See Kennedy & Meade, supranote 71, at 321, 337.
291. A poll of 580 Canadian Internet users found that 40% of the respondents did not believe that
online companies would honor their posted privacy policies. D. Akin, CanadiansStill Not Sold On
Net PrivacyPolicies, THE NATIONAL POST, Jan. 17, 2001, at C6.
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Another aspect of the valuation problem is the difficulty in pricing
specific pieces of personal information out of context. How do I value
my monthly grocery store shopping list? One might say that its value is
the amount of store discounts I receive each month because I voluntarily
trade that information for these cost savings when I use my store
"convenience" card. Yet to value this information with even remote
accuracy, I need to know how the information will be used. The store
might sell it to a marketing firm in the aggregate (along with data from
all customers) without any name identification, in which case I might
value its release nominally. If the store sells it to insurance companies
and financial institutions with name identification, I would likely value it
much higher. Most personal information may never come back to haunt
us, but a few items of information could be used to wreak havoc if
identity fraud occurs.292 Once the information is stored and capable of
being accessed, we lose control over our fate. We often do not have
enough information to evaluate this risk.
Voluntary "trustmarks" or "web seals" are not a suitable substitute for
legal mandates. Seal programs293 can help web users gain confidence in
the privacy practices of the sites they visit, but the most popular
programs do not require that damage remedies be readily available to the
victims of information misuse, and the scope of the web seal "guarantee"
of privacy can be narrower than individuals might expect. For example,
TRUSTe certifies sites that promise not to share information "used to
'
identify, contact, or locate a person."294
Yet reports show that most
Internet users do not want Web sites tracking their movements even if

292. See Sean B. Hoar, Identity Theft: The Crime of the New Millennium, 80 OR. L. REV. 1423,
1424 (2001); Kurt M. Saunders & Bruce Zucker, CounteractingIdentity Fraud in the Information
Age: The Identity Theft and Assumption DeterrenceAct, 8 CORNELL L.J. & PUB. POL'Y 661, 662-67
(1999). See also supranote 4.
293. A trustmark or seal program requires a website licencee to abide by a code of information
practices and to submit to various types of compliance monitoring in order to display a program's
privacy seal. See Pippin, supra note 211, at 132; Web Seals: A Review of Online Privacy
Programs, available at http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/seals.html#2 (Sept. 2002); Privacy
Standards
for
Web
Sites:
Web
Seals,
available
at
http://www.tilj.com/content/ecomarticle02050103.htm (Feb. 5,2001).
294. See
TRUSTe
Program
Principles,
available
at
http://www.truste.org/programs/pubprinciples.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2003). TRUSTe is an
independent, non-profit organization founded in 1997 by the CommerceNet Consortium and the
Electronic Frontier Foundation. TRUSTe developed a license agreement that governs a licensee's
collection and use of information and requires licensees to adhere to standards for notice, choice,
access, and security. The program includes third party monitoring and periodic review of licensee
information practices. See Pippin, supra note 211, at 132.
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the site does not associate the data with a particular user's identity. 295 In
addition, the most popular seal programs do not perform regular and
rigorous audits on their client's web sites to ensure that the web seal
standards are being satisfied.296
Third, there are accountability problems with data collection and
sharing practices. Tracing an injury to a particular cause, source, or leak
will often be impossible. In the context of identity theft, a typical
complaint is, "How did the thief get this information about me?, 297 With
information about us residing in so many databases, if a problem does
surface, there may be no way to locate the original source of the leak.
Without accountability, market forces cannot effectively curb harmful
behavior.
Fourth, if we want to participate in modem society, we have little
choice but to reveal information about ourselves. If we want the job, the
loan, or the medical care, we have to disclose information about
ourselves and our lives. 98 Market solutions presuppose choice, and
where the choice to reveal information is limited, the market will fail to
protect our interests.
Perhaps most fundamentally, however, one may ask why the burden
should be on the individual to figure out how to keep others from getting,
selling, and using information. Self-regulation assumes that information
about us is a property right or commodity that can be bought and sold.
Viewing privacy in this way produces an ineffective system of sporadic
notice and illusory choice. This approach ignores other universally
recognized principles of fair information practice such as minimizing the
amount and type of data that can be stored, and restricting access to the
295. Reidenberg, supra note 134, at 727-28. See also MacDonnell, supra note 83, at 348-49
(explaining that TRUSTe, BBBOnline, WebTrust and other seal programs do not require compliance
with OECD and Canadian privacy guidelines).
296. See MacDonnell, supra note 83, at 392. Auditing compliance with web seal mandates is a
burdensome task and can be costly if the audit is rigorous. One solution to this problem was
advanced by Colin Bennett in a slightly different context. Bennett's scheme would involve three
tiers of compliance with privacy standards: 1) a conformity of "policy"; 2) a conformity of
"procedure"; and 3) a conformity of "practice." Only an organization seeking certification in the
third tier would undergo a complete privacy audit to ensure that it honor its representations in
practice. See Colin Bennett, Prospectsfor an InternationalStandardfor the Protection of Personal
Information, availableat http://www.e-com.ic.gc.ca/english/privacy/632d29.htm (August 1997).
297. Studies have shown that nearly 80% of identity theft victims do not know how or where the
thief obtained their personal information. Lucas, supra note 4.
298. The FCRA, for example, mandates that individuals consent before an employer can obtain
their credit report. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b)(2) (2000). This consent is virtually meaningless if the person
wants the job.
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data that can legally be stored, organized, and sorted.299 Only by
deemphasizing the commodity aspects of information privacy, and
focusing on the societal value of keeping information private, can we
create a different and more effective regulatory model. More "notice and
consent" requirements are not likely to provide greater privacy
protection. °
Evidence showing the failure of market-based regulation has been
gathered by the FTC. After years of promoting market based privacy
measures and waiting for acceptable industry-regulated fair information
practices, the FTC in its May 2000 report concluded that broad-based
legislation is necessary to ensure fair information practices online. 31 The
agency noted private sector initiatives to develop self-regulatory regimes,
but concluded that industry measures were far from adequate.0 2 The
FTC report recommended that technology neutral legislation be enacted,
and called for an implementing agency with regulatory and supervisory
authority.0 3 New leadership at the FTC, however, has recently backed
off of this recommendation, calling for increased enforcement of existing
laws instead. 0 4 The retreat is unfortunate because, for a short period at
least, it looked as if we might be moving toward a privacy policy that is
more compatible with the idea of privacy as a societal value. Without
prompting from the FTC or another influential voice in the privacy
debate, the status quo is likely to remain for some time.

299. Self-regulation also enables data collectors to change the rules after the data has been
collected from individuals. Reidenberg, supra note 134, at 727.
300. A number of bills have been introduced that would impose various types of notice and
consent requirements, including S. 1055, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 89, 107th Cong. (2000); H.R.
237, 107th Cong. (2000); and H.R. 2135, 107th Cong. (2001).
301. FTC REPORT, supranote 285.
302. In a random sample of 335 American commercial web sites that collected personal
identifying information, only 20% applied fair information practices. The figure was higher, 42%,
for 91 of the 100 busiest commercial sites. FTC REPORT, supra note 285, at 20.
303. Id. at iii, 36.
304. See FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris, Protecting Consumer's Privacy: 2002 and Beyond,
Address
Before
The
Privacy
2001
Conference,
at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/privispl002.htm (Oct. 4, 2001); Timothy J. Muris, Challenges
Facingthe Federal Trade Commission, Address Before the Committee on Energy and Commerce,
at http://energycommerce.house.gov/l107/hearings/I1072001 Hearing403/Muris678print.htm (Nov. 7,
2001).
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II.
A.

PRIVACY AS A SOCIETAL VALUE
DefiningInformationPrivacy as a Societal Value

It has been four years since Sun Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy
issued his now famous warning, "You have zero privacy anyway. Get
over it."3 °5 So much information about us is already in government and
private sector databases that it may be too late to rethink our approach to
information privacy protection.30 6 Yet, if we begin to think about
information privacy as an important societal value rather than a typical
consumer law problem calling for a balance between business and
consumer interests, we may be able to achieve several important goals.
However, we must initially agree on a set of privacy objectives. I suggest
three baseline goals for a national privacy policy.
1.

Fundamentalsof Effective PrivacyPolicy

First, while we have begun to recognize that certain uses of even nonconfidential information can threaten privacy, it is not sufficient to
impose limits on the use of information once it has been collected.
Procedural safeguards alone cannot protect the confidentiality of
information adequately. Thought must be given to the types of
information that can be collected in the first instance-by public
authorities and private sector enterprises-because once information is in
a database, controlling its subsequent use is extremely difficult. For
instance, why should we allow employers to collect virtually any
information on applicants and current workers and store the information
in a database? We should reevaluate our presumption that virtually any
piece of personal information can be stored electronically.
Second, we should acknowledge that the current self-regulatory
approach, which requires individuals to police the market to ensure that
their data is not collected or disseminated, is ineffectual. A more
complete range of enforcement schemes should be developed to control
how information will be collected, used, and shared. To the extent
market mechanisms are used, regulation mandating that consumers optin rather than opt-out, for example, can in some circumstances achieve a
WIRED
NEWS,
at
305. See
generally Sun
on
Privacy: Get
over
It,
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,17538,00.html (Jan. 26, 1999).
306. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 131 (1999) (observing that the genie is
already out of the bottle).
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more balanced approach to the disclosure of information. 317 Opt-in
systems place the incentive on entities that want to acquire personal
information, in both the government and private sector, to make it as
easy as possible for individuals to give meaningful consent to the
collection and use of their information.30 8
Third, a national Privacy Board, or an institutional network of privacy
agencies, is necessary to ensure that government and private sector data
collectors maintain fair information practices. Stiff penalties should be
imposed upon those who breach privacy agreements with their customers
(not just a finding under the FTCA that an unfair trade practice has been
committed). Watchdog organizations and individual lawsuits cannot be
relied upon to assume this responsibility. Organizations like the
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) bring legal actions to
accomplish privacy protection goals, but they work piecemeal, vary in
their targets depending on the priorities of the organization bringing the
suit, and succeed only when state or federal laws have been broken.
Individual lawsuits are even rarer. More importantly, however, litigation
should not be the primary enforcement mechanism for citizens who can
rarely afford to sue the government or a large commercial enterprise.30 9
These three changes would mark a fundamental shift from a
presumption favoring the collection and sharing of personal information

307. A survey conducted in 2000 showed that 86% of respondents favored privacy policies
requiring organizations to seek explicit permission before gathering any personal information. See
Fox, supra note 5. Several states require affirmative consent from individuals before their personal
information can be shared with others. See William M. Fay, Jr., Lost in Oz: There Is No Yellow Brick
Road for State Lawmakers to Follow in DraftingPrivacy Legislationfor Insurers, 7 CONN. INS. L.J.
585, 604-18 (2000).
308. To the extent websites give users a choice, most use an "opt-out" system, i.e., unless a user
affirmatively indicates that he or she does not want information sold or shared to another party, the
site is free to circulate the information. An August 2000 survey indicated, however, that 86% of
users favored "opt-in" policies that require affirmative consent from the user before information can
be shared. See Dylan Tweney, The Rules for Writing a Privacy Policy, ECOMPANY Now, available
at http://www.ecompany.com/articles/web/0,l 653,8297,00.html (Sept. 7, 2000).
The Federal Communications Commission recently adopted an opt-in rule to protect sensitive
personal information of customers of telecommunications carriers. The Order provides for expressconsent customer approval for carriers' release of customer information to third parties, but permits
opt-out consent for release of information to affiliated parties. See Federal Communications
Comission Adopts Rules Resolving How Phone Companies Share and Market CustomerInformation,
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-224366Al.pdf (last visited Jan. 20,
2003).
309. See David H. Flaherty, Controlling Surveillance: Can Privacy Protection Be Made
Effective?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 167, 174 (Philip E. Agre & Marc
Rotenberg eds., 1998).
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and toward a neutral position or a presumption against it. How can we
get there from here? We should begin by convincing policy makers to
look at information privacy in a different way. How an issue is defined
on the public agenda is important to the politics of the law-making
process and ultimately the policy resolution.1 ° When information
privacy is defined as a matter of individual concern, it is difficult to see a
broader purpose in controlling the problem. There is no polluted
atmosphere or outbreak of disease that identifies the issue as one of
general public concern demanding a societal, rather than individual,
resolution.
2.

Moving Toward a Societal View ofPrivacy

Priscilla Regan and others have argued that privacy serves not just
individual interests, but also common, public, and collective purposes.
Privacy is a common value because we all recognize its importance in
our lives, a public value because it is necessary to the proper functioning
of a democratic political system, and a collective value because
technology and market forces make it increasingly difficult for any of us
to have privacy unless we all have privacy at a similar level.3" ' If privacy
is regarded as being of societal importance, different policy discourse
and interest alignments are likely to follow, and this opens the way to
serious consideration of different policy resolutions.
Theoretical underpinnings for a societal view of information privacy
began in the 1960s and early 1970s. Privacy literature was abundant
during this period, and several writers acknowledged that privacy was
important to society at large, not just to individuals." ' Yet there was little
development of the idea that privacy policy should be created with this
perspective in mind. Alan Westin, quoting from Robert Merton's Social
Theory and Social Structure, wrote: "Privacy is not merely a personal
predilection; it is an important functional requirement for the effective
'
operation of social structure."313
Abstract declarations of this sort failed
310. See REGAN, supra note 7, at xiii, 220-31.
311. Id. at xv-xvi. See also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace,52 VAND.
L. REv. 1609, 1653 (1999) (stating that database privacy is necessary for democratic deliberation).
312. See, e.g., WESTIN, supra note 85, at 58; James Rachels, Why Privacy is Important, 4 PHIL. &
PUB. AFFAIRS 323 (1975) (observing a "close connection between our ability to control who has
access to us and to information about us, and our ability to create and maintain different sorts of
social relationships").
313. WESTIN, supra note 85, at 58 (quoting ROBERT MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL
STRUCTURE 375 (1957)). See REGAN, supra note 7, at 32.
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to influence the formulation of public policy. Even in the philosophical
literature during this period, the "effective operation of social structure"
quickly evolved into advocacy for privacy as a component of individual
freedom and liberty.3 14 The result was an approach to privacy policy that
focused on the individual and the legal protection of his or her rights
versus the rights of others to use personal information for their own
purposes.315 More recent writing has similarly emphasized privacy's
importance to the individual, and the policy debate has sought to balance
the individual right to privacy against broader societal interests in
information collection and sharing.316
An effort to redefine the societal value of privacy was begun,
however, by Regan and privacy proponents such as Colin Bennett.
Bennett writes about the humanistic and political aspects of privacy.317
The humanistic value recognizes the loss of dignity, autonomy, or
respect for the individual that results when we lose control over personal
information.318 For some privacy advocates, the humanistic dimension is
the only justification needed for protective public policy.3" 9 The very
collection of personal information, regardless of how it is used,
contributes to the sense of alienation in post-industrial society.
Information technology adds a new layer to the already impersonal
314. See REGAN, supra note 7, at 32-33.
315. Political theorists identify two types of "rights"-civil liberties and civil rights. Privacy has
often been characterized as a civil liberty, the right to be free from interference from other
individuals, governments or organizations. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR
ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969) (privacy as a negative liberty); VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 53 (1991) (privacy as a "negative freedom").
As such, it loses some of the legitimacy that civil rights have in American politics. Defining a
problem as a civil right can be a successful political strategy (e.g., women's rights, minority rights,
rights of the disabled). Civil rights movements in the United States have usually assigned some
benefit or status to a group rather than to an atomistic individual. As privacy began to be viewed as a
policy matter of individual liberty, its claim to status as a civil right diminished. See REGAN, supra
note 7, at 4.
316. See, e.g., JULIE INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 140 (1992) (privacy important
because it gives individuals more control over the making of intimate decisions); Post, supra note
93, at 2091 (privacy as "important to individuals to resist misjudgments based upon private
information," and loss of privacy as "particularly hurtful to individuals").
317. BENNETT, supra note 49, at 29-33.
318. See Lawrence E. Rothstein, Privacy or Dignity? Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace, 19
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 379, 383 (2000) (describing privacy as "dignity" in a European
sense, looking at European approaches to workplace monitoring).
319. See, e.g., JAMES RULE, ET AL., THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY 22 (1980) (recognizing "the
restriction of personal information as an end in itself'); DUNCAN CAMPBELL & STEVE CONNER, ON
THE RECORD: SURVEILLANCE, COMPUTERS AND PRIVACY 12 (1986) (privacy as "fundamental to
human integrity").
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character of government bureaucracy and commercial relations with
individuals.32 It contributes to an uneasy sense that "someone out there
knows something about me,"32' a sentiment which alone should get the
attention of policy makers.
A political aspect of privacy policy is at work as well. Privacy is
rooted in the classical liberal belief in limited government and a general
distrust of powerful institutions, whether they are public or privately
owned. Information technology enhances the power of the government
and commercial enterprises to obtain and manipulate information about
us. As power shifts further away from the individual to large institutions
that can affect the individual's life and liberty, we have a collective cause
for concern and a need for a political resolution.322
This revival of a societal view of privacy coincided with the
emergence of the "politics of ideas" movement, which became an
important model for explaining policy making in the 1990s. The model
received considerable attention and some popular appeal during the
Clinton administration, though its application in practice has been
uneven at best. On the theoretical side, the model has both normative and
descriptive aspects. The notion that public policy should promote the
general public good, rather than accommodate competing claims of
influential stakeholders, has long been part of our political culture, if not
our political reality.323 More recent scholarship, however, has
emphasized the descriptive aspect. Ideas about what is good for society,
rather than what emerges from a battle of individual self interests, can
explain more policy making activity than interest group models would
predict.324 Ideas associated with the public interest, commonly shared
320. See Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, in THE QUESTION
CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 25-28, 37-41, 48-49 (William Lovitt trans., 1977)
(warning that technology threatens the "Enframing" of "Being"); Krotoszynski, Jr., supra note 56, at
234.
321. BENNETT, supra note 49, at 28. On the humanistic and ethical dimensions of data collection
and computer technology generally, see JOSEPH WEIZENBAUM, COMPUTER POWER AND HUMAN
REASON (1976) and HUBERT DREYFUS, WHAT COMPUTERS CAN'T DO: A CRITIQUE OF ARTIFICIAL
REASON (1972).
322. BENNETT, supra note 49, at 30 (quoting DAVID BURNHAM, THE RISE OF THE COMPUTER
STATE (1983)) ("The 'rise of the computer state' is regarded as a threat to the liberal values that have
such a central place in the American Heritage."). Viewed in this way, information privacy is "rooted
in Lockean liberalism: inalienable human rights, limited government, the rule of law, and a
separation between the realms of state and civil society." Id. at 31.
323. See generally THE POWER OF PUBLIC IDEAS (Robert B. Reich ed., 1990).
324. On interest group politics in general, see THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM:
IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY (1969); GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE
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principles of morality, justice, and the collective welfare occasionally do
overcome narrower interests as lawmakers evaluate policy alternatives.
Some of the work in this area has focused on deregulation, particularly in
the trucking, airline, and telecommunications industries, where
deregulation occurred despite initial opposition by powerful interest
groups such as the targeted industry, labor unions, and regulatory
oversight agencies.325
In the instances where fundamental policy change results despite the
influence of well-organized special interests, three conditions seem to be
present. First, an outside force or public event brings the problem to the
front of the political agenda. Second, popular symbols or slogans emerge
to give the idea political strength. Third, a forceful yet latent public
interest pushes the idea through to ultimate enactment.326 Interestingly,
all three seemed to be present in the information privacy debate of the
1960s and early 1970s. Rapid changes in information technology and the
proliferation of large computer databases brought renewed interest to the
problem and continued throughout the period of debates. The idea of
privacy protection evoked powerful symbols in American culture. Big
Brother, 1984, and A Clockwork Orange created fearful images that
helped get the issue on the public agenda. Finally, as numerous public
interest surveys revealed, there was and continues to be a strong public
interest in protecting information and controlling the technologies that
could compromise it. 27
Despite this strong public interest in protecting privacy, strong,
countervailing forces ensured that privacy as a political ideal and as an
accepted social value would not have a powerful influence on policy
making. By framing the debate in terms of individual rights-the right of
an individual to control access to information about himself or herselfpolicy makers elicited two responses that narrowed the range of possible
resolutions. First, privacy was viewed as a matter of "individual
utility."32 Each of us considers how valuable our own information is to
POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966) and DAVID
PROCESS: POLITICAL INTEREST AND PUBLIC OPINION (1958).

B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL

325. See generally MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION
(1985) (arguing that the idea of deregulation was powerful enough to prevail over stakeholders in
business and government); TIMOTHY J. CONLAN, ET AL., TAXING CHOICES: THE POLITICS OF TAX
REFORM (1990); Priscilla M. Regan, Ideas or Interests: Privacy in Electronic Communications, 21
POL'Y STUD. J. 450 (1993).

326. See REAGAN, supra note 7, at 18.
327. See id. at 176-77.
328. Seei. at 178.
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us, and how we might be hurt if the information is shared. If individuals
have not personally been affected in a negative way, then the problem is
not as important and the person may disengage from the debate. Second,
because rights are not absolute, privacy had to compete with other rights
and social interests, such as the right of commercial speech and societal
interests in efficient government or business activity. As a result, the
influence of interest group politics could not be overcome. 29
Another circumstance that affected privacy policy resolutions during
this period was the existence of information technology at the periphery
of public awareness and consequently at the sidelines of political
discourse. Despite the appeal of popular symbols like 1984, the costs,
benefits, and broader implications of computer systems were largely
indirect, if perceived at all. Without the consciousness-raising equivalent
of a nuclear
accident, most Americans did not view privacy as a political
330
priority.
In addition, policy makers were not writing on a clean slate. Previous
court rulings had discussed privacy and frequently balanced privacy
"rights" against other societal interests. In 1976, the Supreme Court
decided United States v. Miller,33 holding that records in possession of a
third party (a bank) are considered property of that party. Under these
circumstances, the individual does not have a Fourth Amendment
privacy interest in the records. 332 Thus, the idea of privacy as an
individual right or individual liberty had already been curtailed.
One lesson from the earlier privacy debates is that privacy, when
framed as a matter of an individual interest, does not easily tap into the
idea that there is a broader public purpose being pursued. In fact, those
seeking to weaken proposals to protect individual privacy have
successfully framed their position as a commitment to the common good
(i.e., better government service, stronger law enforcement capabilities,
and a less encumbered business environment). To date, arguments for

329. See id.
330. BENNETT, supra note 49, at 22-23; JAMES N. DANZIGER, ET AL., COMPUTERS AND POLITICS:

HIGH TECHNOLOGY INAMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 1 (1982) ("the costs and benefits and the
broader impacts of computer systems are largely perceived as indirect and subtle, if they are indeed
perceived at all").
331. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
332. See REAGAN, supra note 7, at 179.
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privacy protection have not successfully transcended this political
dynamic.333
3.

Defining Characteristicsof Societal vs. Individual Concerns

In an effort to move the debate forward, the theoretical foundations for
a societal view of privacy must be buttressed by more policy-oriented
arguments. What are the basic characteristics of issues that we generally
view as societal concerns, justifying a resolution in the broader public
interest? Why do we not say, for example, that individuals should police
their own environmental problems and seek redress if an industry breaks
the law or violates its own clean-up program? Why is environmental
protection viewed as a general societal problem calling for a regulatory
response in the public interest?
There are sound reasons why a societal problem like environmental
pollution calls for a societal resolution. Societal problems have the
following six defining characteristics:
Involuntary and unavoidable risk. We are all more or less equally and
involuntarily at risk simply by living in and sharing the same
environment. We have no real choice in this regard, and we are all
equally susceptible to injury if legal norms are breached. We do not
know which of us will become ill if toxins are released, so we all have an
equal interest in controlling the risk.334 While a person might take some
steps to minimize individual exposure (e.g., eating healthy foods or
moving to a city with cleaner air), we realize that such measures help, if
at all, at the margin.335 Most risks are uncontrollable by individual action.
333. Legislation in the United States must survive many "veto points" in the legislative process. A
bill can lose momentum as a result of committee procedures, bicameral approval difficulties, floor
amendments in either chamber, failure of presidential signing, and possibly another set of hurdles in
agency implementation. Even in the best of political climates, any attempt to pass a comprehensive
data protection law would be challenged by an influential army of industry lobbyists. See Bennett,
supra note 268, at 114.
334. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND

POLICY 4, 5 (3d ed. 2000) (listing the basic characteristics of environmental concerns as follows:
collective risks, uncertainty of mechanism and effect, potentially harmful effects, irreversibility, and
uncontrollability).
335. See, e.g., Daniel Machalaba, Local Ties: Decades of MishandlingHazardous Cargo Leave
Railroadsa Toxic Legacy: Areas Near Rail Yards Face Possible Health Problems;Lawsuits Are on
the Rise, WALL. ST. J., at Al, Feb. 3, 1999 (reporting that a resident who lived across from a rail
yard for forty-six years used to eat watermelons and cantaloupes grown in her garden but now
restricts her plantings to flowers, fearing contamination in home-grown produce; another resident
says he will not allow his four children to play outside anymore for fear the ground is contaminated,
explaining that he feel like they are "prisoners" in their own house).
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Difficulty in identifying individual harm. When injuries occur, they are
often not known or even knowable. A harm resulting from environmental
contamination can be latent or, in a great number of cases,
undiscoverable 36 Yet even if an injury is undetectable, we are
nonetheless concerned about potential injuries or damage that is
occurring without our knowledge. Indeed, unseen harms frighten us just
as much as known ones.33 7
Obstacles to tracing injury to its cause. If a person does discover an
injury and suspects an environmental cause, tracing the harm to a
particular source is often impossible. The source may be unknown,
unknowable, or there may be many possible contributors so it is
impossible to identify the perpetrator. We may identify toxins in ground
water as the cause of a person's cancer, but we will have difficulty
proving causation against a particular farm, industry or other
contaminating source. Waste secretly dumped often avoids detection.338

336. See Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 391 N.E.2d 1002, 1003 (N.Y. 1979) (plaintiff was exposed
to a carcinogenic substance in 1954, but did not develop cancer until 1972); Le Vine v. Isoserve,
Inc., 334 N.Y.S.2d 796 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) (plaintiff developed cancer nine years after exposure to
radioactive isotope); Carl B. Meyer, The Environmental Fate of Toxic Wastes, the Certainty of
Harm, Toxic Torts, and Toxic Regulation, 19 ENVTL. L. 321, 330 (1988) (reporting that the impact of
toxic exposure is often intensified because many toxic substances are neither visible nor malodorous;
frequently, victims neither suspect nor avoid exposure to toxic waste until its effects, enhanced by
cumulative exposure, manifest themselves in acute or chronic discomfort or harm); Christopher W.
Krueger, Legislative Relief from Toxic Exposure: The Lifeguard Presumption Act, 3 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 867, 872 (1994) (noting that the gestation period for cancer is indeterminable,
appearing anywhere from six months to fifty years after the initial toxic exposure); CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COMM. ON ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC WORKS,

U.S. SENATE, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Six Case Studies of Compensation for Toxic Substance Pollution
43 (June 1980) (noting that harms at Love Canal (an abandoned hydroelectric canal in New York,
where the Hooker Chemical Company placed harmful substances from 1942-53) arose over twentyfive years after the last dumping of hazardous waste).
337. See Bill Charles Wells, The Grin Without the Cat: Claimsfor Damagesfrom Toxic Exposure
Without Present Injury, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. 285, 310 (1994) (commenting that the
development of an action or element of damages to compensate the plaintiff for fear of injuries that
he has not yet suffered is a more recent development); Terry Morehead Dworkin, Fearof Disease
and Delayed Manifestation of Injuries: A Solution or a Pandora'sBox?, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 527,
567 (1984) (recognizing that although precedent exists for allowing toxic tort plaintiffs who sue for
fear of disease to recover, many courts have opted to focus on requirements such as physical injury
or other economic harm).
338. Christopher H. Schroeder, Lost in the Translation: What Environmental Regulation Does
That Tort Cannot Duplicate,41 WASHBURN L.J. 583, 601 (2002) (explaining the difficulty of tracing
the harm to its cause); Allan Kanner, Environmental and Toxic Tort Issues, ALI-ABA Continuing
Legal Education, Environmental Litigation, June 26, 1995 (explaining that causation refers to two
distinct issues: (1)defendant must be causally related for the liability-creating actions, and (2) there
must be a medical connection between the liability-creating act and the complained of injuries).
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Inadequacy of money damages. Once someone is injured, and
assuming we can identify the cause, money is a rough compensation for
the harm, and it will not make the person whole, even if damages can be
recovered. Money damages are well suited for economic injury, but they
are at best a crude substitute if the harm is not easily translated into
economic terms."' In such cases, we are better off preventing the harm
from occurring in the first place. Money cannot replace the loss.
Externalities. With societal problems such as environmental
contamination, it is not possible to charge the full cost of the harm
against the entity that caused it.34 Pollution imposes costs on others that
are not easily recoverable. Unclean air can increase health care costs,
raise expenses for cleaning buildings, and decrease work productivity for
those who take ill. Without government intervention of some kind (such
as a tax on toxic emissions), the costs are not borne by the entity causing
them.
Non-economic value in preventing the harm. Many aspects of life are
difficult to quantify in economic terms. Most of us would agree that there
are important intangible benefits to having certain legal norms in place,
whether or not we can identify an economic benefit from their existence.
We gain pleasure from having a clean environment (fresh air, good
fishing waters, etc.) even if we do not suffer any obvious or tangible
adverse effects when they are gone. While some quality of life benefits
might be discussed in economic terms (e.g., we might estimate the value
of clean drinking water by looking at the revenues of the bottled water
industry), such an analysis seems counterintuitive and unnecessary in

339. See Meyer, supra note 336, at 370 (stating that environmental and personal injury damages
are complex and difficult to measure); Schroeder, supra note 338, at 589 (arguing that the goal of
modem environmental regulation is to prevent harm to the environment before it occurs, with an
implementation structure that includes prior approvals, permits that embody standards to be met, and
the monitoring of compliance).
340. See EBAN S. GOODSTEIN, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 33-39 (1995) (discussing
why it is not possible for victims of negative externalities to simply band together on their own to
prevent pollution); Kenneth S. Abraham, The Relation Between Civil Liability and Environmental
Regulation: An Analytical Overview, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 379, 379 n.2 (2002) (externalities resulting
from barriers to the imposition of liability on those who create environmental risk were the principal
justifications for the development of environmental law, and especially for the enactment of the
major federal regulatory statutes of the 1970s); Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities
and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 23, 29 (1996) (arguing that the economic goal of government regulation of
pollution is to force polluters to bear the full costs of their activities).
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many circumstances.34 We enjoy certain things because we are human,

and our lives would be less fulfilled if they were gone.
In contrast to a problem of societal concern, a problem of individual
concern such as a consumer warranty complaint or deceptive advertising
program typically has a very different set of characteristics:
Voluntarily assumed risk. The risk of injury is usually created
individually and assumed voluntarily. By purchasing a car, we create
expectations of quality from a specific product or manufacturer; by
signing a lease, we establish a landlord/tenant relationship with a
management company we chose; by dropping off shirts at the cleaners,
we entrust the local merchant with our property. We make choices and
voluntarily assume certain risks when we do so, and in this way we
distinguish ourselves from the rest-of society.342
Discoverable injury. The car does not work properly, or the landlord
breaches the lease. Although we might not know exactly what went
wrong until further investigation reveals the actual cause, we usually

know that an injury of some kind has occurred. We can then try to trace
its cause and seek appropriate redress.

Fewer tracing obstacles. With most consumer problems of individual
concern, tracing the injury to a particular source is typically not the
problem. We know who caused the injury because we know who the
other party in the relationship was. Even if the source of the problem is
not readily identifiable, the list of possibilities is usually small and finite.
For example, in an unlawful debt collection practice the wrongdoer will
341. See Dworkin, supra note 337, at 566 (discussing emotional illness and stress associated with
the threat of cancer and other diseases). Even some economic injuries are non-compensable. See
Adkins v. Thomas Solvent Co., 487 N.W.2d 715, 730 (Mich. 1992) (twenty-two property owners
who lived near a contaminated site could not recover for the diminution of their property values
because no contaminants actually had migrated to their property). See generally Richard L.
Manning, ChangingRules in Tort Law and the Marketfor Childhood Vaccines, 37 J.L. & ECON. 247
(1994) (discussing ways of valuing pain and suffering).
342. Many consumer relationships are based in contract, and the relationship is voluntarily
undertaken. See Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitrationand Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 83, n.134 (1996) (citing ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 4 (1987) (noting that "the general
assumption is that promises are binding.., if, but only if, the relevant actions are voluntary"));
Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingas Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1919 (1992)
(the central normative justification for contractual enforcement is facilitating the exercise of
voluntary choice). But see Michael Philips, Are Coerced Agreements Involuntary?, 3 LAW & PHIL.
133, 133 (1984) (observing that the term "voluntary" could be used to describe all willful acts, i.e.,
as a synonym for "volitional"; Michael D. Bayles, A Concept of Coercion, in XIV NOMOS:
COERCION 16, 18 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1972) ("[A] man who is physically
forced to squeeze the trigger of a gun does not do it voluntarily in any sense. But a man who fires a
gun due to a threat does in one sense act voluntarily although he does not in another.").
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likely be either the creditor itself, a financial institution as the creditor's
assignee, or a collection agency to whom the creditor transferred the
debt.
Economic injurypredominates. Transactions usually involve payment
for goods or services. If we are compensated for the economic losses, we
have some confidence that justice was done. Although full compensation
may be difficult to obtain given that we may have to pay attorney's fees
or we have difficulty proving consequential harm, injury is usually
economic and money damages can compensate for it.
Fewer external costs. In most consumer transactions, externalities are
usually nonexistent or a small part of the harm done. The injury caused
by breaking the legal norm usually affects only a single individual or
class of individuals. Ripple effects to society at large are usually not
significant.
When viewed in this light, information privacy fits the "public
interest" model better than the "individual concern" model:
*

We are all equally at risk of injury from misuse of our data, and
we cannot avoid the problem if we are to participate in modem
society. Information about us is seemingly everywhere, and we
can do little to minimize its collection and use.343

*

Except in the most egregious situations, harms resulting from
information misuse may never be known to us. So much of our
data is being shared every day, yet we have no idea what the
ramifications may be (good or bad) or what decisions are being
344
made in reliance on it.

343. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80
TEX. L. REV. 89, 108, 108-09 (2001) (discussing how ineffective efforts to keep personal
information secret will be since "one's personal information is available from so many sources").
344. See Adam S. Marlin, Online Identity Theft a Growing Concern, CNN.COM, at
www.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/08/l 6/id.theft.offline.idg/index.html
(Aug.
16, 2000)
(describing how an identity thief obtained a doctor's personal information from the Medical Board
of California and another web site (medical license and Social Security number) and used them to
buy medical supplies on his credit; by the time the doctor convinced the medical supply company
that he had not made the purchases and learned that someone had stolen his identity, the identity
thief had spent $185,000); PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, IDENTITY THEFT VICTIMS' STORIES,
LEGISLATIVE TESTIMONY OF JOHN AND JANE DOE (testifying before the Maryland legislature that he

was shocked to find out that he and his wife had no credit: "We were being accused of defaulting on
loans, not making car payments, and overdue on credit card payments. We were suddenly being
called by stores that we never heard of, banks demanding payment on cars or loans that we didn't
have, collection agencies demanding that we pay immediately on some account we never heard of,
or face legal action against us.") at http//:www.privacyrights.org/victim5.htm (1999); Identity Theft

Information Privacy

*

Even if we discover an injury from data sharing, tracing its cause
to a particular information source or leak will likely be difficult,
if not 6impossible." 5 Obtaining effective redress will therefore be
rare.

34

*

Injury, while economic in some cases, can be very hard to undo.
This is particularly true with identity theft, the loss of an
employment opportunity, or harm to reputation caused by
embarrassing information being revealed.

*

Information misuse imposes significant external costs beyond
the direct injury to the individuals involved. Financial
institutions, for example, incur costs investigating claims of

Resource Center, Amy Jo Sutterluety, The Silent Encroachment on Our Privacy: One Woman 's
Searchfor HerStolen Identity, at http://www.idtheftcenter.org/html/silent.htm (2000) (revealing that
one victim's search to find the ring of thieves who were impersonating her started with a call to a
home-furnishings store that had sent her a letter asking her to confirm a credit application and ended
180 phone hours and 580 miles later).
345. With identity theft, the only solvent entity against whom a lawsuit might be brought will
often be the financial institution that opened a credit account or otherwise dealt with the thief.
Liability will not likely be found, however, unless the victim can show that the institution was
negligent. See Stephen L. Wood & Bradley I. Schecter, Identity Theft: Developments in Third Party
Liability, 8 (No. 3) CONS. & PERSONAL RIGHTS LITIG. 3, 5 (Summer 2002).
346. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS, Identity Theft: Prevalence and Cost Appear to be Growing, GAO-02-363, (Mar. 1,
2002) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (reporting that identity theft can cause potentially severe emotional
or other nonmonetary harm in addition to economic harm; the leading types of non-monetary harm
cited by consumers were "denied credit or other financial services (mentioned in over 7,000
complaints), "time lost to resolve problems" (mentioned in about 3,500 complaints), and "subjected
to criminal investigation, arrest, or conviction" (mentioned in almost 1,300 complaints)); See
generally Scott Shorr, PersonalInformation Contracts:How to Protect Privacy Without Violating
the First Amendment, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1756 (1995) (assessing common-law and federal
legislative remedies for commercial disclosures of information that violate personal privacy); Daniel
J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002) (arguing that privacy law has fixed
itself too firmly to certain conceptions of privacy, and as a result, has lost flexibility in dealing with
emerging privacy problems). Cf. Peter Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government
Enforcement
in
the
Protection
of
Personal
Information,
available
at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/selfregl.htm#IA (last visited Jan. 27, 2003) (explaining that
the key market failures with respect to privacy are due to information and bargaining costs: "[A]
company that acquires personal information gains the full benefit of using the information but does
not suffer the full losses caused by disclosure. Because of imperfect monitoring, customers often will
not learn of the disclosure and will not be able to discipline the company in the marketplace for its
less-than-optimal privacy practices. Because the company internalizes the gains from using the
information, but can externalize a significant share of the losses, it will have a systematic incentive
to over-use private information.").
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credit card fraud and re-crediting customer accounts. 347 Some of
these costs are passed though to customers in the form of higher
interest rates and incidental fees, so we all pick up a share of the
expenses when privacy breaches cause harm.348
*

Most of us would say that we benefit in intangible ways just
knowing that our data is reasonably secure, and is not being
bought and sold without our permission. We would feel less
vulnerable if we knew that our data was either not being
collected or, at least, was protected from misuse. Such
sentiments are worth respecting in their own right, but they can
translate into economic benefits as well. If we felt more secure in
our relationships with data collectors, we might use their services
more. One of the impediments to the development of Internet
commerce is the fear many people have that the information they
transmit could be shared, misused, or stolen.349

Even though information privacy has many of the defining
characteristics of other societal values, this does not mean that a heavyhanded regulatory approach should be used to protect our privacy
interests. One important difference between information privacy and

347. See Wood & Schecter, supranote 345, at 4 ("law enforcement consider banks and financial
institutions to be the 'victims' in identity theft cases [because] they are frequently forced to absorb
the costs of the thefts").
348. See LoPucki, supra note 343, at 91 (stating that in dealing with the problem of identity theft,
defrauded creditors are likely to employ legal and practical means that are cost effective, and pass
the remaining costs on to their consumers); Kurt M. Saunders & Bruce Zucker, Counteracting
Identity Fraud in the Information Age: The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, 8
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 661, 663 (1999) (estimating that identity theft imposes a cost on
consumers approaching $100 million annually); GAO REPORT, supra note 346 (stating that the
American Bankers Association reported total check fraud-related losses reached $2.2 billion in 1999;
Mastercard's and Visa's aggregated identity theft-related losses from U.S. operations rose to $114.3
million in 2000; total cost of one national consumer reporting agency's Fraud Victim Assistance
Department was $4.3 million for 2000).
Apart from cost-benefit analysis, economic arguments misconstrue the harm to society from the
loss of confidence in information practices. Many view privacy as central to the democratic fabric of
society. The misuse of personal information harms an individual and deserves protection regardless
of how the misuse might benefit others. See Reidenberg, supra note 134, at 725.
349. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 285, at 2 (reporting that 92% of consumers are
"concerned," including 67% who are "very concerned," about the misuse of personal information
online, and explaining that this apprehension likely translates into lost online sales due to lack of
confidence in how online personal data will be handled; also cites a study that estimates potential
losses in online retail sales due to privacy concerns will reach $18 billion by 2002).
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societal problems like environmental pollution or unsafe food and drugs
is that privacy is seldom a matter of life and death. The effects of even a
widespread disclosure of personal information will not be as catastrophic
as global warming or a mass outbreak of contagious disease. Still, the
case for viewing information privacy as a societal value should not be
discounted. If the stakes do not seem quite as high, the appropriate policy
resolutions may differ but the regulatory function of government need
not be minimized and the policing of privacy interests need not be left to
market forces and individual enforcement initiatives. A less intrusive, but
nonetheless vital, governmental role may be in order.
Throughout our history, we have created administrative bodies to
implement national legal norms and regulate important societal values.
Not all have concerned basic health and safety issues. The Securities
Exchange Commission oversees the operation of our capital markets, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ensures fair employment
practices, and the Comptroller of Currency watches over our national
banks. In all of these areas and many others, oversight became necessary
when policy makers realized that market forces could no longer
effectively protect important societal interests. As we witness the vast
expansion of digital databases and nearly complete loss of control over
the collection and dissemination of our personal information, we see that
the same conditions presently exist with our interest in information
privacy.
B.

Looking to Europefor a Model

There is reason to believe that our approach to the database problem
would take a different form, and policy resolutions would be
recognizably different, if the issue were viewed in a different way. In
Europe, for example, privacy is treated as a political imperative,
anchored in fundamental human rights, and considered a matter of basic
"social protection.""3 5 National and regional governments are viewed as
key players in ensuring data protection, and the problem is considered an
350. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1315, 1347 (2000). This difference in political philosophy was likely
influenced by fairly recent experiences in Europe with information abuse. A 1984 conference on
data protection concluded that "one of the prime motives for the creation of data protection laws in
continental Europe is the prevention of the recurrence of experiences in the 1930s and 1940s with
Nazi and fascist regimes." See David H. Flaherty, Nineteen Eighty-Four and After: Final Report of
the Bellagio Conference on Current and Future Problems of Data Protection, GOV'T INFO. Q. 5
(1984); BENNETT, supra note 49, at 30.
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important element of public law. Market forces and individual
enforcement are important in the regulatory scheme, but they are not the
primary policing mechanisms. Law and government are considered
fundamental in ensuring shared norms of social and citizen protection.35
The most important act of legislation dealing with information privacy
was the 1996 European Community Directive on Data Protection (EU
Directive), which outlines the basic principles for European Union
member countries." 2 The EU Directive took effect in 1998, and although
the Directive has its share of critics,"' it recognizes some key dimensions
of the problem that are missing in United States privacy law.354 The
Directive mandates that all fifteen EU Member States ensure that citizens
have the right to access their data, the right to fix erroneous data, the
right to a recourse for violations, and the right to keep the information
from being used for any marketing purpose without their permission.355
More importantly, however, unlike most American privacy laws, the
EU Directive applies essentially the same standards to private sector and

351. See Reidenberg, supra note 350, at 1347.
352. See generally Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (Oct.
24, 1995) (EU Directive). The EU Directive was first proposed by the European Commission five
years earlier. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PROPOSAL FOR ACOUNCIL DIRECTIVE CONCERNING THE
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS INRELATION TO THE PROCESSING OF PERSONAL INFORMATION, COM
(90) 314 Final-SYN 287 (1990). See generally, Paul Schwartz, European DataProtection Law and
Restrictions on InternationalData Flows, 80 IOWA L. REV. 471 (1995). The Directive is one of
several European Union acts designed to ensure that the free movement of capital and labor will be
supported by the free movement of information. Bennett, supra note 268, at 105. The Directive must
be implemented in each Member State, usually through legislative action in the Member State. See,
e.g., Swedish Personal Data Act (1998:204); Data Protection Act 1998 (1998 ch. 29) (United
Kingdom); Protection of Individuals and Legal Persons Regarding the Processing of Personal Data
Act (Jan. 1997) (Italy).
353. See. e.g., Cate, supra note 122 (arguing that the EU approach is not compatible with
longstanding constitutional and political traditions in the U.S.); PETER SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN,
NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN
PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 14, 50-53, 191 (1998) (EU Directive may have limited usefulness outside the
world of mainframe computers).
354. The progression from the 1975 Council Resolution to the Treaty of Amsterdam evidences an
increasing centralization of consumer policymaking at the Community level, if only in theory.
Overby, supranote 174, at 1241 (discussing the progression).
355. Article 2(a) of the EU Directive broadly defines protected information as "any information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person." Article 2(b) defines data "processing" as
"any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by
automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration,
retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making
available ....
EU Directive, supranote 352, art. 2(a), (b).
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government data bases.356 Cross-sectoral legislation in each Member
State guarantees a set of fundamental privacy rights that ensure the fair
treatment of personal information. Data protection laws define each
citizen's basic legal right to control personal information. Instead of
beginning with a presumption of legitimacy for government and
commercial enterprises that wish to collect and share information, the
European approach seeks to strike a balance that provides for a high level
of data protection for all EU citizens.35 7
Information policies in Europe tend to have broad applicability and
cut across economic sectors.35 There is an underlying presumption that
the collection and sharing of personal information, particularly in the
private sector, is not a standard practice that citizens must simply learn to
accept. Information can be collected only for specified purposes, used in
ways that are compatible with those purposes, and stored no longer than
is necessary.35 9 Individuals must be told that information is being
collected, the purposes of the data collection, and the person responsible
for collecting and controlling the information after it has been stored.3"
Affirmative consent is required in more situations when data is to be
collected or shared, with less responsibility on the individual to opt-out
of data sharing. 6' Independent, national supervisory authorities oversee,
investigate, and enforce legal norms. 62 National "ombuds" serve as

356. Indeed, earlier drafts of the Directive placed stronger restrictions on the private sector than
on governments. The final version treats them essentially the same. Moreover, the scope of
protection in the Directive does not depend on the technique used to store information. Manual filing
systems are covered as well as computerized systems. BENNETT, supra note 49, at 105-07.
357. See Reidenberg, supra note 134, at 731; Julia M. Fromholz, The European Union Data
Privacy Directive, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 461,469 (2000).
358. See generally Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive on the
Protection of Personal Data, 80 IOWA L. REv. 445 (1995) (discussing events leading to the adoption
of the EU Directive).
359. See SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 122, at 13-14.
360. See id. at 15.
361. The EU Directive mandates that the national law of all Member States protect information
about each identifiable individual even if the data is publicly available. Laws must also require an
individual's consent before processing personal information, except for the purposes contemplated
by the original data collection. Member States can further restrict the processing of data deemed
"sensitive" (e.g., medical information), and certain "black list" data is not collectable at all without
the affirmative consent of the individual. This includes data revealing racial/ethnic origin, political
views, religious beliefs, and membership in a trade union. EU Directive, Art. 8(1). See Reidenberg,
supra note 134, at 732.
362. See Cate, supra note 122, at 186.
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advocates for individuals who feel that a breach has occurred.363 Persons
who process individual information in both the public and private sectors
must comply with notice and reporting mandates so their activities can
be monitored.364 Civil liability and "dissuasive penalties" must be
available for noncompliance with legal norms.365
C.

Moving Toward a Global Information Policy in the United States

Circumstances already exist that may move the United States toward
the European approach to information privacy. The EU Directive is far
from perfect, particularly with regard to enforcement of its mandates,366
but it is clearly becoming the international model for data protection.367
We are seeing a convergence of information policy worldwide, and the
United States is under increasing international pressure to conform.
Article 25 of the Directive states that transfers of information about
EU citizens to a country outside the EU may take place only if the
receiving country ensures an "adequate level of protection.""36 EU
Member States are instructed "to take the measures necessary to prevent
'
[the] transfer of data of the same type to the third country in question."369
363. In the 1970s, four Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) established
the office of consumer ombudsman, a supervisory body for overseeing the marketing of consumer
goods and services. See generally Kjersti Graver, A Study of the Consumer Ombudsman Institution
in Norway with Some References to the Other Nordic Countries I: Background and Description, 6 J.
CONS. POL'Y 1 (1986). Similar offices have been created in other nations. See Ewa Letowska, The
East Block's First Government Ombudsman, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 8, 1988, at 5.
364. See, e.g., Italian Data Protection Act (1996), in MARC ROTTENBERG, THE PRIVACY LAW
SOURCEBOOK 2000, available at http://www.privacy.it/legge675encoord.html (2000). The Forward
to the Italian law proclaims that data should be processed "by respecting the rights, fundamental
freedoms and dignity of natural persons, in particular with regard to privacy and personal identity."
Privacy is considered a "fundamental component of the 'electronic citizenship."' Id. Member States
must also require any person processing personal information to notify the national supervisory
authority, which is required to keep a public register of data processors. Reidenberg, supra note 98,
at 733. States must delegate responsibility to one or more public authorities for monitoring the
compliance with the law. EU Directive, Art. 28. These authorities must act with "complete
independence" and must be given investigative authority and the power to bring legal proceedings.
See Bennett, supra note 268, at 108.
365. EU Directive, arts. 23, 25.
366. See Lynn Chuang Kramer, Private Eyes Are Watching You: Consumer Online Privacy
Protection-Lessonsfrom Home andAbroad,37 TEX. INT'L L. J. 387, 409-10 (2002) (noting lack of
compliance with the EU Directive in a survey of European websites).
367. See Graham Greenleaf, The 1995 EU Directive on Data Protection-An Overview, 3 INT'L
PRIVACY BULLETIN, no. 2, at 1 (1995); Joel Reidenberg, Rules of the Roadfor Global Electronic
Highways: Merging the Trade and Technical Paradigms,6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 303 (1993).
368. EU Directive, Art. 25(1).
369. EU Directive, Art. 25(4).
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This means that national authorities in each Member State can prevent
U.S. businesses from processing data of EU citizens if U.S. privacy
protections are not up to EU standards.37 ° The consequences of this
provision are severe for credit-granting and financial institutions, hotel
and airline reservations systems, direct-marketing firms, insurance
companies, and any commercial enterprise that relies on the flow of
personal information from European sources. Europe has made it clear
that it will not tolerate "data havens" that would compromise the
personal information of its citizens.3 7'
The EU Directive now constitutes the "rules of the road" for the
increasingly global nature of information processing. The Directive
represents a multi-national consensus on the content of data protection
rights, and has proved to be a valuable model for countries looking to
enact their own data protection laws.372 Pressures for "policy
convergence" worldwide have prompted other nations to adopt similar
principles that give their citizens more control over personal
information.373 Significant movement toward an EU-style data protection
has already occurred in Canada, South America, and Eastern Europe, and
the movement is spreading to other regions.374 The international
370. See Reidenberg, supra note 134, at 736. In the U.K., the Data Protection Registrar blocked a
proposed sale of a British mailing list to a U.S. direct mail company. See OFFICE OF THE DATA
PROTECTION REGISTRAR, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 33-34 (1990).
371. Bennett, supranote 268, at 109-10.
372. Id. at 111-12.
373. Convergence in this context means more than similarity at a given point in time. It points to
a pattern of similar regulatory regimes developing over time, rather than a static condition. See
BENNETT, supra note 49, at 11. Bennett identifies five principle causes for this policy convergence:
(1) technological determinism, (2) the influence of pioneers in the field, (3) the interaction of a small
group of international experts, (4) harmonization projects of international organizations, and (5) the
accelerating pace of global commerce that forces states to make policy changes that conform to
international norms. Id. at 116-17. Supporting evidence of policy convergence also comes from
David Flaherty, who examined the workings of national and state data protection agencies in
Germany, Sweden, France, Canada and the United States. FLAHERTY, supra note 84. For statements
of privacy principles in an international context generally, see BENNETT, supra 49, at 96-115
(discussing convergent themes of openness (disclosure of the type of information collected and from
what categories of individuals), individual access and correction, limits on what information can be
collected (e.g., relevant and necessary to accomplish the limited purposes of the collecting entity),
limits on how data can be used, limits on disclosing information to external sources, and security
safeguards. See also OECD Guidelines, supra note 142.
374. By the end of the 1980s, most European countries applied the same data protection standards
to both the public and private sector. The U.S., Canada, Australia and Japan rejected this approach,
regulating the public sector with one set of laws (e.g., the Privacy Act in the United States) and the
private sector with sector-specific laws and voluntary codes of practice. See Bennett, supra note 268,
at 100. Not much had changed by the end of 1996. Of the 24 OECD countries, only six had failed to
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harmonization of data protection laws can be attributed partly to pressure
from Europe and the effects of Article 25, but it is fueled by the
conceptual appeal of a comprehensive set of standards that were
carefully crafted by the EU after years of study and debate. Those rules
are becoming the standard for multi-national transactions in the
increasingly global environment of offline and online data sharing. 75 In
this regard, United States information policy lags behind. 76
However, we may not be behind for long. Many U.S. businesses are
already affected by the European standards. Companies that handle
information about European citizens must now certify compliance with
European data protection principles.3 77 A Safe Harbor agreement
between the Department of Commerce and the European Commission

enact a comprehensive privacy law to all data processing entities: U.S., Canada, Australia, Japan,
Greece and Turkey. As a Member State in the EU, Greece must now conform to the standards of the
EU Directive. Id. at 113. In the U.S., the private sector continues to be regulated through an
expanding but still incomplete patchwork of federal and state laws, with no general oversight agency
for privacy compliance in the U.S., and few effective remedies. Id.
More recently, the EU Directive has had its influence worldwide. In October 2000, the
Argentinean Congress approved a data protection act (Law 25.326) based on the EU Directive. See
Kennedy & Meade, supra note 74, at 347. Canada recently passed its Protection of Personal
Information and Electronic Documents Act (Bill C-6), effective January 1, 2001. 48-49 Elizabeth II,
ch. 5, available at http://www.parl.gc.ca136/2/parlbus/chambus/houselbills/govemment/C-6/C6_4/90052bE.html (Apr. 13, 2003).
375. See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection. The Impact of EU and
InternationalRules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 45-51
(2000).
376. Mechanisms outside the law, such as "contractual" agreements between American
businesses and data protection authorities in specific countries, can minimize privacy conflicts for ecommerce transactions, but an international treaty may ultimately be necessary to ensure the growth
of trans-border information exchange. The U.S. could, for example, promote a "General Agreement
on Information Privacy" within the WTO framework. See Reidenberg, supra note 134, at 747.
Of course, inferences about the actual level of data protection in any country cannot be drawn
merely by reading the statutes. In this regard, data protection is different from other societal
problems like environmental protection, where states might agree on a desirable level of a particular
contaminant in the atmosphere and have a clear understanding of how to monitor and assess
performance. See Bennett, supra note 268, at 119. Assessing the level of data protection in practice
is a difficult problem of measurement and is not addressed in this article.
377. The EU Directive bars the dissemination of information about EU citizens to entities outside
of Europe where looser protections are in place. Sweden, for instance, insisted that American
Airlines delete all health and medical information (including dietary requests) they had gathered on
Swedish passengers unless the airline obtained the consent of each passenger to allow them to keep
the info in the database. See American Airlines v. Sabre Kammarratan i Stockholm (Admin. Ct of
Appeal, Stockholm), Apr. 1997; Paul R. Prabhaker, Who Owns the Online Consumer?, 17 J. CONS.
MARKETING 158, 161 (2000). European nations can thus use the Directive to exert significant
pressure on U.S. companies.
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assists businesses who want to comply,378 and nearly 200 American
corporations have signed up.379 If companies find that the EU norms are
not unduly burdensome, then resistance to a similar regime in the United
States may weaken. Moreover, as American policy makers see that U.S.
companies are giving EU citizens greater data protection than U.S.
citizens, then pressure to change our laws may increase.
The Safe Harbor agreement was a response to the real possibility that
Europe would prevent data flows to the U.S. and to pressure from online
industries that did not wish to take that risk.3"' The U.S. Department of
Commerce negotiated with the European Commission for an agreement
that would assure Europe that U.S. businesses could comply with Article
25 even if the U.S. did not change its privacy laws.3"' In the agreement,
the European Commission endorsed what amounts to a voluntary code of
conduct that, the parties agreed, would meet the Article 25 standard.382
The Department of Commerce then established the Safe Harbor
mechanism allowing American businesses publicly to commit to this
code for the treatment of European data. If businesses make and adhere
to the commitment, they can be assured of continuing data transmissions
from Europe.
There are several reasons why a U.S. based business with European
operations might want to certify compliance with the Safe Harbor
agreement. It reduces the likelihood that European privacy authorities
would target a company on the compliance list, thereby avoiding the
interruption of data flows and any associated negative publicity. In
addition, claims brought by EU citizens would be brought in U.S. courts.
Drawbacks include the difficulty of complying with the Safe Harbor,
especially for a large corporation that uses personal data in various ways
that may not be allowed. Risk of prosecution under the Safe Harbor,

378. See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65
Fed. Reg. 45, 665-686 (Dept. Commerce, July 24, 2000) (Safe Harbor). The decision to enter into
the Safe Harbor is voluntary, but once made the company must (1) publicly declare its participation,
(2) annually certify to the Department of Commerce that it is complying, and (3) provide notice to its
customers that it adheres to the Safe Harbor. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview,
available at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh-overview.html (last visited January 30, 2003).
379. The Safe Harbor procedure and a list of companies that have agreed to adhere to the Safe
Harbor Principles can be found at www.export.gov/safeharbor/ (last visited January 30, 2003).
380. Reidenberg, supranote 134, at 738.
381. See Letter from David L. Aaron, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, to Industry Representatives (Nov.
4, 1998), availableat http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/ecom/aaron 114.html.
382. Id.
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either by consumers or the FTC, may be higher than the risk of
33
prosecution by EU authorities.
There are legal and practical problems with the Safe Harbor
agreement, however, that may limit its effectiveness as a standard for
data collection and widespread use in the United States. First, some
European Member States have expressed concerns about the adequacy of
the agreement. 34 To the extent national privacy authorities find its data
protection provisions inadequate, they can influence the way American
businesses deal with information of European origin through threatened
prosecution of American businesses.385 Second, the Safe Harbor
agreement relies largely on the authority of the FTC to ensure
compliance, but the jurisdiction of the FTC and it ability, as practical
matter, to fill this role are questionable. Amendments to section 5 of the
FTC Act in 1975 extended the jurisdiction of the FTC to unfair or
deceptive acts and practices "in or affecting commerce, 386 but there is no
evidence that Congress contemplated protecting foreign consumers or
American businesses from foreign prosecution. Its purpose was to
extend the jurisdiction of the FTC to protect American consumers from a
broader range of unfair or deceptive practices by businesses. The claim
that Safe Harbor comes within section 5 of the FTC Act is a departure
from the purposes of the statute and could be subject to legal
challenge.387

383. See Lillian Blageff, Review and Update on Data Protection and E-Commerce Issues, CORP.
COUNSEL INT'L ADVISOR 192-97 (May 1, 2001).
384. Reidenberg, supra note 134, at 744. For many Member States, Safe Harbor weakens their
data protection standards. It exempts public record information and any information processing
called for by "conflicting obligations" or "explicit authorizations" in U.S. law. These vague
authorizations could turn into large loopholes for U.S. businesses who claim they cannot comply
with European standards because of some other agreement or U.S. law that imposes different
demands. The Safe Harbor agreement also weakens European standards for redress. Under the EU
Directive, victims must be afforded legal recourse and a remedy in damages. The Department of
Commerce assured the European Commission that Safe Harbor and the U.S. legal system provided
for remedies for individual European victims of Safe Harbor violations. In support of its claim that
U.S. law provided adequate remedies for information privacy violations, the Department of
Commerce made some misleading statements about the remedies available to aggrieved individuals.
In fact, few effective remedies for privacy violations exist. See id. at 744-45.
385. The directive states that national "supervisory authorities" have investigative powers and the
right to institute legal proceedings against violators of the privacy laws mandated in the directive.
EU Directive, art. 28(3).
386. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No.
93-637, § 201,88 Stat. 2183, 2193 (1975).
387. See Reidenberg, supra note 134, at 741.
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In addition, the Safe Harbor agreement vastly overstates the extent of
privacy protection offered by U.S. law, and in any event, it may not be
broad enough in scope to have a significant effect on U.S. information
policy.388 By its terms, it applies only to the activities of organizations
that fall within the regulatory jurisdiction of the FTC and the Department
of Transportation."' As a result, many economic sectors will not be able
to insulate themselves from EU challenges by committing to the
voluntary code. Among these sectors are the financial services and
telecommunications industries, which are excluded from FTC
jurisdiction.
IV. CONCLUSION
If information privacy were viewed more as a societal problem than
one of individual concern, privacy policy in the United States would not
necessarily change. The stakes might simply be too small. Data privacy,
while important to most people, is not generally regarded as an
absolutely critical societal value. Even the most ardent privacy advocates
would not put it in the same class as basic health and safety concerns. If
the risks are viewed as real but not particularly important, then the need
for a fundamental shift in policy or a strong regulatory response may be
lacking even if we view the problem as one of general societal concern.
Moreover, even in the regulation of societal problems like
environmental pollution, we often do not use a singular, comprehensive
approach. We have sectoral laws, such as water, air, noise, and laws
governing specific industries such as coal burning utilities, and policies
that reflect compromises reached in part by looking at the costs and
benefits of various alternatives. We do not expect absolutely clean air
and water. We should not expect to keep information about us absolutely
private. Tradeoffs are inevitable. Most of us do not want or expect to
keep our information completely private. We benefit from the collection
and sharing of information in many ways.
The question remains whether we will see a fundamental shift in the
way information privacy is controlled in the United States, or whether
our interests will continue to be bought, sold, and given away as freely as
they have been in recent years. I have argued in this article that privacy

388. See Robert R. Schriver, You Cheated, You Lied: The Safe Harbor Agreement and Its
Enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 2777, 2806-09 (2002).
389. Reidenberg, supra note 134, at 743.
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should be viewed as a societal value, and if it were understood in this
way, a more comprehensive regulatory approach like the one in place in
Europe and a growing number of other regions could emerge in the
United States. No legal impediments to a European-style regulatory
regime exist. 390 Commercial speech and speech on matters of purely
private concern enjoy less First Amendment protection than speech
related to political discourse.39' Congress has enacted privacy legislation
many times before with few constitutional conflicts, and it could
rationally conclude that personal information about its citizens warrants
more protective legislation than currently exists.
The obstacles to a more comprehensive approach to information
privacy are rooted not in our laws but in our view of the appropriate
function of government and the role of the private sector in ordering
societal relationships. Legalities aside, our long history of general
distrust in government solutions, coupled with our preference for open
information flows and reliance upon market forces, make a
comprehensive regulatory approach less likely as a practical and political
reality.392
Given the political history of the privacy debate in this country, no
significant shift in U.S. policy seems likely to occur until some crisis or
highly publicized event forces us to look at the issue from a new
perspective. Indeed, in the current political climate, efforts to press a
fundamental shift in policy appear to be losing momentum. With the
Chairman of the FTC coming out strongly against new privacy
legislation, the prospect for instrumental change seems even more

390. See Volokh, supra note 122, at 1055 (opposing information privacy rules on free speech
grounds, but conceding that First Amendment limitations on nongovernmental gathering of
information are unclear); Krotoszinski, supranote 56, at 242 ("[T]he states or Congress could enact
privacy-protection laws that limit the legal means of obtaining information about non-public figures
involving matters that are not of public concern."). But see Cate, supra note 122 (the U.S.
Constitution does impose restrictions on privacy legislation addressed to the private sector). Some
courts have struck down state privacy laws under the Commerce Clause. See authorities cited supra
note 208.
391. See Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985).
392. See Cate, supra note 122, at 219-25 (observing "four features of American society" that
work against an EU style of privacy protection); BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS CONCERNING THE AVAILABILITY OF CONSUMER IDENTIFYING

INFORMATION AND FINANCIAL FRAUD (March 1997) at 2 ("it is the freedom to speak, supported by
the availability of information and the free-flow of data, that is the cornerstone of a democratic
society... ").
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remote.393 Without a sense of urgency, special interest politics and a
general anti-regulatory sentiment will likely dominate political discourse
in the United States on this issue for the foreseeable future.394
A change in perception can occur over time, however. If people start
thinking about privacy as a general societal concern, the rhetoric of
public debate can shift and the range of politically acceptable policy
resolutions can expand. If no change occurs, we can expect to see more
laws enacted periodically that purport to address privacy concerns in
particular sectors, but individuals will still be expected to shoulder the
burden of monitoring their own information, and market-based solutions
will predominate.395 So long as information privacy is viewed largely as a
matter of individual concern, individuals will be asked to carry the lion's
share of the burden. In time, we may get better at the task, especially as
younger generations become more comfortable with the technologies that
control the flow of our data. For now, we have little choice but to hope,
wait and trust that the data collectors who are holding our personal
information are guarding it securely and using it only for purposes we
would prefer.

393. See supra notes 301-04 and accompanying text; Remarks of FTC Chairman Timothy J.
Muris, supra note 304 (calling for increased enforcement of current laws rather than new
legislation).
394. See Schriver, supra note 388, at n.189 (observing that most privacy legislation has been
enacted in response to public scandals, thus explaining its patchwork quality).
395. In the past two years, dozens of privacy bills have been introduced in Congress. See supra
note 300 and the website for the Electronic Privacy Information Center, available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/billtrack.htm (last visited, Jan. 20, 2003).
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